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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
vs. 
JOHN WALL and 
NANCY WALL, his wife, 
Defendants/Appellees 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is being brought pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, which provides, in part, that an appeal may be taken from a 
district court to the appellate court from all final orders and judgments. Appeal is 
being brought pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which 
provide in part that the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the Clerk 
of the trial Court within thirty days after the judgment or order appealed therefrom is 
entered. 
Jurisdiction is further based upon Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended §78-2-2 which grants this Court appellate jurisdiction over appeals from 
judgments of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction is further pursuant to the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, Rule 4-504, Written Orders, Judgments and Decrees, which provides 
that upon entry of judgment notice of the judgment shall be served upon the opposing 
Case No. 960362-CA 
940905590CN 
party and proof of the service shall be filed wi th the Court. Proof of service was 
provided on April 3, 1996. 
The Order and Final Judgment of Judge Glenn Iwasaki was duly entered 
by the District Court of the Third Judicial District, for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
on March 8, 1996, and the notice of appeal was filed by Bear River Mutual Insurance 
Company (hereinafter "Bear River") as Appellant on the 3rd day of Apri l , 1996. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Appellant in this case is raising three issues: 
ISSUE NO. I. 
The District Court erred in determining that the general release of all 
future claims, causes of action and damages executed by Bear River's 
insureds, John and Nancy Wall, to their tortfeasor, Lana Waters, and the 
tortfeasor's insurance carrier, 18 months after the accident did not 
release Bear River from continuing to make payments pursuant to the 
personal injury protection statute, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended §31a-22 306. 
Standard of Appellate Review and Supporting Authority: This Court, in 
the case of State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, (Utah 1994), and the case of Landes v. 
Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990), ruled that pursuant to an order and 
final judgment on a summary judgment proceeding, the standard is "correctness;" 
meaning that the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer to 
any degree to the trial court 's determination of the law. This is because the 
Appellate's Court has traditionally been seen as the power and duty to say what the 
law is and to assure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction. 
Citation to Record Showing Preservation of Issue: The Complaint of 
Plaintiff, paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19. [Record on Appeal, ("ROA"), pgs.5-6]; 
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the prayer of the First Cause of Act ion, [ROA pg.9] Motion and Memorandum for 
summary judgment [ROA pgs.80-103]. 
ISSUE NO. II. 
The Court erred in determining that the general release of all Future 
claims, causes of action and damages executed by Bear River's 
Insureds, John and Nancy Wall, to their tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's 
insurance carrier did not destroy Bear River's right in arbitration 
proceedings between the insurance carriers for the respective parties for 
reimbursement for their no-fault benefits paid pursuant to UCA §31 a-22-
307. 
Standard of Appellate Review and Supporting Authority: This Court 
upheld [ROA pgs. ] that the case of State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, (Utah 1994), and 
the case of Landes v. Capital Citv Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990), ruled that 
pursuant to an order and final judgment on a summary judgment proceeding, the 
standard is "correctness/ ' meaning that the appellate court decides the matter for 
itself and does not defer to any degree to the trial court 's determination of the law. 
This is because the Appellate's Court has traditionally been seen as the power and 
duty to say what the law is and to assure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction. 
Citation showing the preservation: Complaint of Plaintiff paragraphs 20, 
2 1 , 22, 23, 24, [ROA, pgs.6-8] and the prayer of the Second Cause of Act ion, 
paragraph 3 [ROA pg.9] 
ISSUE NO. III. 
The Court erred in determining pursuant to Bear River's policy that the 
Walls have not contractually waived or extinguished their right for future 
personal injury protection benefits by executing their general release of 
March 4, 1994. 
Standard of Appellate Review and Supporting Authority: This Court 
upheld [ROA pgs. ] that the case of State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, (Utah 1994), and 
the case of Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990), ruled that 
pursuant to an order and final judgment on a summary judgment proceeding, the 
standard is "correctness;" meaning that the appellate court decides the matter for 
itself and does not defer to any degree to the trial court 's determination of the law. 
This is because the Appellate's Court has traditionally been seen as the power and 
duty to say what the law is and to assure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction. 
Citation showing the preservation: Complaint of Plaintiff paragraphs 5, 
[ROA, pg.3] . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES 
The Appellant believes that the determinative statutes in resolving this 
case are in Utah Code Annotated, as fol lows: 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-306 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-307 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-308 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-309 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(d) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case: 
This action was commenced by Bear River Mutual on August 3 1 , 1 9 9 4 , 
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
for a declaratory judgment pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, §78-
3 3 - 1 , 1953, as amended, seeking a determination of the contractual rights of Bear 
River pursuant to its insurance policy issued to John Wall and Nancy Wall, his wi fe, 
(hereinafter "the Walls"). Bear River asked the trial court to determine whether Bear 
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River was under a duty to continue making personal injury protection benefit payments 
to the Walls arising out of an accident on August 7, 1992, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, §31A-22-306 through 309, 1953, as amended, providing for personal 
injury protection payments after an accident. 
Some 18 months after the accident, after Bear River Mutual had paid PIP 
benefits, on March 4, 1994, the Walls entered into a general release with the 
tortfeasor, Lana Waters, and her insurance carrier, and releasing the tortfeasor from 
all actions, claims and demands known, developed or undeveloped, arising out of the 
accident of August 7, 1992. Bear River has never claimed, and does not now claim, 
that it is subrogated to any of the proceeds of the Walls' settlement. There is no 
question that the settlement was within the insurance policy limits of Lana Waters. 
[ROA, pg.539] 
The sole issue is whether Bear River is under a duty to continue making 
PIP benefit payments after the Walls signed a general release with the tortfeasor and 
her insurance carrier. Specifically, Bear River alleges as follows: 
1 . On or about June 5, 1992, and continuing through June 5, 1993, 
Plaintiff had issued its standard automobile Policy No. C145077, to John Wall 
and Nancy Wall, his wife. [ROA, pgs.11-32] 
2. On or about August 6, 1992, the Plaintiffs insured, Nancy Wall, 
was driving her vehicle in Cortez, Colorado, was struck by a vehicle driven by 
Lana D. Waters, who it is alleged, failed to yield the right-of-way at a stop sign. 
As a direct, proximate result of the collision, Bear River's insured, Nancy Wall, 
suffered personal injuries which required medical attention and medical 
services, 
3. Bear River faithfully paid the medical benefits from August 6, 
1992, the date of the accident, until it received notice on March 4 , 1994, some 
18 months later, that the Walls had settled wi th the tortfeasor, Lana Waters, 
and her insurance company, and with the assistance of their attorney, they 
issued a full general release without reservations for $16,000.00 for "any and 
all actions, claims, and demands whatsoever which claimants now have or may 
have, whether known or unknown, developed, or undeveloped, on account of 
or arising out of the accident, casualty or event which happened on or about 
the 7th day of August, 1992." 
4 . It was Bear River's position that by John and Nancy Wall executing 
a general release wi th the tortfeasor's insurance carrier for all future actions, 
claims and demands, were in lieu of any future PIP benefits required to be paid 
by Bear River. The Walls demanded a continuation of PIP benefits. When the 
issue arose Bear River asked the Court for a declaratory judgment for a 
determination of its contractual rights pursuant to its policy and the provisions 
of the Utah Insurance Code, Utah Code Annotated, §31A-22-306 through 309, 
1953, as amended. This was done pursuant to the general policy, as explained 
by the Utah Supreme Court in Western Casualty and Surety Co. v. Marchant, 
615 P.2d 423 (Utah 1980): 
"It would not comport wi th our ideas of either law or justice to 
prevent any party who entertains bona fide questions about his 
legal obligations from seeking adjudication thereon in the courts." 
5. Bear River alleged that their statutory right of subrogation in 
arbitration with the Lana Waters' insurance company, Hawkeye Insurance Co., 
had been extinguished by executing the general release. Utah Code Annotated, 
§31A-22-309(6), 1953, as amended. 
6. Bear River alleges that by the Walls executing the general release, 
waived and extinguished their right to receive future PIP benefit payments 
pursuant to the terms and conditions of their insurance policy. 
7. The Walls filed an answer to the complaint denying that their 
release had extinguished Bear River's right to statutory arbitration, or that they 
had been paid in full pursuant to the release; and had chosen their right of 
action. [ROA, pgs.59-74] 
8. The Walls thereafter filed a donnybrook of pleadings alleging bad 
faith, and that Bear River did not have the right to seek a declaratory judgment 
and a determination of their rights under the policy. [ROA, pgs.80-522] 
9. Bear River's motion for declaratory judgment for interpretation of 
its contract was heard before Judge Glenn Iwasaki on the 24th day of August, 
1995, who ruled that under the case of Allstate v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197, 1202-
03 (Utah 1980), the issue of arbitration was mandatory between the insurance 
carriers that Nancy Wall was entitled to continued payments for PIP benefits 
after the signing of the full release. Judgment was signed on the 8th day of 
March, 1996, [ROA, pgs.534] which provided: 
a. That the Defendants, John and Nancy Wall's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted and Plaintiff is required to pay to John 
and Nancy Wall, pursuant to the provisions of its policy, Part B, Personal 
Injury Protection, those benefits since the time of the release signed by 
Defendants on March 4, 1994, pursuant to the terms and conditions of 
the policy. 
b. That Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for 
Summary Judgment is denied. 
c. That the counterclaim filed by Defendants, John Wall and 
Nancy Wall, is hereby dismissed, and the Defendants' request to file an 
amended counterclaim is denied. 
10. The Court ruled that Bear River's action was commenced in good 
faith wi th debatable issues and dismissed the myriad of pro-se motions, 
counterclaims, proposed counterclaims, motions to file counterclaims, for bad 
faith and breach of contract. [ROA, pg.434] No appeal has been taken from 
that portion of the judgment by cross appeal pursuant to the provisions of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(d) by the Walls. 
1 1 . Bear River then perfected its appeal from the final Order and 
Judgment on April 3, 1996, and filed a cost bond on appeal on that same date, 
alleging that the Trial Court was clearly in error in misinterpreting the Allstate 
v. Ivie case and the previous authorities of Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 
559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977), Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 592 P.2d 609 
(Utah 1979), 
b. Essential Course of Proceedings: 
1. Bear River filed a Complaint for declaratory judgment on August 
3 1 , 1994, in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and commenced its action for a declaratory judgment, 
as set forth in the issues, requesting for a declaratory judgment. [ROA pgs.1-
34] The Walls filed an Answer and Counterclaim on November 17, 1994, 
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denying the allegations of the Complaint alleging that Bear River had a duty to 
continue to pay PIP benefits and pursuant to Allstate v. Ivie. that Bear River 
was under an obligation to make payments. The Walls then asked the Court 
to award them summary judgment pursuant to their counterclaim that Bear 
River was under a duty to continue to make PIP benefit payments. [ROA, 
pgs.59-74] 
2. Thereafter, on February 16, 1994, Bear River filed a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings or in lieu thereof, summary judgment. [ROA, 
pgs.82-83] 
3. On December 16, 1994, Bear River filed its memorandum in 
support of the motion for summary judgment and memorandum in opposition. 
[ROA, pgs.84-106] 
4. On December 13, 1994, the Defendants filed a pro se motion for 
summary judgment [ROA pgs.75-79]; and on December 28, 1994, they filed 
their memorandum in support of the defendants' motion for summary judgment 
[ROA, pgs. 106-110] 
5. Thereafter the Defendants on December 30, 1994, filed a Demand 
for Exemplary and Punitive Damages in Addition to General Damages and 
Restitution. [ROA, pgs. 111-112] 
6. On June 19, 1995, Defendants filed a Motion to Amend 
Defendants' Counterclaim Pursuant to Rule 15, URCP Amended and 
Supplemental Pleadings, to include a complaint for prosecution, damages, 
restitution, communications fraud. [ROA, pgs. 266-268] 
7. On August 24, 1995, pursuant to an oral hearing between the 
parties the Honorable Glenn Iwasaki presiding, the Court ruled that pursuant to 
Allstate v. Ivie, that Bear River was required to continue to pay the PIP benefits 
to John and Nancy Wall even though they had signed a release on March 4 , 
1994. [ROA, pg.406] 
8. The Defendants then filed numerous motions for reconsideration, 
[ROA, pgs.512-517] , motions for reconsideration of the reconsideration, 
9. On December 5, 1995, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss 
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Defendants Motion for 
Reconsideration. [ROA, pgs.489-501] 
The Court denied the respective motions of the Walls on January 10, 
1996, [ROA, pgs.524-526]. On March 8, 1996, the Order and Final Judgment was 
entered by the above court. [ROA, pgs.529-535] 
c. Disposition by the Court: 
The foregoing statement of the Course of the Proceedings outlines all of 
the material procedures and judicial facts in this case. The Court entered its Order and 
Judgment on March 8, 1996, which stated as fol lows: 
1. That the Defendants, John and Nancy Wall 's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted and Plaintiff is required to pay to John 
and Nancy Wall, pursuant to the provisions of its policy, Part B, Personal 
Injury Protection, those benefits since the time of the release signed by 
Defendants on March 4, 1994, pursuant to the terms and conditions of 
the policy. 
2. That Plaint i f fs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for 
Summary Judgment is denied. 
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3. That the counterclaim filed by Defendants, John Wall and 
Nancy Wall, is hereby dismissed, and the Defendants' request to file an 
amended counterclaim is denied. 
The Walls have not filed a cross appeal on the issue of the dismissal of 
their Counterclaims pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Final Order and Judgment, 
[ROA, pgs.529-535] as to the issue of Bear River's good faith in commencing 
the declaratory action, and, therefore, this will not be addressed in this brief 
because the matter is moot pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 
4(d) providing for the timely filing of cross claims on appeal. 
d. Statement of Relevant Facts: 
1. The Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, (hereinafter 
"Bear River") is an insurance corporation engaged in the insurance business in 
the state of Utah, is a non-profit corporation and is owned entirely by its 
policyholders for the use and benefit of the policyholders, having its principal 
place of business at 545 East Third South, Salt Lake City, Utah. [ROA, pg.1] 
2. Defendants, John Wall and Nancy Wall, his wife, are residents of 
Davis County, State of Utah, and reside at P.O. Box 540118, No. Salt Lake, 
Utah 84054. [ROA, pg.1] 
3. Bear River commenced its action pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended §78-33-1, et.seq. seeking by determination the 
rights under a policy issued by Plaintiff, Policy No. C145077. [ROA, pgs. 1-3] 
4. On or about June 5, 1992, and continuing through June 5, 1993, 
Plaintiff had issued its standard automobile Policy No. C145077, to John Wall 
and Nancy Wall, his wife. [ROA, pgs. 11-32] 
5. That the auto policy issued to Defendants, provides under PART 
B - PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE, Insuring Agreement, as 
fol lows: 
"The Company will pay personal injury protection benefits that are 
reasonable and necessary to or on behalf of each eligible injured person 
for: 
(a) medical expenses 
(b) work loss 
(c) funeral expenses 
(d) survivor loss and 
(e) special damages 
with respect to bodily injury sustained by an eligible insured person 
caused by an accident involving the use of a motor vehicle as a motor 
vehicle. 
Medical Payments: 
The maximum amount payable for medical expenses shall not exceed 
$3,000.00; unless additional medical protection or payments are 
provided for on the Declaration page, they must be incurred within three 
years of the date of the accident to be payable. 
6. Utah Code Annotated, §31A-22-308, 1953, as amended, provides 
for payment of PIP benefits anywhere in the United States as fol lows: 
"The fol lowing may receive benefits under personal injury protection 
coverage: 
(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident involving 
any motor vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in 
this state, the United States, its territories or possessions, or 
Canada, except where the injury is the result of the use or 
operation of the named insured's own motor vehicle not actually 
insured under the policy;" 
7. Bear River's policy provides under PART B - PERSONAL INJURY 
PROTECTION COVERAGE, Insuring Agreement. [ROA, pg.20] as fol lows: 
"Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and Conditions of Other 
Insurance Under our Personal Injury Protection 
1. No eligible injured person shall recover or receive duplicate benefits 
for the same elements of loss under this or any similar insurance." 
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8. Under PART G - GENERAL PROVISIONS, APPLYING TO ALL 
COVERAGES, Subrogation, [ROA, pg.30] it provides: 
"In the event of any payment to any person under all coverages: 
1. The Company is subrogated to the rights of the person to whom or for 
whose benefit such payments were made, to the extent of such 
payments, and such person must execute and deliver instruments and 
papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such rights. Such 
person shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights. 
a. If the Insured proceeds or commences an action against a legally 
responsible third party, the Company shall be entitled to the extent 
of such payment to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment 
that may result from the exercise of any rights of recovery of such 
person against any person or organization legally responsible for 
the bodily injury or property damage because of which such 
payment is made and the Company shall have a lien to the extent 
of such payment, notice of which may be given to the person or 
organization causing such bodily injury, his agent, his insurer or a 
court having jurisdiction in the matter; such person shall hold in 
trust for the benefit of the Company all rights of recovery which 
he shall have against such other person or organization because of 
such bodily injury." 
9. On August 6, 1992, the Plaintiffs insured, Nancy Wall, was driving her 
vehicle in the State of Colorado, when Lana D. Waters failed to yield the right-of-
way at a stop sign and ran her vehicle into the vehicle being driven by Nancy 
Wall. As a direct, proximate result of the collision, the Plaintiffs insured suffered 
personal injuries which required medical attention and medical services. Bear 
River Mutual faithfully paid all of the medical expenses of Nancy Wall through 
March 4, 1994. [ROA, pg.5] 
10. On March 4, 1994, Nancy Wall, John Wall and their attorney, executed 
a release to the tortfeasor, Lana Waters, and her insurance carrier of "any and all 
actions, claims, and demands whatsoever which claimants now have or may 
have, whether known or unknown, developed, or undeveloped, on account of or 
arising out of the accident, casualty or event which happened on or about the 7th 
day of August 1992." [ROA, pg.33] 
1 1 . The sole issue is whether Bear River contractually, and pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated, §31A-22-306, 1953, as amended, providing 
for personal injury protection benefits is under a duty to continue to make PIP 
payments to the Walls after the release on March 4, 1994. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Bear River will argue and support the following essential errors that they 
believe were committed by the Trial Court in determining their pending action against 
the Walls. 
1 . The District Court erred in determining that the general release of all 
future claims, causes of action and damages executed by Bear River's 
insureds, John and Nancy Wall, to their tortfeasor, Lana Waters, and the 
tortfeasor's insurance carrier, 18 months after the accident did not 
release Bear River from continuing to make payments pursuant to the 
personal injury protection statute, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended §31a-22-306. 
2. The Court erred in determining that the general release of all Future 
claims, causes of action and damages executed by Bear River's Insureds, 
John and Nancy Wall, to their tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's insurance 
carrier did not destroy Bear River's right in arbitration proceedings 
between the insurance carriers for the respective parties for 
reimbursement for their no-fault benefits paid pursuant to UCA §31 a-22-
307. 
3. The Court erred in determining pursuant to Bear River's policy that the 
Walls have not contractually waived or extinguished their right for future 
personal injury protection benefits by executing their general release of 
March 4, 1994. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE GENERAL 
RELEASE OF ALL FUTURE CLAIMS, CAUSES OF ACTION AND 
DAMAGES EXECUTED BY BEAR RIVER'S INSUREDS, JOHN AND 
NANCY WALL, TO THEIR TORTFEASOR, LANA WATERS, AND THE 
TORTFEASOR'S INSURANCE CARRIER, 18 MONTHS AFTER THE 
ACCIDENT DID NOT RELEASE BEAR RIVER FROM CONTINUING TO 
MAKE PAYMENTS PURSUANT TO THE PERSONAL INJURY 
PROTECTION STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS 
AMENDED §31A-22 306. 
So that the issue is clear, Bear River Mutual, from the time of the 
accident on August 7, 1992, in Colorado, involving the Walls and Lana Waters, Bear 
River paid PIP benefits to the Walls pursuant to the provisions of its insurance policy 
[ROA, pgs. 10-32] and pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §31A-22-306, 308 and 309, 
1953, as amended. 
Bear River Mutual is not attempting to recover or claim any interest in 
Walls' settlement wi th Lana D. Waters and her insurance carrier and their settlement. 
[ROA, pg.33] The settlement was within the insurance policy limits of the Waters' 
insurance policy. [ROA, pg.533] 
These are not issues in this appeal; neither were they issues in the trial 
court. 
Bear River's obligation to pay PIP benefits outside of the State of Utah 
is governed by Utah Statutes, Utah Code Annotated, §31A-22-308(1), 1953, as 
amended, which provides as fol lows: 
"The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection 
coverage: 
(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident involving 
any motor vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in 
this state, the United States, its territories or possessions, or 
Canada, except where the injury is the result of the use or 
operation of the named insured's own motor vehicle not actually 
insured under the policy;" 
Therefore, the duty to pay PIP benefits to the Walls is governed by Utah Law and 
pursuant to the Utah Statutes, even though the accident may have occurred in 
Colorado. The Utah No-fault Act has now been in effect in Utah since 1973. As 
stated in the original enactment in Chapter 55, SLU 1973: 
" . . . to effectuate a more efficient, equitable method of handling 
the greater bulk of the personal injury claims that arise out of automobile 
accidents . . ." 
The Act (Utah Code Annotated, §31-41-2, 1953, as amended,) further 
provided that the purpose of the Act was to stabilize not effect certain savings in the 
rising costs of automobile insurance. Consistent with those particular provisions, is 
now enacted in Utah Code Annotated, §31A-22-307, 1953, as amended. The 
concept that there was not, at any time, to be a double payment, is reinforced by the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated, §31A-22-306, 1953, as amended, and §31A-22-
309(3), provides that the benefits are reduced by workman's compensation, and 
amounts received by the United States and its agencies. 
The Walls now assert that the release that they entered into is not 
binding, that they are seeking additional medical PIP benefits from Bear River Mutual 
Insurance Company after the release of March 4, 1994. [ROA, pg.33] The Walls, on 
the 4th day of March, 1994, with full representation by counsel, and with full 
negotiation with the tort feasor, Lana Waters and David Waters dba D & L 
Construction Co., and insurance carrier, solemnly entered into a release agreement 
with the tort feasors for the sum of $16,000.00. [ROA, pgs.33] The release is clear, 
unambiguous and does not provide for any reservations and provides as follows: 
"John Wall and Nancy Wall . . . for and in consideration of the sum of 
Sixteen Thousand and no/100s Dollars ($16,000.00) the receipt of which is 
hereby acknowledged, do we hereby REMISE, RELEASE AND FOREVER 
DISCHARGE David Waters d/b/a D & L Construction and Lana Waters, their 
agents, and servants and all other persons, firms, and corporations 
whomsoever of and from any and all actions, claims, and demands 
whatsoever which claimants now have or may have, whether known or 
unknown, developed or undeveloped, on account of or arising out of the 
accident, casualty or event which happened on or about the 7th day of 
August, 1992." 
The release further provides: 
"As a further consideration for said Sum Claimants warrant . . . are 
relying solely upon their own judgment; that the above mentioned sum is 
received by claimants in full settlement and satisfaction of all the aforesaid 
claims and demands whatsoever; . . . and that before signing and sealing this 
Release, Claimants have fully informed themselves of its contents and 
meaning and have executed it with full knowledge thereof."(emphasis added) 
The Walls in this matter not only executed a full release, from all claims 
and demands which they now have, but also "whether known or unknown, 
developed or undeveloped, on account of or arising out of the accident" and that they 
fully understood the contents and meaning of the release before they signed it. There 
is not a scintilla of any reservation in the release, other than a full and complete 
release of all claims past, present and future, both for medical expenses, general 
damages, pain and suffering and further that they have relied upon their own judgment 
and in this case with the representation and assistance of counsel. 
The Walls have asserted that (1) the plain language of the document is 
not plain, (2) that the plain meaning is not what is states, and (3) the contents are not 
what they say they are. They seek and desire an open-end medical expense fund 
against Bear River Mutual Insurance Company arising out of this accident. Bear River 
Mutual Insurance Company has paid for the medical expenses, loss of wages and all 
expenses prior to the signing of the Walls' release on March 4, 1994. What the Walls 
are now attempting to do is to seek double recovery. They acknowledged payment 
in full in the release they signed and now they seek to recover once again and 
continue the matter against Bear River Mutual Insurance Company. 
They plainly cannot do this. This conduct on the part of Defendants, and 
the course of action taken by them, is not novel or new, but has been handled in two 
or three landmark cases from the Supreme Court of Utah. 
Under the Utah PIP statute, in the case Jamison v. Utah Home Fire 
Insurance Company, 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977) the parents of a 12-year old boy 
brought action against a truck driver's insurer to recover on the basis of no-fault 
insurance for the boy's loss of household chores at the rate of $12 per day as 
provided in the PIP package, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
§31A-41 -7 , in 1977. The Supreme Court said obviously a 12-year old boy would not 
have incurred those types of expenses in any event as a result of an accident. The 
court stated the general overall purpose of the Utah PIP statute, as fol lows: 
"However much we may desire it to be otherwise, this fact might as well 
be accepted as inescapable: that insurance is a business, not a philanthropy. 
There can be no free gifts or benefactions. In the long run premiums must 
pay for losses; and therefore, increases in premiums must and will be 
correlated to the extent of the coverage. Otherwise, the business cannot 
continue to operate. Someone has to pay the increased premiums. That 
someone is the policyholders, i.e., the public. Accordingly, a seeming 
generosity in broadening coverage in an individual situation, would be no favor 
to policyholders generally, nor to the public. 
. . . it becomes plain that the Act, both in its statement of general 
purpose, and its specific provisions, was not intended to provide an automatic 
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reward or a 'windfall/ for being involved in an accident by requiring payment 
when there was no loss actually suffered, nor for any expense not reasonably 
to be incurred, but should be construed in conformity with the fundamental 
principle of insurance law, that the purpose of insurance is to indemnify for 
losses or damages suffered, as contrasted to gambling for a munificent reward 
if a loss occurs." (emphasis added) 
The Jamison case stands for the proposition that the Utah PIP statute 
was never intended to be for the purpose of a windfall or to give a person money that 
they would not have otherwise received as a magnificent reward if a loss occurs. 
The next case is Jones v. Transamerica Insurance Company, 592 P.2d 
609 (Utah 1979), which is identical to the case that we now have. In the Jones case, 
as in this case, the Plaintiff, Elmer G. Jones, executed a general release wi thout any 
reservations. After entering into the release, he then decided to go back to the 
insurance company for additional PIP benefits. Chief Justice Hall stated: 
" . . . The whole tenor of the Act is that an injured person will not be 
permitted to recover from an insurance carrier (over and above what the 
carrier has previously paid in benefits) once he has successfully recovered 
from his tortfeasor for personal injuries. Any other interpretation would be to 
permit double damage recovery, (emphasis added) 
The Act mandates that every resident owner of a registered motor vehicle 
maintain either insurance or other approved security thereon. It is designed 
to totally eliminate claims for injuries of lesser consequence which fail to meet 
a basic 'threshold' test set forth in the statute and provides for the payment 
of benefits by one's own insurer without regard to fault. 
No-fault benefits are also available to those who sustain greater injuries. 
This is so even though they remain free to pursue a tort claim as well. 
However, this does not entitle one to a double recovery for a single loss since 
the statute specifically affords subrogation rights and arbitration between 
insurers whenever no-fault benefits are paid. 
A fortiori, the legislative intent specifically expressed in the Act itself to 
'possibly stabilizer if not effectuate certain savings in, the rising costs of 
automobile accident insurance and to effectuate a more efficient, equitable 
method of handling the greater bulk of the personal injury claims that arise out 
of automobile accidents' negatives the contention that double recovery is 
permitted. Double recovery for a single item of loss was never contemplated 
by the legislature and we will not permit any type of automatic reward of 
'windfall' to an injured plaintiff. 
. . . Indeed, the Act was never intended to give an injured plaintiff a 
windfall or extra income as a benefit for having had an accident. 
. . . This agreement expressly releases plaintiff's claim against the 
tortfeasors for known and unknown personal injuries as well as for property 
damage arising from the accident. As indicated supra, defendant insurer is 
subrogated to the rights of plaintiff in asserting a claim against the tortfeasors7 
insurers in recovering benefits based upon liability. The rights to which the 
subrogee succeeds can be no greater than those of the person for whom he 
is substituted. By executing the release, plaintiff discharged the tortfeasors 
of any and all liability, notwithstanding the attempted 'specific exclusion' 
relating to no-fault benefits. By so doing, plaintiff has chosen his recovery 
and cannot now successfully assert a claim against his insurer." (emphasis 
added) 
Based upon the Jones v. Transamerica case and the Jamison v. Utah 
Home Fire case, the final nutshell of the matter is that the Defendants have chosen 
their recovery and may not thereafter continue to receive PIP benefits. 
Although the principles enunciated in the Jamison v. Utah Home Fire case 
and the Jones v. Transamerica case were based upon subrogation by an insurer 
against the tortfeasor, which was subsequently reviewed and changed in Allstate v. 
Ivie, the principle involved on double recovery has never been changed. 
The basis concept of no double recovery is drafted through the entire 
tenure of the personal injury act, is drafted into every supreme court decision, to our 
knowledge that has reviewed the matter. 
The principle for the determination for subrogation may be different, but 
the principle application of the Jamison v. Utah Home Fire case and the Jones v. 
Transamerica case have not. The trial court plainly misinterpreted the Allstate v. Ivie 
case which we believe supports our position rather than detracting from it. 
The Court in Allstate v. Ivie, at 1202-03, made the determination that the 
right of action of an insurance company pursuant to subrogation for payments made 
on behalf of its insured, could not subrogate against the tortfeasor individually, but 
would be settled by binding arbitration with the tortfeasor's insurance carrier. This is 
pursuant to provisions for mandatory arbitration as provided for in Utah Code 
Annotated, §31 A-22-309(6), 1953, as amended. 
The principle of double recovery has never been changed and has not 
been overruled in any aspect. As Justice Stewart said in Allstate v. Ivie at pg.1203: 
" . . . On the other hand, the tortfeasor's liability insurer, in fulfilling 
its duty to respond to the claims of the injured party to the limits of its 
policy, stands int he shoes of its insured and pays on the basis of its 
insured's personal liability to the tort victim; this personal liability does not 
include PIP payments. Thus, the tort victim's recovery from the liability 
insurer cannot be reduced by the PIP payments. If the victim's recovery 
be reduced by the amount of the PIP payments by granting his no-fault 
insurer a right of subrogation, it is the no-fault insurer who receives double 
recovery." (emphasis added) 
The Allstate v. Ivie case stands for the proposition that PIP payments 
remain the arbitration responsibility of the respective parties' insurance carriers based 
upon their liability. It does not mean that if the Claimant or the insured settles with 
the tortfeasor, he can then continue to receive benefits. This would mean double 
recovery and a person could go on receiving benefits after a trial of the matter, which 
would necessarily include future medical expenses, loss of wages and the same items 
that are included in the PIP benefits, except loss of services. 
To demonstrate the basic principle of double recovery and that Allstate 
v. Ivie did not change the reasoning of Jamison v. Utah Home, or Jones v. 
Transamerica, a review of the case of Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P.2d 685 (Utah 1981), 
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Justice Stewart 's opinion, a few months after the Allstate v. Ivie case, supra, he 
stated as fol lows: 
"Several cases recently decided by this Court have dealt wi th the 
respective rights of an injured party, the tortfeasor, a no-fault insurer, and 
the tortfeasor's insurer. Street v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, Utah 609 P.2d 
1343 (1980); Allstate v. Ivie, Utah 606 P.2d 1197 (1980); Jones v. 
Transamerica Ins. Co., Utah, 592 P.2d 609 (1979). These cases are 
predicated upon the proposition that a basic principle of the No-Fault Act is 
to prevent double recovery by the no-fault insured." 
All of the subsequent cases, Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 P.2d 
417 (Utah 1981), Street v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 609 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1980), Laub 
v. South Central Utah Telephone Ass 'n, 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982), Guaranty Nat. 
Ins. Co. v. Morris, 611 P.2d 725 (Utah 1980), State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 
1994), Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990), Madsen v. Borthick. 
769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), have affirmed the proposition that the insurance 
settlement between the tortfeasor's insurance carrier and the claimant's insurance 
company has no claim on its insured's recovery. We do not dispute that at all. In the 
Wilde v. Mid-Century case, supra, the court again confirmed the principle that there 
can be no double recovery but distinguished the Jones v. Transamerica case, supra, 
upholding it, except for the claim for household services because they were not 
included in the litigation judgment by Wilde. 
In the Street v. Farmers case, supra, Justice Stewart stated: 
" . . . The right of subrogation, as explained in Ivie, is a right to be 
exercised in an arbitration proceeding between insurance companies of 
the respective parties to that double recovery can be avoided, 
unnecessary litigation made less likely, and the inherent conflicts 
between the insured and the insurer avoided." 
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Based upon the authority of the Street v. Farmers case, once the claimant 
settles with the tortfeasor, there is no further right to be exercised because the 
claimant's insurance company has no right to proceed against the tortfeasor's 
insurance company. 
POINT NO. II 
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE GENERAL RELEASE OF 
ALL FUTURE CLAIMS, CAUSES OF ACTION AND DAMAGES EXECUTED 
BY BEAR RIVER'S INSUREDS, JOHN AND NANCY WALL, ON MARCH 
4, 1994, TO THEIR TORTFEASOR AND THE TORTFEASOR'S 
INSURANCE CARRIER DID NOT DESTROY BEAR RIVER'S RIGHT IN 
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS BETWEEN THE INSURANCE CARRIERS 
FOR THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES FOR REIMBURSEMENT FOR THEIR NO-
FAULT BENEFITS PAID PURSUANT TO UCA §31A-22-307. 
The trial court basically failed to interpret the Allstate v. Ivie case, supra, 
correctly. Justice Stewart's wrote that opinion. He then explained in the Street v. 
Farmers case, supra, approximately one year later, the full parameters of what he was 
saying in the Allstate v. Ivie case. In the Street v. Farmers case, he stated as follows: 
''Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie, Utah, 606 P.2d 1197 (1980) is 
dispositive. It holds that the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act does not 
contemplate the granting of a right of subrogation to a no-fault insurer in 
an action by the no-fault insured against a third-party tortfeasor. The right 
of subrogation, as explained in Ivie. is a right to be exercised in an 
arbitration proceeding between insurance companies of the respective 
parties to that double recovery can be avoided, unnecessary litigation made 
less likely, and the inherent conflicts between the insured and the insurer 
avoided/' (emphasis added) 
The rationale of the case was that there was still "subrogation arising out 
of an automobile accident/' but the insurance carrier was not subrogated to the right 
of its insured against the tortfeasor; but the insurance company who pays PIP benefits 
is subrogated based upon the liability of its insured against the tortfeasor's insurance 
company. Otherwise, there would be double recovery. An examination of the error 
of the trial court can amply be demonstrated by an examination of Utah Code 
Annotated, §31 A-22-309(6), 1953, as amended, which says: 
"(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is 
subject to the fol lowing: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be 
held legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person 
to whom benefits required under personal injury protection have 
been paid by another insurer, including the Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of the person who would 
be held legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer for the 
payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages 
recoverable;" 
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its 
amount shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration 
between the insurers." 
A breakdown of the statute is quite simple. It says based upon "liability" 
the tortfeasor's insurance company shall reimburse the insured or the claimant's 
insurance company for any payments made pursuant to the PIP statute. The bottom 
line is liability. If there is no liability by the tortfeasor's insurance company, either 
because there is no liability based upon negligence arising out of an accident, or that 
the tortfeasor's insurance company has paid the claimant and obtained a full release, 
as we have in this matter, there can be no arbitration award because no liability exists. 
The Walls release provided for "Any and all actions, claims, and demands whatsoever 
which claimants now have or may have, whether known or unknown, developed or 
undeveloped, on account of or arising out the accident, casualty or event which 
happened on or about the 7th day of August, 1992." [ROA, pg.33] Therefore, once 
the settlement is made, and liability extinguished, the claimant's insurance company 
is under no duty to continue making PIP payments. 
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This is the exact principle involved in the Jones v. Transamerica case, 
supra, drafted by Justice Gordon Hall, and the language which is now applicable: 
" . . . This agreement expressly releases plaintiffs claim against the 
tortfeasors for known and unknown personal injuries as well as for 
property damage arising from the accident. As indicated supra, defendant 
insurer is subrogated to the rights of plaintiff in asserting a claim against 
the tortfeasors' insurers in recovering benefits based upon liability. The 
rights to which the subrogee succeeds can be no greater than those of the 
person for whom he is substituted. By executing the release, plaintiff 
discharged the tortfeasors of any and all liability, notwithstanding the 
attempted 'specific exclusion' relating to no-fault benefits. By so doing, 
plaintiff has chosen his recovery and cannot now successfully assert a 
claim against his insurer." (emphasis added) 
In this case the Walls have chosen their recovery and cannot now 
successfully assert a claim against Bear River. The liability of Bear River is no greater 
than that of the tortfeasor, Waters, and their insurance company. Waters and their 
insurance company have no liability to make any future payments, and therefore, there 
can be no compulsory arbitration for liability by Bear River for which none exists. 
POINT NO. HI 
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING PURSUANT TO BEAR RIVER'S 
POLICY THAT THE WALLS HAVE NOT CONTRACTUALLY WAIVED OR 
EXTINGUISHED THEIR RIGHT FOR FUTURE PERSONAL INJURY 
PROTECTION BENEFITS BY EXECUTING THEIR GENERAL RELEASE OF 
MARCH 4, 1994. 
Bear River Mutual's insurance policy, PART B, PERSONAL INJURY 
PROTECTION COVERAGE, provides the following language: 
"Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and Conditions of Other 
Insurance Under our Personal Injury Protection 
1. No eligible injured person shall recover or receive duplicate 
benefits for the same elements of loss under this or any similar 
insurance/' 
Dana OK. 
Bear River's policy, therefore, is clear contractually that an "eligible" 
person shall not be entitled to receive duplicate benefits. When Walls signed the 
general release as herein set forth, without any reservation, and acknowledged 
payment in full, they were not entitled under the policy issued by Bear River to a 
continuation of the PIP benefits. 
The following cases hold that an insurance policy is a contract between 
the insured and the insurer and is to be construed by the same rules as applied to 
ordinary contracts: Alf v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 850 P.2d 1272 
(Utah 1993); and Gee v. Utah State Retirement Board, 842 P.2d 919 (Utah App. 
1992). 
CONCLUSION 
1. Bear River Mutual believes that they have amply demonstrated to 
this Court that the trial court committed error in failing to construe the release of the 
Walls which is plain and unambiguous as a release of all claims, that by doing so, the 
Walls have chosen their recovery and cannot now successfully assert any claim 
against the insurer. 
2. That the general release signed by the Walls on March 4, 1994, 
has destroyed Bear River's right of subrogation against the Walls' tortfeasor and their 
insurance carrier. 
3. That Bear River's insurance contract provides for no double 
payment. 
Since the time of the passage of the personal injury protection statute in 
1973, and the first interpretation of the statute in the Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. 
Page 26 
Co. case, in 1977, to our knowledge all of the insurance companies have been basing 
their premiums and handling of claims in the same manner as Bear River has handled 
this particular claim, in that once the insured signs a full and complete settlement 
agreement with the tortfeasor and its insurance carrier, the insurance company is no 
longer under any obligation to make personal injury protection benefit payments to the 
insured. The basic premise from the commencement of the personal injury protection 
statute to the present has been against double recovery. If the insured can continue 
to receive personal injury protection benefits after a full release, then he in fact is 
receiving double recovery. 
This case should be remanded to the District Court for a judgment in 
favor of the Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, and against the Walls 
pursuant to the allegations of declaratory action. 
Dated this T day of August, 1996. 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB& JACKSON 
u /Thomas A. Duffin / 
Attorney for Appellant /y 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE ] 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN WALL and 
NANCY WALL, his wife, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. 940905590CN 
i Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Comes now the Plaintiff and for a cause of action alleges as follows: 
NATURE OF THE ACTION 
1. The Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, (hereinafter 
"Bear River") is an insurance corporation engaged in the insurance business in the 
state of Utah, is a non-profit corporation and is owned entirely by its policyholders for 
the use and benefit of the policyholders, having its prindpal place of business at 545 
East Third South, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. Defendants, John Wall and Nancy Wall, his wife, are residents of 
Davis County, State of Utah, and reside at 802 Montague, Bountiful, Utah 84010. 
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3. This action is brought pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended §78-33-1, et.seq. seeking by determination the rights of the parties hereto 
under a policy issued by Plaintiff, Policy No, C145077. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
4. On or about June 5, 1992, and continuing through June 5, 1993, 
Plaintiff had issued its standard automobile Policy No- C145077, to John Wall and 
Nancy Wall, his wife. A copy of the policy is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and a 
copy of the declaration page is attached hereto as Exhibit "B.n 
5. That the auto policy, Exhibit "A," issued to Defendants, provides 
under PART B - PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE, Insuring Agreement, 
as follows: 
T h e Company will pay personal injury protection benefits that are reasonable 
and necessary to or on behalf of each eligible injured person for: 
(a) medical expenses 
(b) work loss 
(c) funeral expenses 
(d) survivor loss and 
(e) special damages 
with respect to bodily injury sustained by an eligible insured person caused by 
an accident involving the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. 
Medical Payments: 
The maximum amount payable for medical expenses shall not exceed 
$3,000-00; unless additional medical protection or payments are provided for 
on the Declaration page, they must be incurred within three years of the date 
of the accident to be payable. 
Policy Period, Territory, Other Limits of Liability and Special Provisions 
This coverage applies only to accidents which occur during the policy period 
in the United States and Canada, except if an auto accident to which this 
policy applies occurs outside of Utah, (but is within the United States and 
Canada), our limits of liability under your policy for that accident are as follows: 
1 . If the state, (outside of Utah) or Canada, has: 
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a* a personal injury protection or similar law specifying limits higher 
than that in the declarations, your policy will provide the higher 
specified limit; 
Special Conditions if Law is Declared Invalid 
Tne premium for the policy is based on rates which have been established in 
reliance upon the limitations on the right to recover for damages imposed by 
the provisions of the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. In the event a 
court of competent jurisdiction declares or enters a judgment, the effect of 
which is to render the provisions of such act invalid or unenforceable in whole 
or in part the Company shall have the right to recompute the premium payable 
for the policy and the provisions of this endorsement shall be voidable or 
subject to amendment at the option of the Company. ^ 
Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and Conditions of Other 
Insurance Under our Personal Injury Protection 
1 . No eligible injured person shall recover or receive duplicate benefits for the 
same elements of loss under this or any similar insurance." 
6. Under PART G - GENERAL PROVISIONS, APPLYING TO ALL 
COVERAGES, Subrogation, it provides: 
wIn the event of any payment to any person under all coverages: 
1 • The Company is subrogated to the rights of the person to whom or for 
whose benefit such payments were made, to the extent of such 
payments, and such person must execute and deliver instruments and 
papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such rights. Such 
person shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights. 
a. If the Insured proceeds or commences an action against a legally 
responsible third party, the Company shall be entitled to the 
extent of such payment to the proceeds of any settlement or 
judgment that may result from the exercise of any rights of 
recovery of such person against any person or organization legally 
responsible for the bodily injury or property damage because of 
which such payment is made and the Company shall have a lien 
to the extent of such payment, notice of which may be given to 
the person or organization causing such bodily injury, his agent, 
his insurer or a court having jurisdiction in the matter; such 
person shall hold in trust for the benefit of the Company ail rights 
of recovery which he shall have against such other person or 
organization because of such bodily injury." 
7. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-308 provides: 
-4-
"The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection 
coverage: 
(1} the named insured, when injured in an accident involving any 
motor vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in this state, 
the United States, its territories or possessions, or Canada, except 
where the injury is the result of the use or operation of the named 
insured's own motor vehicle not actually insured under the policy;" 
8. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-309(6) 
provides: 
"(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is 
subject to the following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held 
legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom 
benefits required under personal injury protection have been paid by 
another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, 
the insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall 
reimburse the other insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the 
amount of damages recoverable;" 
9. On or about August 6, 1992, the Plaintiff's insured, Nancy Wall, 
was driving her vehicle carefully and prudently on Colorado State Highway 666 at 
Cortez, Colorado, at its intersection with County Road 5, when Lana D. Waters failed 
to yield the right-of-way at a stop sign and ran her vehicle into the vehicle being driven 
by Nancy Wall. As a direct, proximate result of the collision, the Plaintiff's insured 
suffered personal injuries which required medical attention and medical services. 
10. On September 23, 1992, Bear River Mutual's agent, George 
Sergakis, drafted a letter to Anthony Thurber, attorney for John & Nancy Wall, with 
the provision that he was on notice as to Bear River Mutual's subrogation rights and 
with the language: "/ am looking forward to working with you." 
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11. On July 8, 1993, Plaintiff's attorney sent to Defendant a copy of 
the letter notifying him of the subrogation rights of Bear River Mutual Insurance 
Company for the payment of medical benefits pursuant to the Utah Personal Injury 
Protection statute as herein set forth, placing them on notice as to Bear River Mutuai's 
subrogatable interest. 
12. On November 2,1993, Anthony Thurber drafted a letter to George 
Sergakis and Bear River Mutual Insurance Company indicating that they were fully 
apprised. 
13. On or about March 4, 1994, John Wail and Nancy Wall executed 
a release of "any and all actions, claims, and demands whatsoever which claimants 
now have or may have, whether known or unknown, developed, or undeveloped, on 
account of or arising out of die accident, casualty or event which happened on or 
about the 7th day of August, 1992.n A copy of the release is attached as Exhibit C. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(As to the Obligation of Bear River Mutual to pay 
PIP benefits to Defendants) 
14. The Defendants, on March 4, 1994, Exhibit C, executed a full 
release as to the tort feasor, Lana Waters, providing a release of nany and all actions, 
claims, and demands whatsoever which claimants now have or may have, whether 
known or unknown, developed, or undeveloped, on account of or arising out of the 
accident, casualty or event which happened on or about the 7th day of August, 
1992." 
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15. Bear River Mutuai's policy provides under PART B - Non-
Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and Conditions of Other Insurance Under our 
Personal Iniurv Protection: 
" 1 . No eligible injured person shall recover or receive duplicate 
benefits for the same elements of loss under this or any similar 
insurance." 
16. That the Defendants have accepted $16,000.00 from the tort 
feasor as additional recovery in lieu of further insurance benefits, to which they may 
have been entitled. The agreement expressly releases the tort feasors from all known 
or unknown personal injuries, as well as for property damage arising out of the 
accident. The Defendants have discharged the tort feasor from all liability related to 
no-fault benefits. By doing so the Wails have chosen their recovery and cannot now 
successfully assert a claim against their insurer, 
17. That the said release, Exhibit C, is clear, concise and unambiguous. 
18. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law or appropriate means, 
other than an action for declaratory judgment, to determine its rights and obligations, 
if any, as to the Defendants for future personal injury protection benefits. 
19. If it is proved that the release does not release personal injury 
benefits, then the Plaintiff would be liable to pay those and liable for the expenses and 
attorney fees as provided for in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-
309. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(As to Subrogation of the Plaintiff to the Settlement of Defendants) 
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20. Plaintiff adopts and by this reference incorporates herein 
paragraphs 1 through 13 of the Identification of parties, Jurisdiction and General 
Allegations, and paragraphs 14 through 19 of the First Cause of Action as though the 
allegations contained therein were fully and completely set forth herein, 
21. That on or about the 4th day of March, 1994, the Defendants 
executed a full release as to the tort feasor, Lana Waters, providing a release of nany 
and ail actions, claims, and demands whatsoever which claimants now have or may 
have, whether known or unknown, developed, or undeveloped, on account of or 
arising out of the accident, casualty or event which happened on or about the 7th day 
of August, 1992." 
22. Bear River Mutual Insurance Company's insurance contract 
provides under PART B - Non-Duolication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and Conditions 
of Other Insurance Under our Personal Iniurv Protection as follows: 
" 1 . No eligible injured person shall recover or receive duplicate 
benefits for the same elements of loss under this or any similar 
insurance." 
23. That the said action on the part of the Defendants has deprived 
this Plaintiff of its right to reimbursement from Hawkeye Security Insurance Co. of the 
expenses paid to its insureds, as more fully set forth in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended §31A-22-308, which provides as follows: 
"The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection 
coverage: 
(1) the named insured, when injured In an accident involving any 
motor vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in this state, 
the United States, its territories or possessions, or Canada, except 
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where the injury is the result of the use or operation of the named 
insured's own motor vehicle not actually insured under the policy;" 
and Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-309(6) which states: 
"(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is 
subject to the following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held 
legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom 
benefits required under personal injury protection have been paid by 
another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the 
insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the 
other insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of 
damages recoverable; 
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount 
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the 
insurers." 
24. The Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law or appropriate means, 
other than an action for declaratory judgment, to determine its rights and obligations, 
if any, as to the Defendants for future personal injury protection benefits and requests 
that the above-entitled Court determine whether the release by John & Nancy Wall of 
March 4 , 1994, has destroyed Bear River Mutual Insurance Company's right of 
subrogation in the matter and whether Bear River Mutual Insurance Company is 
entitled to an equitable lien upon the proceeds of the funds received by the 
Defendants. 
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendants as 
follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(As to the Obligation of Bear River Mutual to pay 
PIP benefits to Defendants) 
1. For an order determining the rights and obligations of the parties 
under insurance Policy No, C145077. 
2. For an order determining that the Release, Exhibit C, given by the 
Defendants to Lana D. Waters and Hawkeye Security Insurance Co- was a full and 
complete release of ail claims, demands and causes of action for any obligation of Bear 
River Mutual Insurance Company to pay personal injury protection benefits to the 
Defendants from the date of the release of March 4, 1994. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(As to Subrogation of the Plaintiff to the Settlement of Defendants) 
3. For an order determining that the Release, Exhibit A, given by the 
Defendants to Lana D. Waters and Hawkeye Security Insurance Co. release by John 
& Nancy Wall of March 4, 1994, has destroyed Bear River Mutual Insurance 
Company's right of subrogation in the matter and whether Bear River Mutual Insurance 
Company is entitled to an equitable lien upon the proceeds of the funds received by 
the Defendants. 
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Dated this 3J day of August, 1994. 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
'Thomas A. Duffin /<# 
Attorney for Plaintiff /// 
Plaintiff's Address: 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company 
545 East Third South 
P. 0 . Box 11869 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
Non-Assessable Motor Vehicle and Auto Policy 
UTAH 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company is the oldest, non-profit mutual insurance company incorporated in the State of Utah. 
Please read your policy to make certain you understand the coverage that it provides. You may call the company to help and 
assist you in any questions that you have. 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company 
545 East Third South 
P.O. Box 11869 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
The contractual obligations of this policy are assumed by insured and by Bear River Mutual Insurance Company named in die 
Declarations and Policy. 
11/92 Ed. 
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WARRANTIES AND DECLARATIONS 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY agrees 
to insure you according to the terms of this policy based: 
1. on your payment of premium for the coverages you 
chose; and 
2. in reliance on your statements in these declarations. 
You agree and farther warrant, by acceptance of this policy 
that: 
1. the statements in these declarations are your 
statements and are true; and 
2. we insure you on the basis your statements are true; 
and 
3. this policy contains all of the agreements between you 
and us or any of our agents; and 
4. that this is a non-alcohol drinkers' policy, and 
5. that this policy is for those who do not use illegal 
drugs. 
Unless otherwise stated in the exceptions space on the 
declarations page, your statements are: 
The following words and phrases are defined throughout die 
policy as follows: 
1. Auto Business, means a business or job where the 
purpose is to sell, lease, repair, service, transport store 
or park land motor vehicles or trailers. 
2. Bodily Injury: means bodily injury and/or death to 
a person which occurs during the policy period as a 
result of the injury. 
3. Business: means one engaged in any commercial 
activity for gain or livelihood including employees of 
their employer, executives and traveling salespersons. 
4. Declarations: means the Declaration Page. 
5. Family Member means a person related to you by 
blood, marriage, guardianship or adopdon who is a 
resident of your household. This includes a ward, a 
foster child, or an unmarried son or daughter while 
away at school 
6. Insured: means the person, persons or organization 
defined as insured in the specific coverage, including 
you, the named insured shown in the Declarations. 
1. Ownership. You are the sole owner of your car. 
2. Insurance and License History. Neither you nor 
any member of your household in the past 3 years has 
had: 
a. vehicle Insurance canceled by an insurer, unless 
it is revealed and appears in die application for 
insurance; or 
b. a license to drive or vehicle registration 
suspeaded, revoked or refused. 
3. Alcohol and Drugs. That neither you, nor any 
member of your household, within the past three 
years, has used or consumed any alcohol or alcoholic 
beverages or has used or consumed any illegal drugs 
or has used or consumed any illegal substances. 
4. Application. That the statements in your application, 
declarations or renewal for insurance are true. 
7. Motor Vehicle Auto or Car means a private 
passenger auto, or a pickup track, panel truck or van 
which is a land motor vehicle with four or more 
wheels, which is designed for use mainly on public 
roads. It does not include: 
a. any anto or motor vehicle while being used other 
than on a temporary basis as a residence; 
b. a track-tractor designed to pull a trailer or 
semitrailer; or 
c an anto or vehicle used in any business to haul 
marrrials to or from job sites, deliver goods or 
merchandise or for use in construction* or 
manufacturing and during any continuous and 
regular business use; 
d. any motor vehicle used to carry persons for 
compensation; 
e. any Tehicle or auto used in die auto business; 
f. any recreational vehicle, motorcycle, all-terrain 
vehicle, motor home or similar vehicle whether it 
has four wheels or not, which is not described on 
the &claration page of die policy. 
AGREEMENT 
In return for payment of the premium and subject to all the terms of this policy, we agree with you as follows: 
DEFINITIONS 
8. Non-Owned Vehicle: means a vehicle not: 
a. owned by; 
b. registered in the name oft or 
c. furnished or available for frequent use of: you or 
a person living in your household or any family 
members; 
d. used for the business purposes. 
The use has to be within the scope of consent of the 
owner or person in lawful possession of it 
9. Occupying: means being in or on a motor vehicle as 
a passenger or operator, or being engaged in the 
immediate acts of entering, boarding, or alighting 
from a motor vehicle. 
10. Owned if Leased: for purposes of this policy, a 
private passenger type vehicle shall be deemed to be 
owned by a person if leased: 
a. under a written agreement to that person; and 
b. for a continuous period of at least 6 months. 
11. Person: means human being. 
12. Private Passenger Auto: means an auto: 
a. with four wheels that simultaneously touch die 
ground; and 
b. of die private passenger or station wagon type; 
and 
c. designed solely to cany persons and their 
luggage. 
13. Reasonable: the word "reasonable" when used in 
connection with costs, services, rentals and towing, 
means that they are usual and customary charges and 
when used in connection with repairs, it means that 
they are necessary, usual and customary charges due 
to the loss. 
14. Spouse: means your husband or wife while living 
with you. 
15. Temporary Substitute Auto: means an auto not 
owned by you or your spouse, if it replaces your auto 
for a short time. Its use has to be with the consent of 
the owner. Your auto has to be out of use due to its 
breakdown, repair* servicing^ damage or loss. A 
temporary, substitute auto is not considered a non-
owned anto. 
16. Trailer: means a vehicle designed to be pulled by a: 
a. private passenger "auto; or 
b. pickup truck, panel truck, or van-
It also means a farm wagon or farm implement while 
towed by a vehicle listed in a. or b. above. 
cont'd. 
17. Utility Vehicle: means a motor vehicle with: 
a. a pickup truck, panel or van body; and 
b. a Gross Vehicle Weight of 10,000 pounds or less 
plus its maximum load capacity. 
18. Van: means a four-wheeled land motor vehicle with 
a load capacity of not more than 2,000 pounds or 
Gross Vehicle Weight of not mote than 10,000 
pounds. Gross Vehicle Weight is the weight of the 
vehicle plus its maximum load capacity. 
19. -We", "Us" and "Our" or "Company" refer to 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company. 
20. "You" or "Your" means die named insured shown 
on the declaration page. 
21. Your Covered Vehicle: means: 
a. any motor vehicle shown in the Declarations for 
w'mch a specific premium has been paid for 
coverage; 
b. any newly acquired motor vehicle that you 
acquire during the policy period provided it is a 
private passenger vehicle and we insure all other 
private motor vehicles owned by you on the date 
of delivery to you or your spouse. This coverage 
cads 30 days after you acquire the vehicle, unless 
within the 30 days you ask us and we agree to 
insure it and you pay any additional premium that 
may be due: 
(1) If the newly acquired motor vehicle replaces 
one shown in the declarations, it will have 
the same coverage as the vehicle it replaces; 
(2) If die newly acquired motor vehicle is an 
additional vehicle, it will have die broadest 
coverage we now provide for any motor, 
vehicle shown in the declarations. If you 
have more than one auto policy with us, you 
must tell us which one applies; 
c any trailer you own as to liability and no-fault 
coverage, but only those trailers shown on the 
Declarations Page for which a specific premium 
has been paid for Coverage for Damage to Your 
Anto; 
d. any auto or trailer you do not own while used as 
a temporary substitute for any other auto or 
vehicle described in tins definition which is out 
of normal use because of its: 
(1) breakdown; 
© repair; 
(3> servicing; 
(4) loss; or 
(5) destruction 
your Covered Vehicle doc .ot include a motor 
vehicle that has been sold or is subject to a 
concrac: co sell oral or written, to a non-family 
member or other business entity, provided that 
the pure r is in possession of the'motor 
vehicle. This exclusion applies whether tide has 
been transferred or die purchase price has been 
paid by the purchaser. 
PART A - LIABILITY COVERAGE 
Insuring Agreement 
We will pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for 
which any covered person becomes legally responsible 
because of an auto accident We will setde or defend, as we 
consider appropriate, any claim or suit asking for these 
damages. We have no duty to defend any suit or setde any 
claim for "bodily injury" or "property damage" not covered 
under this policy. 
In addition to our limits of liability, we pay for all defense 
costs for attorneys retained and paid by us. Our duty to defend 
in any litigation ends when die applicable limits of liability 
have been paid as provided for in the policy for the accident 
which is the basis of the lawsuit 
COVERED PERSON as used in diis part means: 
1. You or any family member for the ownership, 
maintenance or use of any covered motor vehicle or 
trailer; 
1 Any other person using your covered motor vehicle 
if the use is within the scope of consent of you or 
your spouse. 
3. For your covered motor vehicle, any person or 
organization but only with respect to legal 
responsibility for acts or omissions of a person for 
whom coverage is afforded under this part; 
4. For any motor vehicle or trailer, odier than your 
covered motor vehicle, any person or organization 
but only with respect to legal responsibility for acts or 
omissions of you or any family member for whom 
coverage is afforded under this part This provision 
applies only if the person or organization does not 
own or hire the auto or trailer. 
Supplementary Payments 
In addition to our limit of liability,, we will pay on behalf of a 
covered person: 
1. Up to $250.00 for the cost of bail bonds required 
because of an accident, however, we do not pay for 
traffic tickets, violations or citations. The accident 
must result in bodily injury or property damage 
covered under this policy. 
2. Premiums on appeal bonds and bonds to release 
attachments in any suit we defend. 
3. Interest accruing after a judgment is entered in any 
suit we defend. Our duty to pay interest ends when 
we tender into court to pay that part of the judgment 
which does not exceed our limit of liability for this 
coverage. 
4. Up to 535.00 a day for loss of earnings, but not other 
income, because of attendance at hearings or trials at 
our request. 
Exclusions to Part A 
Insuring Agreement 
Liability Coverage, 
WE DO NOT PROVIDE LIABILITY COVERAGE FOR 
ANY PERSON: 
1. For property damage and bodily injury which may be 
reasonably expected to result from the intentional or 
criminal acts of the insured or which, in fact, is 
intended by the insured person; 
2. For damage to any property owned by, rented to, in 
charge of or transported by an insured; but coverage 
applies to a rented residence or private rented garage 
damaged by a car we insure. 
3. For any BODILY INJURY to: 
a. A Mow employee, while on the job and arising 
from the maintenance or use of a vehicle by 
another employee- in die employer's business. 
You and your spouse are covered for such injury 
to a fellow employee. 
b. Any employee of a COVERED PERSON 
ARISING OUT OF HIS OR HER 
EMPLOYMENT. This does not apply to a 
household employee who is not covered or 
reqaired to be covered under any Worker's 
Compensation Insurance, 
c. ANY COVERED PERSON or any member of 
a covered person's family residing in the covered 
person's household in excess of die Utah Motor 
Vehicle Liability Policy Minimum Limits as more 
fully set forth in Utah Code- Annotated, 1953, 
§3L\-22-304; providing for minimum limits for 
motor vehicle liability coverage. 
4. For any damages for whic,- -e United States, or its 
employees or any of its agencies, including their 
employees, might be liaPie for the COVERED 
PERSON'S use of any ve^de. 
5. For any obligation of a C O ^ R E D PERSON or his 
or her insurer, under any^  type of worker's 
compensation or disability or similar law. 
6. For liability assumed by the covered person under any 
contract or agreement. 
7. For ftabuiq arising out of die ownership or operation 
of a vehicle while it is beitfg used to cany persons or 
property for any fee or a charge. This exclusion does 
not apply to a share-the-expense car pool. 
8. While employed or otherwise engaged in the business 
or occupation of: 
a. selling, 
b. repairing, 
c. servicing, 
<L storing, 
e. parking 
vehicles designed for use nJainly on public highways. 
This includes road testing and delivery. This 
exclusion does not appty to the ownership, 
maintenance or use of YOUR COVERED AUTO 
by: 
a. you; 
b. any family member; 0* 
c. any partner, agent or employee of you or any 
family member. 
9. Maintaining or using any vehicle while that person is 
employed or otherwise engaged in any business or 
occupation not described in Exclusion 8. This 
exclusion does not apply P &e maintenance or use 
of: 
a. a private passenger au*o; 
b. a pickup truck, panel truck or van that you own; 
or 
c. a trailer used with a vehicle described in a. or b. 
above. 
\ $ . \3s\ng a veincie: 
a. without the consent of you or your spouse; 
b. with permission but consent or the permission or 
its use is beyond the scope and consent of you or 
your spouse0 
IL For bodily injury or property damage for which that 
person: 
a. is an insured under £ nuclear energy liability 
policy; or 
b. would be an insured under a nuclear energy 
liability policy but for its termination upon 
exhaustion of its limit of liability. 
A nuclear energy liability policy is a policy issued by 
any of ±t .owing or their successors: 
a. Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association: 
b. Mutual Atomic Enetg) Liability Underwriters; or 
c. Nuciear Insurance Association of Canada. 
12. Maintaining or using any non-owned or rented vehicle 
by an insured in his employment, occupation, 
profession, or in any commercial activity engaged in 
for gain or livelihood, including employees of their 
employer, executives and traveling salespersons who 
rent or use vehicles in connection with their work or 
livelihood. 
13. WE DO NOT PROVIDE LIABILITY COVERAGE 
FOR THE OWNERSHIP, maintenance or use of: 
a. Any motorized vehicle having less than four 
wheels; 
b. Any vehicle, other than your covered vehicle, 
which is: 
1. owned by you; or 
2. furnished or available for your regular or 
frequent use; 
c. Any vehicle, odier than your covered auto, 
which is: 
1. owned by any family member; or 
2. furnished or available for the regular or 
frequent use of any family member; 
however, this exclusion does not apply to your 
maintenance or use of any vehicle which is: 
1. owned by a family member; or 
2. furnished for or available for the regular use 
of a family member, 
d. To a motor vehicle that has been sold or is 
subject to a contract to sell, oral or written, to a 
non-family member or other business entity, 
provided that the purchaser is in possession of the 
motor vehicle. This exclusion applies whether 
tide has been transferred or the purchase price 
has been paid by purchaser. 
Limit of Liability 
The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each 
person" for Bodily Injury Liability is our maximum limit of 
liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by any one 
person in any one auto accident Subject to this limit for "each 
person1*, the limit of liability shown in the Declarations for 
"each accident" for Bodily Injury Liability h our maximum 
limit of liabiliiy for all damages for bodily injury resulting 
from any one auto accident The limit of liability shown in the 
Declarations for "each accident" for Property Damage Liability 
is our maximum limit of liability for all damages to all 
property resulting from any one auto accident This is the 
most we will pay for any auto accident regardless of the 
number of: 
1. covered persons; 
2. claims made; 
3. vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or 
4. vehicles involved in the auto accident. 
We will apply the limit of liability to provide any separate 
limits required by law for bodily injury and property damage 
liability. However, this provision will not change our total 
limit of liability. A motor vehicle and trailer are considered 
one unit for the limit of liability 
Other Limits of Liability 
We do not provide motor vehicle liability coverage for. 
1. bodily injury caused by an insured for any person 
using your covered vehicle who is not a family 
member to the extent or in excess of the limits of 
liability which this coverage exceeds the minimum 
liability required by the Utah Motor Vehicle Financial 
Responsibility Law. (Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
§3lA-22-304 Motor Vehicle liability Policy 
Minimum Limits). 
2. For bodily injury to any person who is a family 
member or related to an Insured by blood, marriage 
or adoption for whom claim is made to the extent of 
any limits of liability of this coverage which exceed 
the limits of liability required by the Utah Motor 
Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, (Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, §31A-22-304 Motor Vehicle 
Liability Policy Minimum limits). 
Out of State Coverage 
If an auto accident to which diis policy applies occurs in any 
state or Canada other than the one in which your covered 
vehicle is principally garaged, we will interpret your policy for 
that accident as follows: 
If the state or Canada has: 
1. a financial responsibility or similar law specifying 
limits of liability for bodily injury or property damage 
higher than the limit shown in the Declarations, your 
policy will provide the higher specified limit; 
2. a compulsory insurance or similar law requiring a 
nonresident to maintain insurance whenever the 
nonresident uses a vehicle in that state or Canada, 
your policy will provide at least the required 
minimum amounts and types of coverage. 
Financial Responsibility Required 
When certified usder any law as proof of future financial 
responsibility, and while required during the policy period, this 
policy shall comply with such law to die extent required. 
Other Insurance 
If there is other applicable liability insurance we will pay only 
our share of the loss. Our share under this policy is (he 
amount computed under the applicable paragraph below. 
However, any insurance we provide for a vehicle you do not 
own shall be excess over other collectible insurance. 
IF THERE IS OTHER LIABILITY COVERAGE: 
1. Policies Issued by us to yon: 
If two or more vehicle liability policies 
issued by us to you apply to the same accident, 
the total limits of liability under all such policies 
shall not exceed that of the policy with the 
highest Ionic of liabflicy. 
2. Other overage Available from Other Sources: 
If other liability coverage applies, we are liable 
only for our share of the damages. Our share is the 
percent that the limit of liability of this policy bears 
to the total of all liability coverage applicable to the 
accident. 
3. Temporary Substitute Auto, Non-Owned Auto, 
Trailer or Rental Auto: 
If a temporary substitute auto, a non-owned 
auto or trailer or rental auto designed for use with 
a private passenger auto or utility vehicle has other 
liability coverage which applies in whole or in part as 
primary, excess or contingent coverage, then this 
coverage is excess over other liability coverage. We 
do not contribute under this policy to any loss where: 
a. the motor vehicle or trailer is owned by any 
person or organization in the auto business; and 
b. a non-owned or rental vehicle maintained or used 
in any business or business pursuits or business 
activity, including salesman, employees who are 
using or who have rented a car in connection 
with their livelihood. 
4. Newiy-Acquired Vehicle: 
This coverage does not apply if there is other 
vehicle liability coverage on a newly-acquired 
vehicle. 
No one will be entided to a duplication of payments for the 
same elements of loss. 
PART B - PE^ONAL INJURY PROTECTwN COVERAGE 
Insuring Agreement a. &- named insured and persons related to the 
insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or 
guzraiansmp WHO are residents or tne insured s 
hcaseho}4 including those who usua&y make 
their home in the same household but temporarily 
live elsewhere, when injured in an accident 
involving any motor vehicle; and 
b. any other natural person whose injuries arise out 
of an automobile accident occurring while the 
person occupies a motor vehicle described in the 
policy with the express or implied consent of the 
named insured or while a pedestrian if he is 
injured in an accident involving the described 
motor vehicle. 
The Company will pay personal injury protection benefits 
that are reasonable and necessary to or on beha2f of each 
eligible injured person for 
(a) medical expenses 
(b) work loss 
(c) funeral expenses 
(d) survivor loss and 
(e) special damages 
with respect to bodily injury sustained by an eligible 
insured person caused by an accident involving the use of 
a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. 
Exclusions 
This coverage does not apply: 
1. for any injury sustained by the Insured while 
occupying another motor vehicle owned by the 
Insured and not insured under the policy; 
2. for a&y injury sustained by any person winie 
operating the insured motor vehicle without the 
express or implied consent of the insured or while not 
in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle; or 
3. -to any injured person, if the person's conduct 
contributed to his injury: 
(a) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or 
(b) while committing a felony; 
4. for any injury sustained by any person arising out of 
the use of any motor vehicle while located for use as 
a residence or premises; 
5. for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, 
civil war, insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to 
any act or condition incident to any of die foregoing; 
or 
6. for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, 
explosive, or other hazardous properties of nuclear 
materials. 
Definitions 
When used in reference to this coverage: 
1. Bodily Injury: means bodily injury to a person and/or 
death which occurs during the.policy period as a 
result of the injury. 
2. Covered and Insured Persons entitled to Personal 
Injury Protection: 
3. Funeral Expenses: means funeral, burial or cremation 
expenses incurred; 
4. Insured Motor Vehicle: a motor vehicle with respect 
to which: 
a. die bodily injury liability insurance of die policy 
applies and for which a specific premium is 
charged; and 
b. die named insured is required to maintain security 
under the provisions of the Utah Automobile No-
Fault Insurance Act; Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
Tide 41, Chapter 12a, Financial Responsibility of 
Motor Vehicle Owners and Operators Act 
5. Medical Expenses: die reasonable value of all 
expenses for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray, 
dental, rehabilitation (which includes prosthetic 
devices), ambulance, hospital and nursing services; 
6. Motor Vehicle: means every self-propelled vehicle 
which is designed for use upon a highway, including 
trailers and semitrailers designed for use with such 
vehicles, except traction engines, road rollers, farm-
tractors, tractor cranes, power shovels, and well 
drillers, and every vehicle which is propelled by 
electric power obtained from overhead wires but not 
operated upon rails and excluding motorcycles; 
7. Named Insured: the person or organization in die 
declarations; 
8. Occupying: being in or on a motor vehicle as a 
passenger or operator or engaged in the immediate act 
of entering, boarding or alighting from % motor 
vehicle; 
9. Pedestrian: means, any person not occupying or 
riding upon a^motor vehicle. "Any person riding, 
occupying or upon a motorcycle is not a pedestrian; 
10. Survivor Loss: compensation on account of the death 
of the eligible injured person; 
11. Work Loss: any loss of gross income and loss of 
earning capacity per person from inability to work, 
for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the 
loss, except that this benefit need not be paid for the 
first three days of disability, unless the disability 
continues for longer than two consecutive weeks after 
the date of injury; 
12. Special Damage: an allowance for a marirrjum of 
365 days, for services actually rendered or expenses 
reasonably incurred for services that, but for the 
injury, the injured person would have performed for 
his household, except that this benefit need not be 
paid for the first three days after the date of injury 
unless the person's inability to perform these services 
continues for more than two consecutive weeks. 
Personal Injury Payments and Limits of Liability 
Regardless of the number of persons insured, policies or bonds 
applicable, claims made, or insured motor vehicles to which 
this coverage applies, the Company's liability for personal 
injury protection benefits with respect to bodily injury 
sustained by any one eligible injured person in any one motor 
vehicle accident, is limited except or unless additional 
protection is purchased or provided for by statute as follows: 
Medical Payments: 
The maximum amount payable for medical expenses shall 
not exceed 53,000.00; unless additional medical protection 
or payments are provided for on the Declaration page, 
they must be incurred within three years of die date of the 
accident to be payable; 
Work Loss: 
The maximum amount payable for work loss is eighty-five 
percent of any loss of gross income and earning capacity, 
not to exceed the total of $250.00 per week; 
Special Damage: 
A special damage allowance not exceeding $20.00 per day 
for inability to perform services for his household; 
Funeral Expenses: 
The maximum amount payable for funeral expenses shall 
not exceed $1,500.00; 
Survivor Loss: 
The amount payable for survivor loss is $3,000.00 and is 
payable only to natural persons who are die eligible 
injured person's heirs. 
Policy Period, Territory, Other Limits of 
Liability and Special Provisions 
This coverage applies only to accidents which occur during the 
policy period in the United States and Canada, except if an 
auto accident to which this policy applies occurs outside of 
Utah, (but is within the United States and Canada), our limits 
of liability under your policy for that accident are as follows: 
1. If the sure, (outside of Utah) or Canada, has: 
a. a personal injury protection or similar law 
specifying limits higher than that in the 
declarations, your policy will provide the higher 
specified limit; 
b. compulsory personal injury protection insurance 
or similar law requiring a non-resident to 
maintain personal injury protection insurance, 
whenever the non-resident uses a vehicle in that 
stare or Canada, your policy will provide at least 
the required minimum amounts and types of 
coverage; 
C. no compulsory personal injury protection 
insurance or similar law requiring a non-resident 
to maintain insurance, whenever the insured uses 
a vehicle in that state or Canada, your policy 
does not provide for any benefits under Part B, 
Personal Injury Coverage, to non-residents of the 
State of Utah, except for medical expenses under 
this section, not to exceed 33,000.00; 
d. no compulsory personal injury protection 
insurance or similar law requiring a non-resident 
to maintain insurance in that state or Canada, 
your policy does not provide benefits under this 
section to residents of the State of Utah who are 
not family members in any amount in excess of 
the minimum limits as provided for this type of 
coverage in the State of Utah. 
2. Any amount payable by the Company under the terms 
of this coverage shall be reduced by die amount paid, 
payable, or required to be provided on account of 
such bodily injury: 
a. under any worker's compensation plan or any 
similar statutory plan; 
b. which that person receives or is entitled to 
receive from the United States or any of its 
agencies because he is on active duty in the 
military service. 
3. That where a Covered Person under this policy is or 
would be held legally liable for the personal injuries 
sustained by any person to whom benefits required 
under personal injury protection provisions of this 
policy have been paid by die injured party's insurance 
carrier; including the Workers' Compensation Fund of 
Utah, the Company if it would be legally held liable 
shall reimburse the insurance company of theother 
party for the payments as provided herein, but not in 
excess of die amount of damages recoverable; that the 
issue of liability for that reimbursement in its amount 
shall be mandatory binding arbitration between the 
two insurance companies providing for insurance 
covera£e as herein set forth. 
4. If the C o vered Person inc ^  .nedical expenses which 
are unreasonable or unnecessary, we may refuse to 
pay for those medical expenses and contest theme 
Unreasonable medical expenses are fees for medical 
services which are higher than the usual and 
customary charges for those services; unnecessary 
medical expenses are fees for medical services which 
are not usually and customarily performed for 
treatment of the injury, including fees for an 
excessive number, amount, or duration of medical 
services. 
5. If the Covered Person is sued by a medical services 
provider because we refuse to pay contested medical 
expenses, we will pay all defense costs and any 
resulting judgment against the Covered Person. We 
have the right to choose the counsel. The Covered 
Person must cooperate with us in the defense of any 
claim, demand or lawsuit If the Covered Person is 
required to attend any trials or hearings and wages or 
salaries are lost as a result, we will pay up to $35.00 
per day. 
Special Conditions if Law is Declared Invalid 
The premium for the policy is based on rafies which have 
been established in reliance upon the limitations on the 
right to recover for damages imposed by the provisions of 
the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act In the 
event a court of competent jurisdiction declares or enters 
a judgment, the effect of which is to render the provisions 
of such act invalid or unenforceable in whole or in part, 
the Company shall have the right to recompute the 
premium payable for the policy and the provisions of this 
endorsement shall be voidable or subject to amendment at 
the option of the Company. 
Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability 
and Conditions of Other Insurance Under our 
Personal Injury Protection 
this or aiN milar insurance. 
2. If the Insured sustains bodily injury while occupying 
a vehicle not owned by you, your spouse or any 
family member, this coverage applies: 
a. as excess to any personal injury protection 
coverage which applies to the use of the vehicle 
as primary coverage, but only in an amount 
which it exceeds the primary coverage, 
If coverage under more than one policy applies as 
excess: 
a. the total maximum recovery, liability or benefit 
payable shall not exceed the difference between 
the limit of liability that applies as primary 
insurance, and the maximum recovery, liability or 
benefit that applies from any one of the 
coverages that apply as excess; and 
b. we are liable only for our share of the loss or 
damage. Our share is die proportion of damages, 
loss, or benefits that the limits of this bear to the 
tocal applicable to all personal injury protection 
coverage as excess to die accident We will pay 
oar share of the loss, damages or benefits. 
3. Except as provided for in the preceding paragraphs, 1 
and 2, if the Insured sustains bodily injury as a 
pedesirian or sustains bodily injury while occupying 
your covered vehicle, and if two or more insurers are 
liable to pay no-fault or personal injury coverage 
benefits or provide similar coverage involving die use 
of an automobile: 
a. the total limits of liability or benefits under an 
such coverages shall not exceed the coverage or 
benefits of the policy with the highest limit of 
liability; and 
b . . we are liable only for our share of the loss or 
damage. Our share is that percent of the 
damages that the limit of liability of this coverage 
bears to the total of all personal injury benefits 
coverage applicable to the accident 
No eligible injured person shall recover or receive 
duplicate benefits for the same elements of loss under 
PART CI - UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE 
Insuring Agreement 
We will pay for bodily injury for damages which a covered 
person, as defined in this section are legally entitled to recover 
from the owner or operator of a motor vehicle: 
1. sustained by you and your covered vehicle; and 
2. caused by an accident 
the owner's or operator's liability for these damages must arise 
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured 
motor vehicle. 
Any judgment for damages arising out of a suit brought 
without our written consent is not binding on us. 
"Uninsured Motor Vehicle" Means a Land Motor Vehicle 
or Trailer of any Type: 
1. To which no bodily injury liability bond or policy 
applies at the time of die accident 
2. To winch a bodily injury liability bond or policy 
applies at the time of die accident In this case its 
limit rbr bodily injury liability must be less than the 
minimum limit for bodily injury liability specified by 
the financial responsibility law of the state in which 
your covered vehicle is principally garaged. 
3. Which is a hit and run vehicle whose operator or 
owner cannot be identified and which hits: 
a. you or any family member; 
b. a vehicle which you or any family member are 
occupying; or 
c. your covered vehicle. 
4. In accordance with Utah Code Annotated, §31A-22-
305, the policy is expanded so that uninsured motorist 
also includes any motor vehicle whose operator or 
owner cannot be identified which causes an accident, 
but does not make physical contact with your covered 
vehicle- The existence of this vehicle and motorist 
must be demonstrated by clear and convincing 
evidence other than the testimony of the covered 
person or persons. 
5. To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy 
applies at the time of the accident but the bonding or 
insuring company: 
a. denies coverage; or 
b. is or becomes insolvent 
However, "Uninsured Motor Vehicle" Does Not Include 
Any Vehicle or Equipment 
1. Owned by or furnished or available for the regular 
use of you or any family member; 
2. Owned or operated by a self-insurer under any 
applicable motor vehicle law; 
. 3, Owned by any governmental unit or agency, 
4. Operated on rails or crawler treads; 
5. Designed mainly for use off public roads while not on 
public roads; 
6. While located for use as a residence or premises. 
Definitions 
The following phrase and words are defined in this Section as 
follows: 
1. As used in this section "covered persons" includes: 
a. the named insured; 
b. persons related to the named insured by blood, 
marriage, adoption, or guardianship, who are 
residents of the named insured's household, 
including those who usually make their home in 
the same household, but temporarily live 
elsewhere; 
c. any person occupying a covered motor vehicle 
refer^d to in the policy; 
All other definiticas apply. 
Exclusions 
A. We do not provide Uninsured Motorists Coverage for 
bodily injury sustained by any person: 
1. While occupying, or when struck by, any motor 
vehicle owned by you or any family member which 
is not insured for this coverage under this policy. 
This incudes a trailer-of any type used with that 
vehicle. 
2. For any Covered Person who, without written consent 
from the Company, settles with any person or 
organization who may be liable for bodfly injury. 
3. While occupying your covered vehicle when it is 
being used to cany persons or property for a fee. 
This exclusion does not apply to a share-the-expense 
carpooL 
4. Using a vehicle without permission or a reasonable 
belief that the person is entitled to do so or its use is 
beyond 4e consent of you or your spouse. 
B. This coverage shall not apply directly or indirectly to 
benefit any insurer or self-insurer under any of the 
following or similar law: 
1. workers' compensation law 
2. disability benefits law 
3. any government body or agency, including political 
subdivisions 
Limits of Liability 
The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each 
person" for Uninsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum 
limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by 
any one person in any one accident Subject to this limit for 
"each person", tie limit of liability shown in the Declarations 
for "each aeddeaf for Uninsured Motorists Coverage is our 
mflYiTnirm limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury 
resulting from any one accident."This is the most we win pay 
regardless of die number of: 
a. covered persons 
b . efcirna Trraifc 
c. vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations 
d. vehicles involved in the accident 
Any amounts otherwise payable fo. -amages under this 
coverage shall be reduced by all sums paid or payable because 
of the bodily injur/ under any of the following or similar law: 
a. workers' compensation law; or 
b. disability benefits law. 
Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability 
and Conditions of Other Insurance Under Our 
Uninsured Motorist Coverage 
1. If the Insured sustains bodily injury while occupying 
a vehicle not owned by you, your spouse or any 
family member, this coverage applies: 
a. as excess to any uninsured motor vehicle 
coverage which applies to the vehicle as primary 
coverage and only in an amount by which it 
exceeds the primary coverage. 
If coverage under more than one policy applies as 
excess: 
a. the total maximum recovery, liability or benefit 
payable shall not exceed the difference between 
the limit of liability diat applies as primary 
insurance, and the maximum recovery, liability or 
benefit that applies from any of the coverages 
that apply as excess; and 
b. we are liable for our share of the loss or damage. 
Our share is the proportion of damages that die 
limit of liability of this coverage bears to die total 
applicable uninsured motorist coverage as excess 
to the accident 
2. Except as provided for in the previous paragraph 1, if 
the Insured sustains bodily injury as a pedestrian or 
sustains bodily injury while occupying your covered 
vehicle, and if two or more insurers are liable to pay 
uninsured motorist protection as provided by this 
coverage: 
a. die total limits of liability under all such 
coverages shall not exceed that of the coverage 
with die highest limit of liability; and 
b. we are liable only for our share. Our share is 
that percent of the damages that the limit of 
liability of this coverage bears to die total of all 
uninsured motor vehicle coverage applicable to 
the accident 
3. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2. under this part, 
Non-duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and 
Conditions of Other Insurance Under Our Uninsured 
Motorist Coverage, if uninsured motorist coverage is 
available to a covered; injured person, under more 
than one insurance policy, the covered injured person 
may elect die policy under which he desires to collect 
the uninsured motorist benefits. 
uninsured TL 1st coverage for two or more motor 
vehicles be added togedier or stacked to determine the 
limit of coverage available to a covered injured 
person for any one accident. 
No Insured person can recover duplicate benefits from 
the same elements of loss under diis, or other similar 
insurance. 
Medical Reports; Proof of Claim 
As soon as practicable the eligible covered person or someone 
on his behalf shall give to die Company written proof of 
claim, under oath if required, including full particulars of die 
nature and extent of the injuries and treatment received and 
contemplated, and such other information as may assist the 
Company in desrxnining the amount due and payable. The 
eligible covered person shall submit to physical and mental 
examinations by physicians selected by the Company when and 
as often as die Company may reasonably require. 
Arbitration 
If we and a covered person do not agree: 
1. whether that person is legally entided to recover 
damages under this part; or 
2. as to the amount of damages; 
either party may make a written demand for the matters to be 
settled by arbitration. Any matter in dispute between you and 
us will be made pursuant to arbitration as provided for in the 
arbitration rules of die Arbitration Forums, Inc., a copy of 
which is available on request from the Company, which shall 
be binding on both you and the Company. The arbitration 
award may include attorney's fees if allowed by state law and 
may be entered as a judgment in any court of proper 
jurisdiction. Such arbitration shall be in compliance with the 
"Utah Arbitration Act" (Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah Code 
Annotated) or the applicable arbitration provisions in force and 
effect in Utah at the time. 
Additional Duties for Uninsured Motorists 
Coverage 
A person seeking Uninsured Motorists Coverage must also: 
1. promptly notify die police if a hit and run driver is 
involved; 
2, prompdy send us copies of the legal papers if a suit 
is brought. 
However, in no event will the limit of liability for 
PART C2 - UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE 
Insuring Agreement 
We will pay for bodily injury for damages which a covered 
person, as defined in this pan is legally entitled to recover 
from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle 
because of bodily injury, sickness, disease or death: 
1. sustained by you and your covered vehicle; and 
2. caused by an accident. 
The owner's or operator's liability for these damages must 
arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the 
underinsured motor vehicle. 
Any judgment for damages arising out of a suit brought 
without our written consent is not binding on us. 
"Underinsured Motor Vehicle" means a Land Motor 
Vehicle or Trailer of any Type: 
1. The ownership, maintenance or use of which is 
insured or bonded for bodily injury liability at die 
time of the accident; but 
a. whose limits of liability for bodily injury liability 
are insufficient to compensate fully the insured 
for all special and general damages; 
b. have been reduced by payments to persons other 
than the insured to less than die amount of the 
insured's damages. 
However, "Underinsured Motor Vehicle" Does Not Include 
any Vehicle or Equipment 
1. Owned by, furnished or available for die regular use 
of the insured, a resident spouse or resident relative of 
the insured, unless the motor vehicle is described in 
the Declarations and for which a specific premium 
has been paid, or if the motor vehicle is a newly 
acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the 
terms of the policy; 
2. Owned or operated by a self-insurer under any 
applicable motor vehicle law; 
3. Owned by any governmental unit, political 
subdivision or agency; 
4. Operated on rails or crawler treads; 
5. Designed mainly for use off public roads while not on 
public roads; 
6. While located for use as a residence or premises; 
7. Defined as more fully set forth in Part CI, Uninsured 
Motorist Coverage in your policy; 
8. To which a bodily: injury liability bond or policy 
applies at the time of the accident but its limit for 
bodily injury liability is less than die minimum limit 
for bodily injury liability specified by the Utah Safety 
Responsibility Act; 
9. To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy 
applies at the time of the accident but the bonding or 
insuring company: 
a. denies coverage: or 
b. is or becomes insolvent. 
Definitions 
As used in this section "covered persons" includes: 
a. the named insured; 
b. persons related to the named insured by blood, 
marriage; adoption, or guardianship, who are residents 
of the named insured's household, including those 
who usually make their home in the same household 
but temporarily live elsewhere; 
c any person occupying a covered motor vehicle 
referred to in the policy, 
All other definition apply. 
Exclusions 
A. We do not provide Underinsured Motorists Coverage for 
bodily inysry sustained by any person: 
1. While occupying, or when struck by, any motor 
vehicle owned by you or any family member which 
is not insured for this coverage under this policy. 
This includes a trailer of any type used with diat 
vehicle. 
2. For any Covered Person who, without written consent 
from the Company, settles with any person or 
organization who may be liable for bodily injury. 
3. While occupying your covered vehicle when it is 
being used to cany persons or property for a fee. 
This exclusion does not apply to a share-the-expense 
car pool 
4. Use of a vehicle without permission, or the use with 
permission is beyond die consent of you or your 
spouse. 
B. There is no coverage until me limits of liability of all 
.bodily injury liability bonds and policies that apply have 
been used up by payment of judgments or settlements to 
other persons. 
Limits of Liability 
The limit of liability shown in die Declarations for "each 
person" for Underinsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum 
limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by 
any one person in any one accident Subject to this limit for 
"each person", the limit of liability shown in the Declarations 
for, "each accident" for Underinsurea ~ts Coverage is our 
maximum limit of liability for all dam^-i for bodily injury 
resulting from any one accident. This is the most we will pay 
regardless of the number of: 
a. covered Persons 
b. claims mace 
c. vehicles or premiums shown on the Declarations 
d. vehicles involved in the accident 
Any amounts otherwise payable for damages under this 
coverage shall be reduced by all sums paid or payable because 
of the bodily injury under any of the following or similar law: 
a. workers' compensation law; or 
b. disability benefits law. 
payaL s iy one vehicle under the policy with 
the tighe* _ jssible dollar limit; 
b. subject to paragraph a, above, any insurance we 
provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own 
shall be excess over any other collectible 
insunnce; 
c. we will pay our share of the loss. Our share is 
the proportion of damages that the limit of 
liability of this coverage bears to the total 
applicable underinsured motorist limits. 
No eligible injured person shall recover duplicate 
benefits for the same elements of loss under this or 
any similar insurance. 
Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability 
and Conditions of Other Insurance Under Our 
Underinsured Motorist Coverage 
1. A covered person injured in a vehicle described in an 
insurance policy that includes underinsured motorist 
benefits may not elect to collect underinsured motorist 
coverage benefits from any other motor vehicle 
insurance policy under which he is a named insured 
except: 
a. if a named insured is injured as a pedestrian or 
while occupying a vehicle not described in this 
part, (C2, Underinsured Motorist Coverage) and 
is covered by more than one policy including 
undennsured motorist coverage, the injured 
person may elect die policy under which he 
collects underinsured motorist benefits. 
2. The limits of liability for underinsured motorist 
coverage for two or more motor vehicles may not be 
added together, combined, or stacked to determine die 
limit of insurance coverage available to an injured 
person for any one accident 
3. If there is other applicable or similar insurance under 
more than one insurance policy or provision of 
coverage: 
a. the TnaTinnim recovery under all policies 
combined will not exceed the maximum amount 
Fault, Amount and Arbitration 
The following two questions for the coverage under 
underinsured motorist protection must be decided by agreement 
pursuant to the provisions of the policy as follows: 
1. is the insured legally entitled to collect for bodily 
injury fcr damages from die owner or driver of an 
underinsured motor vehicle; and 
2. if so, in what amount? 
If we and a covered person do not agree: 
1. whether that person is legally entided to recover 
damages under this part; or 
2. as to die amount of damages; 
either patty may make a written demand for the matters to be 
* settled by arbitration. Any matter in dispute between you and 
us will be made pursuant to arbitration as provided for in die 
arbitration rules of die Arbitration Forums, Inc., a copy of 
which is available on request from the Company, which shall 
be binding on both you and the Company. The arbitration 
award may include attorney's fees if allowed by state law and 
may be entered as a judgment in any court of proper 
jurisdiction. Sudi arbitration shall be in compliance with the 
"Utah Arbitration Acf (Tide 78, Chapter 31a, Utah Code 
Annotated) or die applicable arbitration provisions in force and 
effect in Utah at the time. 
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PART D - COVERAGE FOR DAMAGE TO YOUR VEHICLE 
Insuring Agreement 
We will pay as follows: 
1. for any direct and accidental loss or damage to your 
covered vehicle, 
a. for which a premium is charged for each 
coverage, including its equipment, 
b. provided it is common to your vehicle, 
minus any deductiblefs] and subject to the limits of 
liability or as s^t forth on the Declaration page under 
Dl and D2; 
2. for the perils and coverage under D3 and D4 for 
which a premium is charged for each coverage, minus 
any deducnble[s], subject to the limits of liability as 
set forth on the Declaration page under D3 and D4 
because of a loss; 
Dl. COLLISION COVERAGE: 
"Collision" means the upset, or collision with another 
object by your covered or non-owned vehicle. However, 
loss caused by the following are not considered 
"collision": 
1. Missiles or falling objects; 
2. Hre; 
3. Theft or larceny; 
4. Explosion or earthquake: 
5- Windstorm; 
6. Hail, water or flood; 
7. Malicious mischief or vandalism; 
8. Riot or civil commotion; 
9. Contact with bird or animal; or 
10. Breakage of glass, except if part of a collision. 
The amounts payable under Dl are subject to the 
deductible and limits of liability as set forth on the 
Declaration page. 
D2. COMPREHENSIVE COVERAGE: 
"Comprehensive" means loss arising from any cause other 
than collision, including the breakage of glass, or loss 
caused by missiles, falling objects, fire, theft, larceny, 
explosion, earthquake, windstorm, hail, water, flood, 
malicious mischief, or vandalism, riot or civil commotion, 
and contact with a bird or an amnwi is payable under this 
coverage. 
If your covered vehicle is stolen, we will pay your 
incurred transportation costs at the rate of up to $14.00 per 
day, with a maximum amount of $420.00 for each loss. 
This coverage begins 48 hours after you notify the police 
and us of the theft and ends when: 
a. your covered vehicle is returned to you if it is 
driveable or in a repaired condition; or 
b. we offer to pay you the actual cash value of the 
vehicle. 
The amounts payable under D2 are subject to the 
deductible and limits of liability as set forth in the 
Declaration page. 
D3. TOWING AMD EMERGENCY ROAD SERVICE: 
We will pay the reasonable costs you incur for your 
covered vehicle due to loss: 
1. For a mechanic and the reasonable cost for his 
services at the place of breakdown, not to exceed one 
hour. 
2. The reasonable cost of towing your vehicle to a 
necessary place where repairs can be made if the 
vehicle will not run. 
3. The reasonable cost of towing your covered vehicle if 
it is stuck. 
4. The reasonable cost of delivery for gas, oil or a 
battery and change of a die, but we do not pay for 
the cost of these items. 
The amounts payable under D3 are subject to die 
deducttbie[s] and limits of liability as set forth in die 
Declaration page. 
D4. EXPENSE FOR CAR RENTAL: 
We win pay you, not to exceed, $14.00 per day for rental 
expenses incurred for a covered loss: 
1. if you rent a vehicle from a car rental agency or 
garage because your covered vehicle will not run due 
to a loss; 
2. when your covered vehicle runs and when you leave 
it at a repair establishment for agreed and necessary 
repairs pursuant to a written contract or agreement for 
repairs; 
Ending when 
1. die repairs have been made or completed; 
2. when we offer to pay for the loss; or 
3. the repair costs exceed the fair market value of die 
vehicle and we offer to pay for the loss; or 
4. die rental time has exceeded 30 days, 
whichever comes first 
Any rent payable under coverage D4 is reduced by any 
amount payable under the comprehensive. 
We win not pay rental time: 
1. while your covered vehicle is being repaired, 
serviced, or being used ^; ' person while that 
person is working in any car ousiness; 
2. while used in any other business or occupation. This 
does not apply to a private passenger car driven or 
occupied by the insured, his spouse or family 
member, 
3. for any covered vehicle while subject to any lien, 
rental or sales agreement not shown in the 
Declarations. 
The amounts payable under D 4 are subject to the 
deductible and limits of liability as set forth in the 
Declaration page. 
Duplication of Benefits 
There is no duplication of benefits under D l , D 2 , D 3 and D 4 
for the same elements of loss under this, or any similar 
insurance. 
Exclusions 
We will not pay f o n 
1. Loss to your covered vehicle or non-owned vehicle 
which occurs while it is used to c a n y persons or 
property for a fee. This exclusion does not apply to 
a share-the-expense car pooL 
2. Damage 6n& and confined to: 
a. w e a r and tear; 
b. freezing; 
c. mechanical or electrical breakdown or failure; or 
cL road damage to tires. 
This exclusion does not apply if the damage results 
from the total theft of your covered vehicle. 
3 . Loss due to or as a consequence of: 
a. radioactive contamination; 
b. discharge of any nuclear weapon (even if 
accidental); 
c. war, declared or undeclared, civil war, 
insurrection, rebellion or revolution; 
d. taking by any governmental authority or political 
subdivision; 
e. embezzlement, conversion, repossession by any 
person who has the vehicle.due to any lien, rental 
or sales agreement 
4 . Loss to equipment designed for the reproduction of 
sound, including, but not limited to loss to any of the 
fo l lowing or their accessories: 
a. c i t izens band radio; 
b. two-way mobile radio; 
c. telephone; 
d. scanning monitor receiver; 
e. racai c *ors; 
f. compac. _*sc players; 
g. stereos; or 
h. televisions. 
This exclusion does not apply if the equipment is 
permanently installed in the opening normally used by 
the auto manufacturer for the installation of this 
equipment, however, we do not pay in excess of 
S500.00 unless an extra premium has been charged 
for each item. 
5. Loss to tapes, records or other devices for use with 
equipment designed for the reproduction of sound. 
6. L o s s to a camper body or trailer not shown in the 
Declarations. This exclusion does not apply to a 
camper body or trailer that you: 
a. acquire during the policy period; and 
b . ask us to insure within 30 days after you become 
the owner. 
7 . Loss to: 
a. T V antennas; 
b . awnings or cabanas; or 
c. equipment designed to create additional living 
facilities. 
8. L o s s to any custom furnishings or equipment in or 
upon any motor vehicle. Custom furnishings or 
equipment include but are not limited to: 
a. special carpeting and insulation, furniture, bars or 
television receivers; 
b. facilities for cooking and sleeping; 
c height-extending roofs; 
d. custom murals, paintings or other decals or 
graphics; 
e . radar and telephones. 
9 . W e do not pay for loss to motor homes, campers, 
trailers and recreational vehicles owned or non-owned 
for which coverage is not purchased; 
10. Separate coverage may be purchased waiving 
paragraph 4 for accessories and customized 
furnishings, paragraph 8, if a separate premium is 
paid, but said waiver of customized furnishings shall 
n o t include custom murals, paintings or other decals 
or graphics. 
1 1 . W e do not pay for any loss or damage to your 
covered or non-owned . vehicle because o f 
embezzlement, conversion or repossession by any 
person who has taken possession of the vehicle due to 
any lien* rental or sales agreement 
12. We dq^ not pay for any Joss or damage on a covered 
vehicle if it is newly acquired and there is similar 
coverage on your newly acquired vehicle. 
Pagel4 
13. We do noc pay for any loss or damage on a covered 
or non-owned vehicle for tires unless they are 
damaged by fire, vandalism or they are stolen, unless 
they are covered by other provisions of this section. 
Limit of Liability under Collision and 
Comprehensive Coverages 
Our limit of liability for loss will be the lesser of the: 
1. actual cash value of the stolen or damaged property; 
or 
2. amount necessary to repair or replace the property. 
Cash value of damaged or stolen property is the fair market 
value of the property, taking into consideration its age, 
condition as of the date of the loss. Fair market value does 
not include any value for antique or sentimental value. The 
deductible will then be subtracted from the amount of the 
determined loss. 
Payment of Loss under Collision and 
Comprehensive Coverages 
We have the option to pay you for a loss of the property in 
one of the following manners: 
1. we may pay you for the fair market value of the 
property in money; or 
2. we may repair or replace the damaged or stolen 
property; if the repair or replacement results in an 
improvement to the condition, kind or quality, you 
must pay for the amount of the improvement 
3. we may, at our expense, return any stolen property to: 
a. you; or 
b. the address shown in this policy 
but you cannot abandon the property to us. 
4. if we return stolen property, we will pay for any 
damage resulting from the theft; or we may keep all 
or part of die property at an agreed or appraised 
value. 
No Benefit to Bailee 
This insurance shall not directly or indirectly benefit any 
carrier or other bailee for hire. 
Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability 
and Conditions of Other Insurance 
If there is other applicable liability we will pay only our share 
of the loss. Our share under this policy is the amount 
computed under ce applicable paragraph below. 
However, any insurance we provide for a vehicle you do noc 
own shall be excess over other collectible insurance. 
IF THERE IS OTHER LIABILITY COVERAGE: 
1. Policies Issued by Us to You: 
If two or more vehicle liability policies issued by us 
to you apply to the same accident, the total limits of 
liability under all such policies shall not exceed that of the 
policy with Ae highest limit of liability. 
2. Other Liability Coverage Available from Other 
Sources: 
If other liability coverage applies, we are liable only 
for our share of the damages. Our share is the percent 
that the limit of liability of this policy bears to the total of 
all liability coverage applicable to the accident. 
3. Temporary Substitute Auto, Non-Owned Auto, Trailer 
or Rental Auto: 
If a temporary substitute auto, a non-owned auto 
or trailer or rental auto designed for use with a private 
passenger auto or utility vehicle has other liability 
coverage which applies in whole or in part as primary, 
excess or contingent coverage, then our coverage is excess 
over other liability coverage. We do not contribute under 
this policy to any loss where: 
a. the motor vehicle or trailer is owned by any person or 
organization in the auto business; and 
b. a non-owned or rental vehicle maintained or used in 
any business or business pursuits or business activity, 
including salespersons, employees who are using or 
who have lotted a car in connection with their 
livelihood; 
4. Newly-Acquired Vehicle: 
Our coverage does not apply if there is other vehicle 
liability coverage on a newly-acquired vehicle. 
Appraisal and Arbitratioii 
If we and a covered person do not agree: 
1. whether that person is legally entitled to recover 
damages under this pact; or 
2. as to the amount of damages; 
the parties may agree in writing to have the loss 
determined by competent appraisals, as set forth in 
paragraph A. 
If you or we do not desire to proceed with the appraisal 
process, as sax. forth in paragraph A, either party may 
demand arbitration, as sec forth u agraph B. 
A. APPRAISAL: If we and you do not agree on the 
amount of the loss, in this event each party will select 
a competent appraiser. The two appraisers will select 
an umpire. The appraisers will state separately the 
actual cash value and the amount of loss. If they fail 
to agree, they will submit their differences to the 
umpire. A decision agreed to by any two will be 
binding. Each party will: 
1. pay its chosen appraiser; and 
2. bear the expenses of the appraisal and umpire 
equally. 
We do not waive any of our rights under this policy 
by agreeing to an appraisal 
B. ARBITRATION: If we and the covered person do 
not agree to settle the matter by appraisal, or in the 
event that you do not desire to proceed by selecting 
competent appraisers, either party may make a written 
demand for arbitration. Any matter in dispute 
between you and us will be made pursuant to 
arbitration as provided for in the arbitration rules of 
PART E - SPECIAL CONDITIONS 
Section I - General Conditions 
jL Action Against Company. No action shall lie 
against the Company unless as a condition precedent 
thereto, there shall have been full compliance with all 
the terms of this coverage. 
B. Notice. In the event of an accident, notice containing 
particulars sufficient to identify the eligible covered 
person* and also reasonably obtainable Information 
respecting die time, place and circumstances of the 
accident shaE be given by or on behalf of each 
eligible covered person to the Company at the home 
office as soon as practicable. If any eligible covered 
person, his legal representative or his survivors shall 
institute legal action to recover damages for bodily 
injury against a person or organization who is or may 
be liable in tort therefor, a copy of the summons and 
complaint or otfier process served in connection with 
such legal action shall be forwarded as soon as 
practicable to the Company by such eligible person, 
his legal representative, or his survivors. 
Section II - Prohibited Use of Alcohol and Drags 
for All Coverages 
You understand and agree as follows: 
the Arbitral Forums, Inc., a copy of v/hich is 
available on request from the Company, which shall 
be binding on both you and the Company. The 
arbitration award may include attorney's fees if 
allowed by state law and may be entered as a 
judgment in any court of proper jurisdiction. Such 
arbitration shall be in compliance with the "Utah 
Arbitradon Act" (Tide 78, Chapter 31a. Utah Code 
Annotated) or the applicable arbitration provisions in 
force and effect in Utah at the time. 
Additional Duties for Coverage for Damage to 
Your Covered Vehicle 
A person seeking Coverage for Damage to Your Covered 
Vehicle must also: 
1. Take reasonable steps after loss to protect your 
covered vehicle and its equipment from farther loss. 
We will pay reasonable expenses incurred to do this. 
2. Prompdy notify the police if your covered vehicle is 
stolen or damaged. 
3. Permit as to inspect and appraise the damaged 
property before its repair or disposal 
APPLYING TO ALL COVERAGES 
A. That we do not issue policies to persons who 
consume any alcohol or alcoholic beverages or who 
use or consume any illegal drugs or who use or 
consume illegal substances, or who will operate any 
motor vehicle after having consumed alcoholic 
beverages of any kind or in any amount whatsoever 
or who allow the insured vehicle to be operated by 
anyone who consumes any alcohol or alcoholic 
beverages or who uses or consumes any illegal drugs 
or illegal substances or who operate the insured 
vehicle after consuming alcohol or alcoholic 
beverages of any kind or in any amount, or after 
using or consuming any illegal drugs or illegal 
substances. 
B. The ngmed insured further understands that the 
premiums charged for coverage under this policy 
reflect the reduced risk present with insured who do 
not consume any alcohol or alcoholic beverages, or 
who do not use or consume any illegal drugs or 
illegal substances, or operate a motor vehicle after 
having consumed alcohol or alcoholic beverages of 
any Vrrrf or in any amount, or who have used or 
consumed any illegal drugs or illegal substances; and 
who do not allow the insured motor vehicles to be 
operated by anyone who consumes alcohol or 
alcohoEc beverages or has consumed an alcoholic 
beverage of any kind or in any amount, or who has 
used or consumed any illegal drugs or illegal 
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substances, and that the company would not issue a 
policy to the named insured except upon this 
representation and agreement. 
For any loss incurred under this policy when the 
insured motor vehicle is being operated by someone 
who has consumed any alcohol or alcoholic beverages 
of any kind or in any amount whatsoever, or who has 
used or consumed any illegal drugs or illegal 
substances of any kind or in any amount whatsoever 
then the coverage under Pan iC Part B, Part CI, Part 
CI and Pan D of this policy shall apply only for the 
minimum limits of motor vehicle liability coverage as 
provided for in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, including §31A-22-304, §31A-22-305 and 
§31A-22-307 providing for bodily injury and property 
damage, personal injury protection, uninsured motorist 
coverage and underinsured motorist coverage and 
damage to your vehicle because of injury or 
destruction of property not the amounts set forth in 
the Declaration, if greater. If the motor vehicle is 
being operated by an Insured as applied in this 
section, outside of the state of Utah, then this policy 
only provides the minimum limits of bodily injury 
and property damage, personal injury protection, 
uninsured motorist coverage and underinsured 
motorist coverage and damage to your 
vehicle, if w,/, applicable in the state in which the 
vehicle is being operated and not the amount stated in 
the declarations if greater. 
D. This provision providing for minimum limits of motor 
vehicle liability coverage for bodily injury and 
proper^ damage as applied in this section applies to 
all motor vehicles, whether owned or non-owned and 
to all coverages. 
Section m - Special Conditions Applying to All 
Coverages, Except A, Arbitration 
The Company and any Insured or Covered Person agree that 
on any matter in dispute between die Insured or Covered 
Person and the Company, that any of the above have the right 
to make a written demand for all matters to be settled by 
arbitration. Any matter in dispute between You and Us will be 
made pursuant to arbitration as provided for in the arbitration 
rules of the Arbitration Forums, fiux, a copy of which is 
available on request from die Company, which shall be binding 
on both You and the Company. The arbitration award may 
include attorney's fees if allowed by state law and may be 
entered as a judgment in any court of proper jurisdiction. Such 
arbitration shall be in compliance with the "Utah Arbitration 
Act" (Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah Code Annotated) or die 
applicable arbitration provisions in force and effect in Utah at 
the time. 
PART F - DUTIES AFTER AN ACCIDENT OR LOSS FOR ALL 
COVERAGES 
General Duties 
We must be notified prompdy of how, when and where the 
accident or loss happened Notice should also include the 
names and addresses of any injured persons and of any 
witnesses. 
A covered person seeking any coverage must 
1. Cooperate with us in the investigation, settlement or 
defense of any claim or suit. 
2. Prompdy send us copies of any notices or legal 
papers received in connection with the accident or 
loss. 
3. Submit, as often as we reasonably require, to physical 
exams by physicians we select We will pay for these 
exams. 
4. Authorize as to obtain: 
a. medical reports; and 
b. other pertinent records. 
5. Furnish us with a proof of claim in particularity as to 
any damages or loss under oath and properly verified 
if requested by us for damage to your covered or non-
owned vehicle, medical expenses, medical treatment, 
and all losses and damages in any form which you 
claim you are entitled to under the policy and such 
other and further information that may assist the 
company in determining the amount due because of 
die loss. 
6. Submit to examinations under oath as reasonably 
required by us. 
PART G - GENERAL PROVISIONS, APPLYING i j ALL COVERAGES 
Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy or insolvency of the covered person shall not 
relieve us of any obligations under this policy. 
Fraud 
We do not provide coverage for any "Insured" who has made 
fraudulent statements or engaged in fraudulent conduct in 
connection with any accident or loss for which coverage is 
sought under this policy. 
All Agreements Between You and Us 
This policy contains all the agreements between you and us. 
Its terms may not be changed or waived except by 
endorsement issued by us. If a change requires a premium 
adjustment, we will adjust the premium as of the effective date 
of change. 
We may revise this policy form to provide more coverage 
without additional premium charge. If we do this your policy 
will automatically provide the additional coverage as of the 
date the revision is effective in Utah. 
Legal Action Against Us 
No legal action may be brought against us until there has been 
full compliance with all the terms of this policy. In addition, 
under Pan A, no legal action may be brought against us until: 
1. we agree in writing that the covered person has an 
obligation to pay; or 
2„ die amount of that obligation has been determined by 
arbitration or judgment after a trial, as applicable 
under the various coverages of this policy. 
No person or organization has any right under this policy to 
bring us into any action to detennine the liability of a covered 
person. 
Subrogation 
In the event of any payment to any person under all coverages: 
1. The Company is subrogated to the rights of the 
person to whom or for whose benefit such payments 
were made, to the extent of such payments, and such 
person must execute and deliver instruments and 
papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure 
such rights. Such person shall do nothing 
after loss to prejudice such rights. 
a. If the Insured proceeds or commences an 
action against a legally responsible third party, 
the Company shall be entitled to the extent of 
such payment to the proceeds of any settlement 
or judgment that may result from the exercise of 
any rights of recovery of such person against any 
person or organization legally responsible for the 
bodily injury or property damage because of 
which such payment is made and the Company 
shall have a lien to the extent of such payment, 
nonce of which may be given to the person or 
organization causing such bodily injury, his agent, 
his insurer or a court having jurisdiction in the 
matter, such person shall hold in trust for the 
benefit of the Company all rights of recovery 
which he shall have against such other person or 
organization because of such bodily injury. 
b. If the Company proceeds or commences an 
action against a legally responsible third party, 
the Company may, at its option, and has the right 
to proceed or commence against any third party, 
which may be liable for damages to die Insured 
for bodily injury, medical expenses, property 
damages or other payments. The Insured agrees 
in consideration of the payments made under this 
policy to subrogate the said Company to all rights 
and causes of action the Insured has against any 
persons or corporations whomsoever, arising out 
of or incident to the bodily injury, medical 
expenses or property damage or other payments, 
authorizes the Company to sue and commence an 
action in die name of the Insured, but at the 
expense of the Company against any third party 
pledging full cooperation in the action for his 
deductible. The Ensured assigas his deductible, if 
any, to the Company and authorizes the Company 
to sue in the name of the Insured as part of the ~ 
overall cause of action. In the event of any 
reimbursement, collection or payment by a third 
party, from the payment or proceeds the 
Company will be paid and reimbursed first for 
any costs of litigation and reasonable attorney 
fees necessarily incurred. The remaining 
payments or proceeds will be distributed in direct 
proportion to each interest (the amount of the 
Insured's deductible) in proportion to- the 
Company's payments pursuant to the provisions 
of this policy for which it has a subrogatable 
interest. 
The benefits and provisions of subrogation, as herein provided, 
are subject to the provisions of Utah Code 
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Annotated, 1953. §3lA-22-3Q9, * -its. Exclusions and 
Conditions to Personal Injury Protection and providing for 
mandatory binding arbitration between insurers; and the 
provision for that reimbursement and the amount decided by 
mandatory binding arbitration between the insurers is not pan 
of the subrogation rights as provided herein. 
Policy Period and Territory 
1. This policy applies only to accidents and losses which 
occur during the policy period as shown in the 
Declarations and within the policy territory. The 
policy territory is the United States of America, its 
territories or possessions, Puerto Rico or Canada. 
This policy also applies to loss to, or accidents 
involving, your covered vehicle while being 
transported between their ports. 
2. The policy term is shown on the Declaration page and 
is for successive periods of time if renewed for which 
you pay a renewal premium. 
3. The policy begins and ends at 12:01 ajn. standard 
time at the address shown on the Declaration page. 
Termination 
and Us 
Cancellation, Non-renewal by You 
A. Cancellation by You. 
You may cancel this policy during any policy period 
by returning it to us or by letting us know in writing 
of the date cancellation is to take effect, but the date 
of cancellation must be prospectively after the date 
that you let us know you intend to cancel 
B. Cancellation by Us. 
We may cancel this policy only for the reasons stated 
below by letting you know in writing of the date 
cancellation takes effect in the following manner 
1. When you have not paid the premium, we may 
cancel at any time by letting you know at least 10 
days before the date cancellation takes effect 
2. When this policy has been in effect for less than 
60 days and is not a renewal with us, we may 
cancel for any reason by letting you know at least 
10 days before* the date of the cancellation. If the 
notice of cancellation is by mail, it will be sent 
first class, postage prepaid and the 10 days takes 
effect three days after the date of mailing. 
3. When this policy has been in effect for 60 days 
or more, or at any time if it is a renewal with us, 
we may cancel: 
a. if .e has been material misrepresentation 
of fact which if known to us would have 
caused us not to issue the policy; or 
b. if the risk has changed substanrially since the 
policy was issued; 
c. if there have been substantia! breaches of 
contractual duties, conditions and warranties; 
d. if there has been a revocation or suspension 
of the driver's license of the named insured, 
or any other person who customarily drives 
the car. 
Tins can be done by letting you know at least 30 
days before the date cancellation takes effect. 
4. Waen this policy is written for a period of more 
than one year, we may cancel for any reason at 
anniversary by letting you know at least 30 days 
before die date cancellation takes effect: 
a. when this policy is canceled, the premium 
for the period from die date of cancellation 
to the expiration date will be refunded pro 
rata; 
b. if the return premium is not refunded with 
the notice of cancellation or when tins policy 
is returned to us, we will refund it within a 
reasonable time after the date cancellation 
takes effect. 
5. If your policy is canceled or not renewed you 
have the right by First Class Mail to request the 
reasons for the cancellation and non-renewal of 
your policy. This will be sent to you within tea 
woriring days after written request 
6. Any cancellation, termination or non-renewal 
nonces as required herein, under the provisions of 
tins paragraph and the provisions of Part G, 
Termination - Cancellation, Non-renewal by Us* 
paragraphs 1 through 5, may be delivered to you 
or mailed to you at your mailing address shown 
in the declarations and proof of mailing will be 
sufficient proof of notice. 
C Automatic Termination. 
If we offer to renew or continue your policy and you 
or your representative do not accept, this policy will 
automatically terminate at the end of the anient 
policy period. Failure to'pay the required renewal or 
continuation premium when due shall mean that you 
have not accepted our offer. 
If you obtain other insurance on your covered vehicle, 
any similar insurance provided by this policy will 
terminate as to the covered date on the effective date 
of die odier insurance. 
SB IT REMEM8EREDThat John Wall and Nancv Wall 
Address 1269 West California. Salt Lake Citv, Utah 8410* 
(hereinafter referred to as the Claimant s J for and in consideration of the sum of S i x t e e n Thousand and no/lOOs 
Dollarsg 1 6 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) 
the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do we hereby REMISS, RELEASE AND FOREVER DISCHARGE 
David Waters d/V/a D & L Cons truc t ion and Lana Waters 
TTft—rt H«-t ruu N*mm ol P*r%oc%u Qoroonuom or ^%rxnmru\tox To B« fttwww) 
T h e i r ***r*t* and «»«wits arsf el! <y&sr person, firms, and orporstans *-hcmscsvsr of end from sny 2nd ai! scsons, 
(His, HOT. jnotr , its) 
daims, and demands whatsoever which daimant s now have or may have, whether known or unknown, developed or un-
developed, on account*of or arising out of the accident, casualty or event which happened on or about the 7 th day of 
As a further consideration for said Sum Claimant s warrant that no promise or agreement not herein expressed has 
been made to Claimant s ; that in executing this Release Claimant s are not relying upon any statement or representation 
(IV A*** 
made by the party or parties hereby released or said party's or parties' agents, servants or physicians concerning the nature, 
extent, or duration of the injuries and/or damages, or concerning any other thing or natter, but are relying solely upon 
t h e i r own judgment; that the above mentioned sum is received by Claimants in full settlement and satisfaction 
(Wtt, « « i , Tftoif, US) - - - - - -
of all the aforesaid daims and demands whasoever; that Oaimantc ar» legally competent to execute this Release: and that be-
ds. Ami 
fore signing and sealing this Release, Claimant
 c Savn fully informed ^ a - ^ o i y a g of its contents and meaning 
(Has, MSV«) (Hunsait, nortttt, Tnomsoms) 
and have executed it with full knowledge thereof. It is further understood and agreed that the payment of said amount is 
not to be construed as an admission of liability, but is a compromise of a disputed daon. 
HAVE READ THE FOREGOING RELEASE AND FULLTUNOERSTANirir^ 
Signed, sealed and delivered this 
_ ^ _ tiav of "l/IOjCiJ^^ 
at > ^ S ^ s h s ~lC£UsA- «4 3s**Z>L~f -^jLj^JX^ 
» _ _ / . 
In the presence of 
Witness: 
Witness: 
Witness: 
(Claimants sign below) 
(/NOTARY PUBUC 
2«*7 Hawthorne Or. 
layton, UT 8AOU 77 
(Seal) 
(Seal) 
(Seal) 
THOMAS A. DUFFIN (0927) 
DANIEL 0. DUFFIN (6530) 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-6600 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE ] 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN WALL and 
NANCY WALL, his wife, ] 
Defendants. 
I ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT 
I Civil No. 940905590CN 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for hearing before the 
above-entitled Court on the 24th day of August, 1995, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., the 
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding, Thomas A. Duffin appearing for and on behalf 
of Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, and John and Nancy Wall 
appearing per se, whereupon the Court heard the respective argument of the parties, 
pursuant to Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or in lieu thereof, Motion 
for Summary Judgment, and Defendants' counter Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
pursuant to the pleadings, the following facts are not in dispute: 
1. The Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, (hereinafter 
"Bear River") is an insurance corporation engaged in the insurance business in the 
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state of Utah, is a non-profit corporation and is owned entirely by its policyholders for 
the use and benefit of the policyholders, having its principal place of business at 778 
Winchester, Murray, Utah. Bear River Mutual only issues insurance policies in the 
state of Utah. 
2. Defendants, John Wall and Nancy Wal l , his wi fe, are residents of 
Davis County, State of Utah, and reside at 802 Montague, Bountiful, Utah 84010 . 
3. This action is brought pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended §78-33-1, et.seq. seeking by determination the rights of the parties hereto 
under a policy issued by Plaintiff, Policy No. C145077. 
4 . On or about June 5, 1992, and continuing through June 5, 1993, 
Plaintiff had issued its standard automobile Policy No. C145077, to John Wall and 
Nancy Wall, his wi fe . A copy of the policy is attached as Exhibit "A" and a copy of 
the declaration page is attached as Exhibit "B" to Plaint i f fs Complaint. 
5. That the auto policy issued to Defendants, provides under PART 
B - PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE, Insuring Agreement, as fol lows: 
"The Company will pay personal injury protection benefits that are reasonable 
and necessary to or on behalf of each eligible injured person for: 
(a) medical expenses 
(b) work loss 
(c) funeral expenses 
(d) survivor loss and 
(e) special damages 
with respect to bodily injury sustained by an eligible insured person caused by 
an accident involving the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. 
Medical Payments: 
The maximum amount payable for medical expenses shall not exceed 
$3,000.00; unless additional medical protection or payments are provided for 
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on the Declaration page, they must be incurred within three years of the date 
of the accident to be payable. 
Policy Period, Territory, Other Limits of Liability and Special Provisions 
This coverage applies only to accidents which occur during the policy period in 
the United States and Canada, except if an auto accident to which this policy 
applies occurs outside of Utah, (but is within the United States and Canada), 
our limits of liability under your policy for that accident are as follows: 
1. If the state, (outside of Utah) or Canada, has: 
a. a personal injury protection or similar law specifying limits higher 
than that in the declarations, your policy will provide the higher 
specified limit; 
Special Conditions if Law is Declared Invalid 
The premium for the policy is based on rates which have been established in 
reliance upon the limitations on the right to recover for damages imposed by the 
provisions of the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. In the event a court 
of competent jurisdiction declares or enters a judgment, the effect of which is 
to render the provisions of such act invalid or unenforceable in whole or in part, 
the Company shall have the right to recompute the premium payable for the 
policy and the provisions of this endorsement shall be voidable or subject to 
amendment at the option of the Company. 
Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and Conditions of Other 
Insurance Under our Personal Injury Protection 
1. No eligible injured person shall recover or receive duplicate benefits for the 
same elements of loss under this or any similar insurance." 
6. Under PART G - GENERAL PROVISIONS, APPLYING TO ALL 
COVERAGES, Subrogation, it provides: 
"In the event of any payment to any person under all coverages: 
1. The Company is subrogated to the rights of the person to whom or for 
whose benefit such payments were made, to the extent of such 
payments, and such person must execute and deliver instruments and 
papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such rights. Such 
person shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights. 
a. If the Insured proceeds or commences an action against a legally 
responsible third party, the Company shall be entitled to the 
extent of such payment to the proceeds of any settlement or 
judgment that may result from the exercise of any rights of 
recovery of such person against any person or organization 
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legally responsible for the bodily injury or property damage 
because of which such payment is made and the Company shall 
have a lien to the extent of such payment, notice of which may 
be given to the person or organization causing such bodily injury, 
his agent, his insurer or a court having jurisdiction in the matter; 
such person shall hold in trust for the benefit of the Company all 
rights of recovery which he shall have against such other person 
or organization because of such bodily injury." 
7. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-308 provides: 
"The fol lowing may receive benefits under personal injury protection 
coverage: 
(1) the named insured, when injured in an acciaent involving any 
motor vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in this state, 
the United States, its territories or possessions, or Canada, except 
where the injury is the result of the use or operation of the named 
insured's own motor vehicle not actually insured under the pol icy;" 
8. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31 A-22-309(6) 
provides: 
"(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is 
subject to the fol lowing: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held 
legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to w h o m 
benefits required under personal injury protection have been paid by 
another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, 
the insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall 
reimburse the other insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the 
amount of damages recoverable;" 
9. On or about August 6, 1992, the Plaint i f fs insured, Nancy Wal l , 
while a resident of Utah, was involved in an automobile accident on Colorado State 
Highway 666 at Cortez, Colorado, 
10. That on or about March 4 , 1994, John Wall and Nancy Wall 
executed a release of nany and all actions, claims, and demands whatsoever which 
claimants now have or may have, whether known or unknown, developed, or 
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undeveloped, on account of or arising out of the accident, casualty or event which 
happened on or about the 7th day of August, 1992." A copy of the release to the tort 
feasors, David & Lana Waters, is attached as Exhibit C to Plaintiffs Complaint, and 
the release was less than the insurance limits of the tort feasors. 
11. Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment for the interpretation 
of its policy provisions and whether Plaintiff is under an obligation pursuant to Utah 
law to make further personal injury protection benefit payments as provided for in Part 
B of its policy providing for personal injury protection benefits to Defendants was filed 
promptly and commenced in good faith by Plaintiff after receiving knowledge of the 
general release of the tort feasors by Defendants, jointly and severally. There were 
legal, debatable, questions of law and there exists a reasonable question as to the 
issues of law for denial of the claim of Defendants by Plaintiff. 
12. The Court examined the briefs of the Plaintiff and Defendants and 
the cases and authorities cited by both, and finds that that the Plaintiff's Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings or for summary judgment, should be denied, and that 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted and that Plaintiff should 
be required to pay further personal injury protection claims to Defendants, John Wall 
and Nancy Wall, pursuant to Part B of its policy under the personal injury protection 
benefits. 
13. The Court hereby dismisses the Counterclaim of the Defendants 
on the basis that it attempts to include a criminal action with a civil action and, 
therefore, is an improper counterclaim; the Court further denies the Defendants' 
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Motion to amend their Counterclaim based upon the settlement of the issues herein 
set forth. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED: 
1 . That the Defendants, John and Nancy Wall's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted and Plaintiff is required to pay to John and Nancy Wall, pursuant 
to the provisions of its policy, Part B, Personal Injury Protection, those benefits since 
the time of the release signed by Defendants on March 4, 1994, pursuant to the terms 
and conditions of the policy. 
2. That Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for 
Summary Judgment is denied. 
3. That the counterclaim filed by Defendants, John Wall and Nancy 
Wall, is hereby dismissed, and the Defendants' request to file an amended 
counterclaim is denied. y^fyf 
Dated this & day of March, 1996. 
BY THE CO 
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Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Judgment to 
the following parties by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
John Wall and 
Nancy Wall 
P.O. Box 540118 
No. Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
postage prepaid, this /^ day of March, 1996. 
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(801) 531-6600 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN WALL and 
NANCY WALL, his wife, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
IIOTICE OF flPPEBL 
Civil No. 940905590CN 
JUDGE CLC::V.:.!WASAK1 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, by and through their attorney, 
Thomas A. Duffin, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, from 
the judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
entered in this matter on the 8th day of March, 1996, as attached. The parties to the 
judgment appealed from and the names and addresses of their respective attorneys 
are as follows: 
flame Address 
John and Nancy Wall 
Defendants 
P.O. Box 540118 
No. Salt Lake, UT 84054 
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This Notice is filed pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Dated this 3 day of April, 1996. 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
^iPfiomas A. Duffin 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
\J J°^ 
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Notice of 
Appeal to the following parties by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
John Wall 
P.O. Box 540118 
No. Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
postage prepaid, this 3 day of April, 1996. 
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7> 
Mailing Certific t
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Notice of 
Appeal to the following parties by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Nancy Wall 
P.O. Box 540118 
No. Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
postage prepaid, this ^ day of April, 1996. 
CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 31A-22-307 
(a) the occurrence causing the property damage involves actual physi-
cal contact between the covered motor vehicle and an uninsured motor 
vehicle; 
(b) the owner, operator, or license plate number of the uninsured motor 
vehicle is identified; and 
(c) the insured or someone on his behalf reports the occurrence within 
ten days to the insurer or his agent. 
(4) The coverage provided under this section shall be subject to a $250 
deductible and shall be excess to any other insurance covering property 
damage to the motor vehicle described in the policy. 
(5) The insurer providing coverage under this section may make available 
additional deductibles at appropriate premium rates. 
(6) No rating surcharge may be applied to any policy of motor vehicle 
insurance issued in this state as a result of payment of a claim made under this 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-305.5, enacted Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 321, § 2 
by L. 1990, ch. 321, § 1. makes the act effective on October 1,1990. 
31A-22-306. Personal injury protection. 
Personal injury protection under Subsection 31A-22-302(2) provides the 
coverages and benefits described under Section 31A-22-307 to persons de-
scribed under Section 31A-22-308, but is subject to the limitations, exclusions, 
and conditions set forth in Section 31A-22-309. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-306, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 158. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AXJL — Combining or "stacking" of "no ages in automobile liability policy or policies, 29 
fault* or personal injury protection (PD?) cover- A.L.R-4th 12. 
3XA-22-307. Personal injury protection coverages and 
benefits. 
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits include: 
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical, 
X-ray, dental, rehabilitation, including prosthetic devices, ambulance, 
hospital, and nursing services, not to exceed a total of $3,000 per person; 
(b) (i) the lesser of $250 per week or 85% of any loss of gross income and 
loss of earning capacity per person from inability to work, for a 
maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the loss, except that this 
benefit need not be paid for the first three days of disability, unless the 
disability continues for longer than two consecutive weeks after the 
date of injury; and 
(ii) a special damage allowance not exceeding $20 per day for a 
maximum of 365 days, for services actually rendered or expenses 
reasonably incurred for services that, but for the injury, the injured 
person would have performed for his household, except that this 
benefit need not be paid for the first three days after the date of injury 
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unless the person's inability to perform these services continues for 
more than two consecutive weeks; 
(c) funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to exceed a total of $1,500 
per person; and 
(d) compensation on account of death of a person, payable to his heirs, 
in the total of $3,000. 
(2) (a) To determine the reasonable value of the medical expenses provided 
for in Subsection (1) and under Subsection 31A-22-309(l)(e), the commis-
sioner shall conduct a relative value study of services and accommodations 
for the diagnosis, care, recovery, or rehabilitation of an injured person in 
the most populous county in the state to assign a unit value and determine 
the 75th percentile charge for each type of service and accommodation. 
The study shall be updated every other year. In conducting the study, the 
department may consult or contract with appropriate public and private 
medical and health agencies or other technical experts. The costs and 
expenses incurred in conducting, maintaining, and administering the 
relative value study shall be funded by the tax created under Section 
59-9-105. Upon completion of the study, the department shall prepare and 
publish a relative value study which sets forth the unit value and the 75th 
percentile charge assigned to each type of service and accommodation. 
(b) The reasonable value of any service or accommodation is determined 
by applying the unit value and the 75th percentile charge assigned to the 
service or accommodation under the relative value study. If a service or 
accommodation is not assigned a unit value or the 75th percentile charge 
under the relative value study, the value of the service or accommodation 
shall equal the reasonable cost of the same or similar service or accom-
modation in the most populous county of this state. 
(c) This subsection does not preclude the department from adopting a 
schedule already established or a schedule prepared by persons outside 
the department, if it meets the requirements of this subsection. 
(d) Every insurer shall report to the Commissioner of Insurance any 
patterns of overcharging, excessive treatment, or other improper actions 
by a health provider within 30 days after such insurer has knowledge of 
such pattern. 
(e) In disputed cases, a court on its own motion or on the motion of 
either party may designate an impartial medical panel of not more than 
three licensed physicians to examine the claimant and testify on the issue 
of the reasonable value of the claimant's medical services or expenses. 
(3) Medical expenses as provided for in Subsection (l)(a) and in Subsection 
31A-22-309(l)(e) include expenses for any nonmedical remedial care and 
treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method of 
healing. 
(4) The insured may waive for the named insured and the named insured's 
spouse only the loss of gross income benefits of Subsection (l)(b)(i) if the 
insured states in writing that: 
(a) within 31 days of applying for coverage, neither the insured nor the 
insured's spouse received any earned income from regular employment; 
and 
(b) for at least 180 days from the date of the writing and during the 
period of insurance, neither the insured nor the insured's spouse will 
receive earned income from regular employment. 
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(5) This section does not prohibit the issuance of policies of insurance 
providing coverages greater than the minimum coverage required under this 
chapter nor does it require the segregation of those minimum coverages from 
other coverages in the same policy. 
(6) Deductibles are not permitted with respect to the insurance coverages 
required under this section 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-307, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 159; 
1989, ch. 261, § 13; 1990, ch. 327, § 8; 1991, 
ch. 74, § 7; 1994, ch. 71, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, divided former 
Subsection (2) into present Subsections (2)(a) to 
(2)(d) and substituted "Deductibles are not per-
mitted" for "An insurer may not offer policies 
that require deductibles" in Subsection (5). 
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 
ANALYSIS 
Allowable benefits. 
—Household services. 
—Loss of earnings. 
Arbitration panel. 
Dismissal of claim. 
Time computation. 
Tort claims, 
—Availability of insurance benefits. 
—Motorist's liability. 
Allowable benefits. 
—Household services. 
The phrase "and regardless of whether any of 
these expenses are actually incurred* in former 
version of this section was included to elimi-
nate the necessity of proving such expenses and 
to prevent the insurer from claiming the benefit 
of services rendered gratuitously by friends or 
relatives which otherwise would have to be 
paid for; it did not require that reimbursement 
be made any time a family lost the services of 
one of its members regardless of the character 
of those services. Jamison v. Utah Home Fire 
Ins. Co., 559 R2d 958 (Utah 1977). 
Former provisions did not require insurer to 
pay the family of a twelve-year-old boy injured 
in an automobile accident $12 per day during 
the period of the boy's disablement as reim-
bursement for the value of lost services, which 
would have consisted of doing dishes, carrying 
out the garbage, washing the family car, and 
other similar chores because it was not reason-
able to assume that the family would in fact 
have incurred expenses to perform the boy's 
chores, and so they were not entitled to reim-
bursement. Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. 
Co., 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977). 
1991, inserted "maintaining, and administer-
ing* in the next-to-last sentence in Subsection 
(2)(a), added present Subsection (2)(d) and re-
designated former Subsection (2)(d) as present 
Subsection (2)(e) and made minor stylistic 
changes in Subsection (l)(a) and in the second 
sentence in Subsection (2)(a). 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, 
added Subsection (4), renumbering former Sub-
sections (4) and (5) as Subsections (5) and (6). 
If a person is not "disabled" for purposes of 
loss of earnings benefits, neither is he "dis-
abled" for purposes of household services bene-
fits. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 592 P.2d 
609 (Utah 1979). 
The legislature intended to establish the 
mandatory household services benefit as an 
aggregate maximum of $20 per day of disabil-
ity, up to a maximum of 365 days of disability, 
and not as an individual maximum of $20 on 
each day services are actually rendered. Tanner 
v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
—Loss of earnings. 
"Disability* refers to the inability to work; 
injured party who was able to work during the 
period for which disability benefits were sought 
and who earned more than $150 per week 
during the entire time for which benefits were 
sought was not entitled to disability benefits for 
loss of earnings. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 
592 PJ2d 609 (Utah 1979). 
A claimant who was unemployed at the time 
of his or her accident can collect disability 
benefits for lost wages from prospective em-
ployment only if the claimant establishes that a 
job was available for which the claimant was 
qualified and that the claimant would have 
taken that job. The legislature did not intend to 
provide compensation for "loss of earning ca-
pacity* unless a claimant has suffered a direct 
and specific monetary loss. Versluis v. Guar-
anty Natl Cos., 842 R2d 865 (Utah 1992). 
Arbitration panel. 
Failure to arbitrate a claim before a panel 
was not a ground for dismissal of plaintiff's 
complaint. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct App. 1993). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Dismissal of claim. 
This statute provides no basis on which to 
dismiss a claim., Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 851 R2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
Time computation. 
The 52 consecutive week period in Subsection 
(IXbXi) runs from the loss of gross income and 
loss of earning capacity, not from the date of the 
accident. Plaintiff who did not begin to suffer 
loss of income and loss of earning capacity until 
six months after an accident and continued to 
suffer that loss for a period exceeding the 
maximum benefit of 52 weeks was improperly 
denied coverage when the trial court only pro-
vided for coverage for 52 weeks following the 
date of the accident. Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
217 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Ct App. 1993). 
Tort claims. 
—Availability of insurance benefits. 
No-fault benefits are available to those who 
sustain serious injury even though they remain 
free to pursue a tort claim as well; however, the 
injured person is not entitled to a double recov-
ery from the tort-feasor and under no-fault for a 
single loss. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 592 
P.2d 609 (Utah 1979). 
Where insured brought action against his 
no-fault insurer seeking additional no-fault 
benefits after receiving benefits from the no-
fault insurer and obtaining a judgment against 
a third-party tort-feasor, insured was collater-
ally estopped from recovering additional no-
fault benefits in the form of lost wages but was 
not collaterally estopped from recovering for 
household expenses. Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. 
Co., 635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981). 
—Motorist's liability. 
A party having the security required under 
this section is granted partial tort immunity 
and is not personally liable for the benefits 
provided hereunder; he remains liable for cus-
tomary tort claims, such as general damages 
and economic losses not compensated by the 
benefits paid hereunder, if the threshold provi-
sions of § 31A-22-309 are met Allstate Ins. Co. 
v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C JT.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 113. 
AXJEL — Validity and construction of "no-
fault" automobile insurance plans, 42 A.L.R.3d 
229. 
Validity of state statute prohibiting health 
providers from the practice of waiving patients' 
obligation to pay health insurance deductibles 
or copayments, or advertising such practice, 8 
Ai.R.5th 855. 
Key Numbers. —Automobiles «• 43. 
31A-22-308. Persons covered by personal injury protec-
tion. 
The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection cover-
age: 
(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident involving any motor 
vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in this state, the United 
States, its territories or possessions, or Canada, except where the injury is 
the result of the use or operation of the named insured's own motor vehicle 
not actually insured under the policy; 
(2) persons related to the insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or 
guardianship who are residents of the insured's household, including 
those who usually make their home in the same household but temporar-
ily live elsewhere under the circumstances described in Section (1), except 
where the person is injured as a result of the use or operation of his own 
motor vehicle not insured under the policy; and 
(3) any other natural person whose injuries arise out of an automobile 
accident occurring while the person occupies a motor vehicle described in 
the policy with the express or implied consent of the named insured or 
while a pedestrian if he is injured in an accident occurring in Utah 
involving the described motor vehicle. 
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History: C. 1953, 31A-22-308, enacted by 
L, 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1990, ch. 327, § 9. 
Amendment Notes, — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, divided the for-
merly undivided language in Subsection (1) 
into present Subsections (1) and (2); redesig-
nated former Subsection (2) as present Subsec-
tion (3); substituted "when injured in an acci-
dent involving any motor vehicle, regardless of 
whether the accident occurs in this state, the 
United States, its territories or possessions, or 
Canada, except when the injury is a result of 
the use or operation of the named insured's own 
motor vehicle not actually insured under the 
policy* for "and" in Subsection (1) and "under 
the circumstances described in Section (1), ex-
cept where the person is injured as a result of 
the use or operation of his own motor vehicle 
not insured under the policy; and" for "when 
injured in an accident in Utah involving any 
motor vehicle" in Subsection (2); and, in Sub* 
section (3), deleted "in Utah" after the first 
instance of "occurring" and inserted "occurring 
in Utah" near the end of the subsection. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Limitation of policy covering driver. 
Motorcycle driven by insured. 
Named-driver exclusionary endorsement. 
Out-of-state incidents. 
Limitation of policy covering driver. 
Passenger in an automobile driven by 
insured's son but owned by another person was 
not entitled to personal iujury protection (PIP) 
coverage under a policy covering the driver. 
McCaffery v. Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Motorcycle driven by insured. 
The coverages described in § 31A-22-307 
were applicable to an insured killed while rid-
ing a motorcycle involved in an accident in this 
state with a motor vehicle; there is no require-
ment that the insured must be operating or 
occupying the motor vehicle to be subject to 
coverage, but only that he be in an accident 
involving a motor vehicle. Coates v. American 
Economy Ins. Co., 627 P2d 92 (Utah 1981). 
Named-driver exclusionary endorsement. 
Insurance policies used as security must in-
clude minimum omnibus coverage including 
persons operating the vehicle with the express 
or implied permission of the owner-insurer, and 
include the statutory minimum liability limits; 
a named-driver exclusionary endorsement to 
an insurance policy presented as security is 
void in relation to the statutory minimum level 
of coverage, but is enforceable as to coverage 
provided above the mandatory minimum lim-
its. Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & 
Guar. Co., 619 R2d 329 (Utah 1980) (decided 
before 1985 repeal of Chapter 12 of Title 41). 
Out-of-state incidents. 
In light of language limiting application of 
these provisions to accidents in this state, in-
surance commissioner's regulation making no-
fault insurance coverage applicable to incidents 
occurring outside the state was in error. IML 
Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296 (Utah 
1975). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — What constitutes "entering" or 
"alighting from" vehicle within meaning of in-
surance policy, or statute mandating insurance 
coverage, 59 A.L.R.4th 149. 
31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to 
personal injury protection* 
(1) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a 
policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of 
action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been 
caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has sustained one 
or more of the following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objec-
tive findings; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
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(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this 
part may only exclude from this coverage benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another 
motor vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured 
or a resident family member of the insured and not insured under the 
policy; 
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the 
insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the 
insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle; 
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his 
injury: 
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or 
(B) while committing a felony; 
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of 
any motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises; 
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war, 
insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition 
incident to any of the foregoing; or 
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, 
or other hazardous properties of nuclear materials, 
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which 
may be contained in other types of coverage. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 are 
reduced by: 
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a 
result of an accident covered in this code under any workers' compensation 
or similar statutory plan; and 
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive 
from the United States or any of its agencies because that person is on 
active duty in the military service. 
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy, 
including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given by 
the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident. 
(5) (a) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be 
made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. 
(b) Benefits for any period are overdue if they are not paid within 30 
days after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of 
expenses incurred during the period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as 
to the entire claim, the amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue 
if not paid within 30 days after that proof is received by the insurer. Any 
part or all of the remainder of the claim that is later supported by 
reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days after the proof 
is received by the insurer. 
(c) If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses 
shall bear interest at the rate of 1 Yz% per month after the due date. 
(d) The person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract 
to recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is 
required by the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the 
insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant. 
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to 
the following: 
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(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally 
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits 
required under personal injury protection have been paid by another 
insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of 
the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other 
insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages 
recoverable; and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount 
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-309, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 160; 
1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, § 10; 1991, ch. 74, 
§ 8; 1992, ch. 230, § 9; 1994, ch. 4, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, made minor 
stylistic changes in Subsection (1) and rewrote 
Subsection (2)(a)(i), which read: "for any inju-
ries sustained by the injured while occupying 
another motor vehicle owned by the insured 
ANALYSIS 
Acceptance of monthly payment. 
—Effect on insurer's obligation. 
Accrual of cause of action. 
Attorney's fees. 
—Appeal. 
Claims against federal government. 
Household exclusion clause. 
Personal injury protection requirements. 
Reimbursement. 
—Recovery from insured and his insurer. 
Release given by iiyured party to tort-feasor. 
Tort claims. 
—Liability of insured. 
—Pleading and instructions. 
Workers' compensation. 
Acceptance of monthly payment. 
—Effect on insurer's obligation. 
The acceptance of a monthly payment by an 
insured from a no-fault insurer does not termi-
nate the contractual obligation of the insurer to 
make additional payments for subsequently 
accrued claims. Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 
635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981). 
Accrual of cause of action. 
A cause of action against the state accrues at 
the time of the subject accident rather than 
when the plaintiff satisfies the threshhold re-
quirements under this section. Jepson v. State, 
846 R2d 485 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Attorney's fees. 
—AppeaL 
Plaintiff was not required to file a cross-
and not insured under the policy." 
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
1992, inserted "or is required to have* near the 
beginning of Subsection (1). 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, 
added "or permanent impairment based upon 
objective findings* to the end of Subsection 
(D(c); made a stylistic change in Subsection 
(3Xb); and added letter designations in Subsec-
tion (5). 
appeai in order to be entitled to attorney's fees 
incurred on appeal in defending his judgment 
for benefits. Coates v. American Economy Ins. 
Co, 627 R2d 92 (Utah 1981). 
Claims against federal government. 
Even if the federal government could be char-
acterized as an insurer because it provided 
financial security for its employees in regard to 
vehicle operation claims, it could not be sub-
jected to mandatory arbitration under Subsec-
tion (6), since this would conflict with the 
administrative arrangement established in the 
Federal Tort Claims Act. United States Fid. & 
Guar. Co. v. United States, 728 F. Supp. 651 (D. 
Utah 1989). 
Household exclusion clause. 
A household or family exclusion clause in an 
automobile insurance policy is contrary to pub-
lic policy and to the statutory requirements 
found in the No-Fault Insurance Act as to the 
minimum benefits provided by statute. Farm-
erslns. Exch. v. Call 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985). 
If an insurer fails to disclose material exclu-
sions in an automobile insurance policy and the 
Purchaser is not informed of them in writing, 
those exclusions are invalid. Without disclo-
sure, the household exclusion clause fails to 
honor the reasonable expectations of the pur-
chaser, rendering the exclusion clause invalid 
as to the entire policy limits. Farmers Ins. 
Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985). 
Household or family exclusions are valid in 
this state as to insurance provided by an auto-
niobile policy in excess of the statutorily man-
dated amounts and benefits. State Farm Mut. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Donald J. JAMISON, Sr., et aL, Plaintiffs 
and Respondents, 
• . 
UTAH HOME FIRE INSURANCE COM-
PANY, Defendant and Appellant 
No. 14523. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan, 20, 1977. 
Parents, whose 12-year-old son was in-
volved in collision with pickup truck while 
son was riding bicycle, brought action 
against truck driver's insurer to recover on 
basis of No-Fault Insurance Act • The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., J., awarded parents 
disability benefits of $12 per day for loss of 
son's household services and awarded par-
ents $475 in attorney fees, and insurer ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, J., 
held that son's household chores were not 
chores for which his family would "reason-
ably have incurred" expenses within mean-
ing of No-Fault Insurance Act provision, 
but that award of attorney fees would not 
be disturbed. 
Reversed in part and affirmed in part 
Maughan, J., dissented and filed opin-
ion in which Ellett, J., concurred. 
1. Statutes e=>184 
Background and purpose of a statute 
may be looked to for purpose of ascertain-
ing its meaning and proper application in 
particular circumstances. 
2. Insurance <s==> 467.61 
Provisions of No-Fault Insurance Act 
should be construed in conformity with 
principle that purpose of insurance is to 
indemnify for losses or damages suffered, 
as contrasted to gambling for a munificent 
reward if a loss occurs. U.C.A.1953, 31-
41-1 et seq. 
3. Damages <s=>184 
such an award must be supported by proof 
on which reasonable minds acting fairly 
thereon could believe that it is more proba-
ble, than not, that damage was actually 
suffered. 
4. Insurance <s=> 513.4 
Twelve-year-old boy's household chores, 
which allegedly consisted of taking out the 
garbage, washing dishes, vacuuming carpet, 
helping carry in groceries and washing car 
during summer, were not chores for which 
his family would "reasonably have in-
curred" expenses within meaning of No-
Fault Insurance Act provision which in ef-
fect provides for an allowance of $12 per 
day "in lieu of reimbursement for expenses 
which would have been reasonably incurred 
for services that, but for the injury, the 
injured person would have performed for 
his household and regardless of whether 
any of these expenses are actually in-
curred." U.C.A.1953, 31^1-1 et seq., 31-
41-6, 31-41-6(l)(b)(ii). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Insurance <£=>675 
Award of attorney fees of $475 to 
plaintiffs in action in which recovery was 
sought against an insurer on basis of No-
Faolt Insurance Act would not be disturbed 
on appeal, in view of fact that exhibit, 
which showed details and time of certain 
payments made by insurer, was not includ-
ed in record on appeal and in light of fact 
that there was evidence as to reasonable-
ness of the attorney fee. U.C.A.1953, 31-
41—1 et seq. 
L. L. Summerhays, of Strong & Hanni, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant-appellant. 
Gaylen S. Young, Jr., Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs-respondents. 
CROCKETT, Justice: 
The issue involved herein is plaintiffs' 
asserted right to recover from the defend-
JAMISON v. UTAH HOME FIRE INS. CO. 
Cite as 559 P^d 958 
Utah 959 
son as coming within the meaning of Sec-
tion ai-41-6(lXbXtt)i U.CJL195S, which is 
quoted below. From a determination on 
that issue in favor of the plaintiffs, award-
ing disability benefits at $12 a day for 112 
days, totaling $1,344, and attorney fees to-
taling $475 and costs, the defendant ap-
peals. 
Inasmuch as the recovery sought is based 
on the No-Fault Insurance Act, the exact 
details as to how the accident occurred are 
not material to the issue involved. There is 
no dispute about the fact that while Donald 
was riding his bicycle on Highland Drive 
about 3700 South in Salt Lake County on 
November 19, 1974, he was involved in a 
collision with a pickup truck driven by Boyd 
D. Lemon, who was insured by the defend-
ant, nor that Donaid suffered bruises and 
contusions, injuries to his hip and a broken 
nose. He was hospitalized for a week, then 
remained at home until after the Christmas 
holidays when he was permitted to attend 
school, but was not given an outright re-
lease by his doctor until March 11, 1975. 
This totals the 112 days during which plain-
tiff says he was not able to perform the 
household services hereinafter listed. 
The parties reached an agreement and 
the court approved a settlement as to other 
aspects of the case for Donald's injury, 
medical and hospital expenses. But, they 
were unable to agree upon, and therefore 
stipulated to reserve for determination by 
the court, the issue as to plaintiffs rights to 
any further damages as disability benefits 
under the No-Fault Insurance Act, and as 
to attorney's fees. 
The statute of concern here, Section 31 -
41-6(l)(b)(ii), states: 
. in lieu of reimbursement for 
expenses which would have been reason-
ably incurred for services that, but for 
the injury, the injured person would have 
performed for his household and regard-
less of whether any of these expenses are 
actually incurred, an allowance of $12 per 
day commencing not later than three 
days after the date of the injury and 
totvtimimg for z. maximum of $65 days 
thereafter, . . . . [Emphasis added.] 
[1] The view of this statute advocated 
by the plaintiff is that it mandates an auto-
matic award of $12 per day for injury to 
any member of a household who would have 
performed services of any nature, however 
much or minimal, and whether their value 
is great or small. As it is but natural to 
expect, the defendant takes a differing 
view and argues that the statute is not 
susceptible to any such interpretation. We 
have no hesitancy in agreeing that the in-
terpretation and application of the law 
should be a process of reason, as contrasted 
to a mere reading of tables or schedules, 
nor that when controversies arise it is both 
permissible and desirable to look to the 
background and purpose of a statute to 
ascertain its meaning and proper applica-
tion in particular circumstances. 
Since the advent of the automobile near 
the turn of this century there has been a 
constant and accelerating increase, both in 
the number of automobiles and the speed at 
which they travel, and a corresponding in-
crease in injuries and damages resulting 
from their use. This has resulted in ever 
increasing insurance coverage and insur-
ance costs, including various methods of 
compelling insurance coverage. Conse-
quent to this, due to the controversies and 
litigation over who was at fault in such 
accidents, with the attendant delays, uncer-
tainties and expenses, the concept of No-
Fault Insurance arose. In enacting it, our 
legislature determined as a matter of public 
policy that some specified primary damages 
as to necessary medical, hospital, and loss of 
wages should be paid without undue delay.1 
> 
This objective is plainly stated in Sec. 
31-41-2: 
to effectuate a more effi-
cient, equitable method of handling the 
greater bulk of the personal injury claims 
that arise out of automobile accidents 
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Another equally important and desirable 
objective of the act, to be achieved in cor-
relation with the foregoing, is coping with 
the ever increasing costs of the insurance. 
This is also clearly expressed in the lan-
guage of the same section, stating that a 
purpose of the act is to possibly stabilize, if 
not effectuate certain savings in the rising 
costs of automobile accident insurance. 
Consistent with the general purposes just 
stated, Sec. 31-41-7 provides a formula to 
arrive at what the actual losses are; and 
also provides that any benefits shall be re-
duced by other coverages, workmen's com-
pensation or military benefits, which the 
injured person receives. This idea finds 
further support in Section 31-41-8, which 
states that payment of the benefits provid-
ed for in Section 31-41-6 shall be made on 
a monthly basis as expenses are incurred; 
and that benefits are overdue if not paid 
within 35 days after the insurer receives 
"reasonable proof of the fact and amount of 
expenses incurred" 
To test the validity of plaintiff's conten-
tions and how they coordinate with the 
above stated objectives and provisions of 
the statutes, such problems as this should 
be considered: assume, e. g., a family where 
there are eight or ten children, each of 
whom does his assigned share of the family 
chores. The family car has a collision and 
all are injured. Does the insurer pay the 
$12 per day X 10 = $120 per day? Or, 
does the rule of reason apply? 
However much we may desire it to be 
otherwise, this fact might as well be accept-
ed as inescapable: that insurance is a busi-
ness, not a philanthropy. There can be no 
free gifts or benefactions. In the long run 
premiums must pay for losses; and there-
fore, increases in premiums must and will 
be correlated to the extent of the coverage. 
2. Farmers Insurance Co. v. U.S.F. & G. Co., 13 
Wash.App. 836, 537 P.2d 839 (1975); Oregon 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Salzberg, 85 
Wash.2d 372, 535 P.2d 816 (1975). 
3. No bad faith is imputed in this case. 
Otherwise, the business cannot continue to 
operate. Someone has to pay the increased 
premiums. That someone is the policyhold-
ers, i. e.f the public Accordingly, a seeming 
generosity in broadening coverage in an 
individual situation, would be no favor to 
policyholders generally, nor to the public. 
The principle which best serves the objec-
tive to be desired is to give both parties the 
benefit of a sensible, even-handed and prac-
tical application of the statute, under the 
assumption that all of its language was 
used advisedly and in harmony with its 
purposes.2 If the Act had intended reim-
bursement for any and all duties performed 
by members of households, it could have 
plainly so stated. But it does not do so. 
Only by keeping the awards within reason, 
and excepting therefrom claims that might 
be unrealistic, fanciful, or perhaps even 
fraudulent,3 can the stated objective, "to 
effectuate . . . savings in the rising 
costs of automobile accident insurance 
. . ." be accomplished. Otherwise it is 
obvious that necessary increases in premi-
ums would defeatr rather than promote, the 
purposes of the Act 
[2] When the provisions of the sections 
of the Act as quoted herein are considered 
together in the light of that purpose, partic-
ularly the key statement in Section 31-41-
6, wherein it speaks in terms of reimburse-' 
ment "for expenses which would have been 
reasonably incurred " it becomes plain that 
the Act, both in its statement of general 
purpose, and its specific provisions, was not 
intended to provide an automatic reward or 
a "windfall," for being involved in an acci-
dent by requiring payment when there was 
no loss actually suffered, nor for any ex-
pense not reasonably to be incurred,4 but 
should be construed in conformity with the 
v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 203 A.2d 421 
(D.C.Ct.App.1964); Barmeier v. Oregon Physi-
cians Service, 194 Or. 659, 243 P.2d 1053 (Ore. 
1952); Fire Assn. of Philadelphia v. Strayhorn, 
211 S.W. 447 (Texas 1919); Whitney Estate Co. 
v. Northern Assur. Co., 155 Cal. 521, 101 P. 911 
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principle of insurance law, b r i g h t in extra money by going out tend-fundamental ri ci le t i s ra ce 
that the purpose of insurance is to indemni-
fy isr ta»fe& w fortftagss ^wii^t^d, *s> wa-
trasted to gambling for a munificent re-
gard if a loss occurs.5 
The clause of the statute, "and regardless 
of whether any of these expenses are actu-
ally incurred . . .," was undoubtedly 
included to eliminate the necessity of proof 
and to prevent an insurance company from 
claiming the benefit of services rendered 
gratuitously by friends or relatives,6 which 
otherwise would have to be paid for. But it 
i^  still speaking of "expenses which would 
have been reasonably incurred." 
It seems commendable indeed that Don-
ald assumed and discharged considerable 
responsibility in the household. Particular-
ly in view of the fact that tie had two older 
sisters, one 13 and one 14, and his parents, 
all of whom were able to help. Donald's 
contributions are summarized, with the 
time for each, thus: 
Took out the garbage daily (five min-
utes); washed dishes two or three times a 
v?eek (fifteen to twenty minutes); vacu-
umed carpet three or four times a week 
(fifteen to twenty minutes); helped mother 
carry in groceries from car each Friday (no 
time given); and washed the car in the 
summer once every week or two (no time 
given). 
In response to a question as to whether 
the sisters and others helped with those 
chores Mrs. Jamison testified: 
Q. And they shared the household duties 
around the house, did they with your son? 
A. A little. My oldest one worked, and 
ixiy other one was mainly out tending. She 
5, U.C.A., Sec. 31-1-7 defines insurance as "a 
contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify 
another or pay or allow a specified or as-
certainable amount or benefit upon determina-
ble risk contingencies." 
g. See Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 
409 P.2d 121 (1965). 
7. The dissent poses questions which are quite 
ingT-
Q. You say they didn't do the dishes 
al<jng with your son? 
A- A little, yes. They helped around 
th£ house, but Don did most of the chores 
around the house because the girls were not 
hoflie that much. 
Q. Did the manager of the apartment 
hav« your walks cleaned for you? 
A- I will say, sometimes. 
Q. Did you ever complain to him about 
not doing it? 
A- Oh, definitely. That's why we 
moved out We had a lot of complaints 
with him. 
Whatever view ma*y he taken cxt the fate-
going, for the purpose of dealing with the 
issue presented in this case, we accept the 
validity of the plaintiffs averment that, 
"but for the injury, the insured (Donald) 
would have performed his household duties 
as recited herein." But, in accordance with 
our understanding of the statute as herein-
above discussed, there remains the other 
critical question: Is it reasonable to suppose 
th£t the plaintiffs family would have hired 
sotneone else and paid out money to do the 
chores he lists.7 
[3] In this connection, it is also perti-
nent to observe that the general rule is that 
an award of damages cannot properly be 
there must be a firmer foundation. That is, 
any such award must be supported by proof 
upon which reasonable minds acting fairly 
thereon could believe that it is more proba-
ing, we respond: It would seem that in both 
examples there would be reimbursement. In 
the first because they are the type of services 
for which the family would reasonably incur 
expenses; and the second because there would 
&e actual expenditures for that type of service. 
Whereas here, we have concluded that the mi-
nor tasks done by Donald were not things for 
vvhich the family would have "reasonably in-
e s t m a s t m A a l c a 
962 Utah 559 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
ble than not, that damage was actually 
suffered.8 
[4] Upon our consideration of the prob-
lem in the light of what has been said 
herein, it is our opinion that reasonable 
minds would not believe that the chores 
done by Donald were something for which 
the family would "reasonably have in-
curred" expenses, i. e., would have hired 
someone else to do them and thus have 
made a cash outlay. That being so, reim-
bursement for such services is not covered 
by the statute. 
[5] Concerning the award of $475 to the 
plaintiffs as attorney's fees,* the problem is 
quite different and the record is somewhat 
confused. This is undoubtedly due to the 
fact that concern was focused upon the 
main problem in the case, which we have 
discussed above. There is concededly some 
indication that the matter of attorney's fees 
was tied to that problem. But, there are 
also indications otherwise. In his summa-
tion the trial court included the following: 
The insurance company knew then 
what the nature of the claim was and 
declined to make any payment within 35 
days thereafter. And I suppose the coun-
terargument is we were in litigation. 
But I suppose the answer to that is we 
were in litigation when medical expenses 
were paid, and that took those out of this 
present action. 
So the court finds that the reasonable 
sufficient proof of claim was given at one 
or the other of those dates, and that the 
amounts which the Court has heretofore 
adjudged to be due as benefits under the 
Act were not paid within 35 days. The 
Court finds, therefore, that a reasonable 
attorney's fee is provided for under the 
Act under this circumstance, and further 
finds that the sum of $475 is a reasonable 
attorney's fee under all the circumstanc-
es. This is not taking into account there 
8. As to the degree of certainty required to 
prove loss or damage incurred, see Robinson v. 
Hreinson, footnote 5 above. 
were other claims in this lawsuit, and it is 
really difficult to separate out time; and 
looking at what generally, reasonably 
would have been required to pursue just 
this claim, I find that $475 would be a 
reasonable attorney's fee for that 
amount. 
The exhibit showing the details and time 
of other payments made by the defendant 
insurance company was not included in the 
record brought here. In order to overturn 
the judgment, it is the appellant's burden to 
affirmatively show that the trial court was 
in error. In the absence of that record, and 
because there is evidence as to the reasona-
bleness of the attorney's fee, that portion of 
the judgment should remain undisturbed. 
But the award of $12 per day benefit is 
reversed. The parties to bear their own 
costs. (All emphasis in this opinion is add-
ed.) 
HENRIOD, C. J., and WILKINS, J., con-
cur. 
NOTE: The majority of the court had 
acted in this case prior to the retirement of 
Chief Justice HENRIOD. Its release was 
delayed pending preparation of the dissent. 
MAUGHAN, Justice (Dissenting). 
We should affirm the trial court. All 
references are to U.C.A.1953, as enacted 
L.1973. 
The majority opinion is premised on the 
assumption that 31-41-6(l)(b)(ii) is ambigu-
ous and that it is essential to apply the 
rules of construction to determine the un-
derlying legislative intention in order to 
construe its provisions. 
The language of the section is clear, pre-
cise, specific and unambiguous and it is the 
duty of this court to interpret as the legisla-
ture has expressed it. 
that in an action to recover those expenses, the 
insurer is required to pay reasonable attorney's 
fees. 
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(ii) in lieu of reimbursement for ex-
penses which would have been reasonably 
incurred for services that, but for the 
injury, the injured person would have 
performed for his household and regard-
less of whether any of these expenses are 
actually incurred, an allowance of $12 per 
day . . 
The clear meaning of this statute is that 
if the injured person would have performed 
household services, but for the injury, he is 
granted a flat allowance. The injured par-
ty in the instant case, washed dishes, took 
out garbage, vacuumed carpets, assisted his 
mother in carrying groceries, and washed 
the car. The statute provides an allowance 
for this labor, whether any expense was 
actually incurred. The flat rate avoids the 
necessity of proving the reasonable value of 
each service performed. The effect of the 
majority opinion is to engraft a valuation 
requirement in contradiction of the express 
terms of the statute, viz., whether the value 
of the services is sufficient to merit the 
employment of another to perform them. 
Through judicial legerdemain the majority 
opinion has amended the statute to conform 
with the Massachusetts Act, Mass.Genrl. 
Laws, Chapt. 90, Sec. 34A, Amended by 
St.1970, C. 670, Sec. 1, which provides: 
and for payments in fact 
made to others, not members of the in-
jured person's household and reasonably 
incurred in obtaining from those others 
ordinary and necessary services in lieu of 
those that, had he not been injured, the 
injured person would have performed not 
for income but for the benefit of himself 
and/or members of his household 
. . . . [Emphasis supplied.] 
Since Utah Act, Chapt. 41, Title 31, was 
basically patterned after the Massachusetts 
Act, the determination of the legislature to 
depart from the benefit provisions has 
great significance. The majority has it, to 
be entitled to the statutory benefits, the 
injured party must prove actual damages, 
viz.; he must prove the household services 
were of such a value to his family, that 
the family is compelled to hire someone 
else, and make a cash outlay. 
The phrase "regardless of whether any of 
these expenses are actually incurred" has 
been restricted to those instances where the 
injured person fortuitously locates a good 
Samaritan, who administers to his brother's 
needs gratuitously. If a member of the 
household performs the injured party's 
household duty, no benefit need be paid is 
the underlying philosophy of the majority, 
which, in fact, coincides with the Massachu-
setts statute. In that statute the services 
must be rendered by one who is not a 
member of the injured party's household. 
How would the majority apply its ruling 
to the following fact situation: The mother 
of five young children is injured. Her hus-
band takes his annual vacation and per-
forms the mother's regular household 
duties. As father and husband, he is equal-
ly responsible for the care of his family. 
Should the mother recover the statutory 
allowance? What if the family has three 
healthy teen-age daughters, who suffer 
from a terminal case of laziness? The 
mother is injured, and the family employs 
someone to clean the house and cook the 
meals. Should the statutory allowance be 
denied because the daughters should have 
performed these household services? 
The legislative design of the statute was 
to eliminate any valuation proof, e. g., were 
the household services of minimal or great 
value, and to set a flat rate. The sole issue 
under this statute is whether the party 
would have performed household services, 
but for the injury. If he would have, he is 
entitled to the statutory benefit. 
The selective citations of the Act to but-
tress the peculiar construction of the major-
ity merits attention. 
31-41-2, provides: 
The purpose of this act is to require the 
payment of certain prescribed benefits in 
respect to motor vehicle accidents 
through either insurance or other ap-
proved security but on the basis of no 
fault, preserving, however, the right of 
an injured person to pursue the custom-
4.1 ~ . . ~ i . : _ J . -».-• B _ 
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type of injuries occur. The intention of 
the legislature is hereby to possibly stabi-
lize, if not effectuate certain savings in, 
the rising costs of automobile accident 
insurance and to effectuate a more effi-
cient method of handling the greater bulk 
of the personal injury claims that arise 
out of automobile accidents, these being 
those not involving great amounts of 
damages. This act is not designed to 
have any effect on property damage 
claims. 
The majority opinion states the public 
policy set forth is to provide the payment 
for 'some specified, primary damages with-
out undue delay. I construe this section^as 
decIaringTWatniT^l^ 
personal injury claims do not involve great 
amounts of damages, the injured party is 
deprived of his common law tort action. In 
substitution thereof certain prescribed ben-
efits will be paid. The Act further states 
the intention of the legislature to stabilize, 
if not effectuate certain savings in, the cost 
of automobile insurance. The flat rate of 
$12 per day in Section 6(l)(bXii), in substi-
tution of value, is a specific application of 
this policy. - . 
The majority further cites Sec". 8 of the 
"Act, wherein it is provided in regard to the 
various ""benefits'set forth Jri Sec. 6, that 
they' shall be paid on a monthly- basis as 
expenses are incurred and that benefits are 
overdue if not paid within 35 days after the 
insurer receives * "reasonable proof of the 
fact and amount of expenses ' incurred" 
e
* Since these are general provisions in di-
rect conflict with'the specific provision'of 
Sec. 6(l)(b)(ii) providing u regardless' of 
whether any of these expenses are actually 
-incurred/',-the majority's interpretation is 
perplexing, 
„ The majority expresses, the.view\that to 
grant the benefit in the instant case would 
be a* windfall and against public policy, by 
broadening coverage, to the detriment of 
the public through-J increased insurance 
costs. Basic policy is a legislative determi-
nation. The selection of a flat rate in place 
of an individual valuation is a matter spe-
cifically within the province of the legisla-
ture; it alone may determine the coverage, 
viz., the payment of certain prescribed ben-
efits m lieu of the common law tort action. 
The application of insurance law in this 
matter is inappropriate. This is not an 
insurance act, per se, but a scheme analo-
gous to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 
wherein the legislature has determined that 
common law actions and principles are inad-
equate to deal with the social problem. In 
response to social conditions, the legislature 
has created an entirely new basis to com-
pensate injured persons; the Act should be 
so interpreted without reliance on the con-
cepts of traditional tort law. 
ELLETT, J., concurs in the views ex-
pressed in the dissenting opinion of MAU-
GHAN, J. 
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Archie Clarence PACE, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
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 v
-
Larry C/PACE et at, Defendants 
and Appellant 
'ljNo.14542.;' 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
.Jan.* 21^1977. 
Mortgagee* brought> foreclosure ^suit 
against mortgagor ^ and second mortgagee. 
Second mortgagee,filed.a counterclaim on 
an-open account to .which the. mortgagee 
asserted a defense of accord and satisfac-
tion--.The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Marcellus K. Snow, J., rendered 
summary judgment for the mortgagee on 
the counterclaim and second mortgagee ap-
pealed. . The Supreme Court, .Wilkins, J., 
held that an issue of material fact existed 
aS t o w h e t h e r tViPrp wac nawmant *~ +1*~ 
ALLSTATE INS. CO. v. I*TE 
Cite as, Utah, 606 P.2d 1197 
of the institution to carry on its operations 
in secret. Accordingly, the judgment that 
the plaintiff and other members of the pub-
lic are entitled to it is affirmed.12 No costs 
awarded. 
Utah H97 
MAUGHAN and HALL, JJ., concur. 
WILKINS and STEWART, JJ., concur in 
result. 
Cause rsessaded. 
Ste-rcc. J- filed concurring opinion. 
Hall, J- tHed dissenting opinion, in 
which Crocket- C. J., concurred. 
Crocked C. J-, filed dissenting opinion 
in which Hall J- concurred. 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Louise IVTE and Travelers Insurance 
Companies, Defendant and 
Appellant 
No. 15983. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 7, 1980. 
Passenger who sustained severe person-
al injuries in motor vehicle accident appeal-
ed decision of the Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, David K. Winder, J., granting 
summary judgment in favor of no-fault in-
surance carrier for car in which passenger 
was riding in the amount of personal injury 
protection benefits paid by it to passenger. 
The Supreme Court, Maughan, J., held that 
No-Fault Insurance Act does not confer on 
no-fault insurer right of subrogation to 
funds received by its insured for personal 
injuries in subsequent legal action, but 
rather grants the io-fault insurer a limited, 
equitable right to seek reimbursement in 
arbitration proceeding.against the liability 
insurer. 
12. We so decide this case on the record as 
presented to the district court, and on the basis 
of our statutory law. We have taken judicial 
notice of the subsequently enacted Chap. 113, 
S.L.U.1979, Sec. 5 of which provides that per-
L Automobiles «=»251.11 
No-Fault Insurance Act confers two 
privileges on party who has either insurance 
or other accrued security: first, he is grant-
ed partial tort immunity, and second, he is 
not personally liable for no-fault insurance 
benefits paid by insurer; he does, however, 
remain liable for customary tort claims not 
compensated by such benefits. U.CA.1953, 
31-41-5, 31-41-6. 
2. Automobiles *=»251.U 
Where tort-feasor has complied with 
security provisions of No-Fault Insurance 
Act, injured party, if entitled to maintain 
claim for personal injuries, should plead 
only for those damages for which he has not 
received reparation under his first-party in-
surance benefits. U.OA.1953, 31-41-5, 31-
41-6, 31-41-9(1). 
3. Automobiles «=»25L11 
Under No-Fault Insurance Act, tort-
feasor has partial immunity for general 
damages until threshold provisions of in-
jured party's damages are met and no per-
sonal liability for payment of the benefits 
provided by no-faulfinsurance company, if 
he has complied with security requirements 
of the Act. U.C.A.1953, 31-41-6, 31-41-
9(2). 
4. Insurance <«=» 601.25 
No-Fault Insurance Act does not confer 
on no-faolt insurer right of subrogation to 
funds received by its insured for personal 
injuries in subsequent legal action, but 
rather grarrt* no-fault insurer a limited, 
equitable rfgfct to seek reimbursement in 
sonaifcr xsesaofiable salary data of employees of 
insan&x* of higher education is "private in-
formzzfacr « id subject to disclosure only to 
the ttffl provided by the Utah Information 
Prac=cas >*3~ 
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arbitration proceeding against the liability 
insurer, 
5. Subrogation <s=>l 
Subrogation is creature of equity, pur-
pose of which is to work out equitable ad-
justment between parties by securing ulti-
mate discharge of debt by person who,~ in 
equity and in good conscience, ought to pay 
i t 
6. Insurance <s»512J(l) 
In action for damages against tort-fea-_ 
sor brought by claimant who has collected 
benefits from its no-fault insurer, tort-fea-
sor's liability insurer, in fulfilling its duty to 
respond to claims of the injured party to 
limits of its policy, stands in shoes of its 
insured and pays on the basis of its in-
sured's personal liability to injured party, 
and such personal liability does not include 
personal injury protection benefits paid un-
der no fault insurance; therefore, tort vic-
tim's recovery from the liability insurer 
cannot be reduced by personal injury pro-
tection benefits. U.OA.1953, 31-41-6,* 31-
41-9(1, 2). 
L. Rich Humpherys of Christensen, Gard-
iner, Jensen & Evans, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant 
L. E. Midgley, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff and respondent 
MAUGHAN, Justice: 
Before us is a matter involving our "no-
fault" insurance act It was resolved, by 
summary judgment, in favor of plaintiff 
Allstate Insurance Company. We reverse 
and remand. Costs awarded to defendant 
Ivie. 
Defendant, hereinafter "Ivie," sustained 
severe personal injuries in a motor vehicle 
accident Allstate Insurance Company, the 
plaintiff herein, was the "no-fault" insur-
ance carrier for the vehicle in which Ivie 
was a passenger. In compliance with the 
Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance "Act, 
Section 41, Title 31, U.C.A.1953, as enacted 
1973, Allstate paid Ivie PIP (personal injury 
Drotection) benefits amounting to the sum 
of $7,394.00. Thereafter, Ivie filed an ac-
tion for damages against James Salisbury, 
the driver of the other motor vehicle in-
volved in the accident. Salisbury's liability 
insurer was Travelers Insurance Company. 
Allstate declined to join *n or participate in 
the lawsuit, although it ksserted it had sub-
rogation rights to the extent of the PIP 
benefits it had paid. 
The trial of the negligence action was set 
for April 11, 1978. In March 1978, Travel-
ers offered to settle for $44,000. Travelers' 
liability was limited to $50,000 under the 
policy. Ivie's counsel was employed tinder a 
contingency fee arrangement, viz., twenty-
five percent prior to actual trial preparation 
and one third if the case were settled imme-
diately before or during the trial, or went 
to judgment Additionally, Ivie was re-
sponsible for all costs and expenses incurred 
in the prosecution of her claim. After re-
viewing the deposition of tort-feasor Salis-
bury, and further investigation, Ivie deter-
mined there would be a limited opportunity 
to collect a judgment in excess of the liabili-
ty policy limit of $50,000, although Ivie 
claimed $150,000 in damages. Under these 
circumstances, Ivie accepted a settlement of 
$44,000; thus she limited her attorney's 
fees to twenty-five percent Travelers is-
sued two drafts: one was made payable 
jointly to Allstate and Ivie in the sum* of 
$7,394.00; the other was for the balance" of" 
the $44,000 settlement Ivie refused to de-
liver the check for $7,39400 to Allstate, and 
the present action was filed. - s - ^ 
In its complaint, Allstate pleaded in the' 
alternative that it was entitled to subroga-
tion under the contractual terms of the* 
policy issued on the vehicle in which Ivie* 
was a passenger to the extent it had paid 
the PIP benefits, or it was entitled to reim-~ 
bursement under Section .31-41-11, U.CA.' 
1953, enacted in 1973. ^Allstate further 
pleaded for a declaration of its rights"in 
regard to Ivie's recovery as a result of the* 
settlement of her tort action. Allstate 
moved for summary Judgment 
Ivie opposed the summary judgment on 
the ground there were triable issues of fact. 
Ivie urged equitable principles apply to sub-
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rogation, and the insured is entitled to be These laws are of two typos: fi«t m 
made whole before the insurer is entitled to add-on statutes; and second the ' • 
any portion of the recovery from the tort- *—•• *-'-- -*-*••*— -• Ia 
feasor. Ivie argued she sustained severe 
injuries and was compelled to settle for a 
sum totally inadequate to compensate her 
for the total damages sustained. According 
to her argument, to prevail Allstate must 
prove it has a greater equity than Ivie, 
which, in effect, would require proof Ivie 
had received double payment for her medi-
cal expenses.1 
Ivie further urged, if Allstate were enti-
tled to its subrogation claim, it should con-
tribute to the costs and attorney's fees in-
tort exemption statutes. The add-on atat 
utes merely add to the notfigence system of 
reparations with some kind of no-fault ben 
efits to an injured person, without regard to" 
fault All tort claims uro preserved under 
these statutes, although some provide for 
subrogation or offset to avoid double rocov 
ery for an item of loss. These add-on laws" 
are not regarded as true "no-fault" legiala 
taon, 
The true "no-fault" inaurance is a typo of 
compensation system which couples the 
payment of benefits on a no-fault basis 
curred by Ivie in collecting the claim. Ivie with the partial elimination of fault-b 
cites the principle that in the absence of an tort actions for both oconomic loss** *A 
agreement to the contrary as set forth by pain and suffering. This system jrencr 11 
the terms in a policy of insurance, the in- continues to permit fault-based claim f ^ 
sured, who is successful in the recovery of pain and suffering in tho more serious W 
funds which include money payable by the and for economic losses above no-fault be68 
.- J ^ „ .- ... - ^ i ^ ^ ^
 A a y s t e m w W c h h w ^ ^ ^ n -
tion at all is not a "no-fault" insurance" 
The Utah no-fault statute is
 a compulsory' 
partial tort exemption law coupling nc-
fault insurance benefits, Section 6, with a 
partial elimination of tort claims for bodily 
injury. y 
Section 2 of the aci provides: 
The purpose of this act is to require the 
payment of certain proscribed benefits in 
respect to motor vehicle accidents 
through either insurance or other ai>-' 
proved security, but on the basis of no 
fault, preserving, howover, the right of 
an, injured person to pursue the custom-
ary tort claims where the most serious 
type of injuries occur , 
(1) No person for whom direct bene 
fit coverage is provided for in this'act 
shall be allowed to maintain a cause of 
action for general damages arising out 
of personal injuries alleged to have 
been caused by an automobile accident 
except where there has been caused by 
this accident any one or more of the 
following: 
insured to an insurance company, is entitled 
to deduct attorney fees and other expenses 
reasonably and necessarily incurred in mak-
ing such a recovery from the amount pay-
able to the insurance company.2 
The trial court granted AUstate's motion 
for summary judgment Specifically, the 
court granted Allstate judgment against 
Ivie and Travelers jointly and severally in 
the sum of $7,394.00. The court declared 
Travelers was bound by the provisions of 
Section 31-41-11, and Ivie was not entitled 
\o an attorney's fee from Allstate. 
To resolve the issues between the parties, 
it is essential to construe Section 31-41-11; 
however, this section cannot be construed in 
isolation, but must be correlated with other 
pertinent provisions in Chapter 41 of Title 
31, Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance 
Act. As an aid to the proper construction 
of this act, reference to an article by Robert 
E. Keeton in the 1973 Utah Law Review is 
beneficial, Compensation Systems and 
Utah's No-Fault Statute, 1973 ULR 383. 
Therein, it is explained that twenty-one 
states have enacted "no-fault" legislation. 
1. Transamerica Insurance Company v. Barnes, 2. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins 
29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972); Lyon v. Company v. Clinton, 267 Or. 653, 518 ? 2 d ^ 
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 25 (1974). ' M W 5 
Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 (1971). 
1200 Utah 606 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
(a) Death; 
(b) Dismemberment or fracture; 
(c) Permanent disability; 
(d) Permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) Medical expenses to a person in ex-
cess of $500. 
(2) The owner of a motor vehicle 
with respect to which security is re-
quired by this act who fails to have 
such security in effect at the time of an 
accident shall have no immunity from 
tort liability and shall be personally 
liable for the payment of the benefits 
provided for under Section 3I-4I-6L 
[Emphasis supplied]. 
[1] Under this statutory plan, first par-
ty PIP benefits up to the amounts provided 
in Section 6 are paid to an injured person 
without regard to fault. Furthermore, the 
injured party is precluded from maintaining 
an action to recover general damages (all 
damages other than those awarded for eco-
nomic losses),3 except where the threshold 
requirements of Section 9(1) are met Un-
der Section 9(2), there are two consequences 
to the owner of a motor vehicle who fails to 
have the security required by Section^ 5: 
first, he has no immunity from tort liabili-
ty; second, he is personally liable for the 
benefits provided under Section 6. "The 
only logical inference is that if a party has 
the security required under Section 5/the 
no-fault insurance act confers two privileg-
es: first, he is granted partial tort immuni-
ty; second, he is not personally liable'for 
the benefits provided under Section 6.%_He 
does, however, remain liable for customary 
tort claims, viz., general damages and eco-
nomic losses not compensated by the bene-
fits paid under Section 6, where the thresh-
old provisions of Section 9(1) are met 
[2] There is no provision in the statuto-
ry scheme to indicate the tort-feasor who 
has complied with the security provisions of 
the act, becomes personally liable for the 
PIP benefits provided in Section 6, when 
the injured party is entitled under the 
threshold provisions of Section 9(1) to main-
tain a claim'for personal injuries. In such a 
situation, the injured party should plead 
only for those damages for which he has not 
received reparation under his first party 
insurance benefits. In order to present a 
completely factual picture to th* jury, the 
injured party may wish to present%evidence 
of all his medical bills or other economic 
losses. The court, by an appropriate in-
struction, could explain to the jury that 
these economic losses have not been includ-
ed in the prayer for damages, because the 
injured party has previously received repa-
ration under his own no-fault insurance 
coverage. 
The foregoing interpretation is the only 
one consistent with the provisions in Section 
9(2). The obvious legislative intent was to 
encourage compliance with the security pro-
visions of the act The design to compel 
compliance included not only partial toft 
exemption, but immunity from personal lia-
bility for payment of the benefits provided 
for under Section 6. 
When Section 9(2) is construed in con-
junction with Section 9(1), the legislative 
intent emerges. 
No person for whom direct benefit cov-
erage is provided for in this act shall be 
allowed to maintain a cause of action for 
general damages . . . except where 
Until the threshold requirements are met; 
the injured party is limited to his direct 
benefit coverage. If his injuries meet the 
threshold requirements, then he may main* 
tain a claim for general damages. Tire 
term "general damages" is explained as fol-
lows: 
Another interesting feature of the 
Utah law is its distinctive phrasing of the 
tort exemption provision, which declares:. 
"No person for whom direct benefit cov£ 
erage is provided for in this act shall be 
allowed to maintain a cause of action for 
general damages unless one of the thresh-
old requirements is met" -The term 
"general damages" is not defined in .the 
statute. The tort exemption provisions 
of other statutes, rather than referring, to 
3. 1973 ULR 383, 392. 
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"general damages" have used phrases 
such as "pain and suffering" or "pain, 
suffering, mental anguish, and inconven-
ience," or have used especially defined 
term such as noneconomic detriment. 
The terpi "general damages" was often 
used, in public discussion of no-fault pro-
posals, as a comprehensive term for ele-
ments of tort damages other than eco-
nomic losses, which were often referred 
to as "specials." In view of that usage, it 
would seem that "general damages" as 
used in the Utah statute includes dam-
ages for pain and sufferingo It may rea-
sonably be argued that "general dam-
ages" refers more broadly to all damages 
other than those awarded for economic 
losses and that preclusion of "general 
damages" precludes also any award for 
disability as such (including for example* 
disability to -play golf), as distinguished 
from an award reimbursing economic 
losses resulting from the disability.4 
[3] Thus, under Section 9(1) and (2), the 
tort-feasor has partial immunity for general 
damages until the threshold provisions are 
met and no personal liability for the pay-
ment of the benefits provided under Section 
6, if he has complied with the security re-
quirements of the act 
Section 11 must be construed in connec-
tion with the other relevant provisions. 
Section 31-41-11 provides: 
(1) Every insurer authorized to write 
the insurance required by this act shall 
agree as a condition to being allowed to 
continue to write insurance in the State 
of Utah; 
(a) That where its insured is or 
would be legally liable for the personal 
injuries sustained by any person to 
whom benefits required under this act 
have been paid by another insurer, in-
cluding the state insurance fund, it will 
reimburse such other insurer for the 
payment of such benefits, but not in 
excess of the amount of damages so 
recoverable, and 
4. Id. p. 392. 
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(b) That the issue of liability for 
such reimbursement and the amount of 
same shall be decided by mandatory, 
binding arbitration between the insur-
ers. 
Section 11 is not a model of clarity. A 
degree of confusion has been generated by 
the subtitle to this section supplied by the 
publisher of the Utah Code Annotated, The 
Allen Smith Company. The subtitle reads: 
"Subrogation rights and arbitration be-
tween insurers." In contrast, the subtitle 
in the session laws, Laws of Utah, 1973, 
Regular Session, Chapter 55, reads: "Condi-
tions insurers to abide by." 
In reference to Section 11, Keeton 
states:5 
The Utah law preserves subrogation-
like rights of reimbursement among no-
fault insurers. That is, after an insurer 
pays no-fault benefits, it is entitled to 
reimbursement from the insurer of a neg-
ligent driver who would have been liable 
in tort to the injured person but for the 
partial tort exemption. These claims for 
reimbursement are declared to be subject 
to mandatory, binding arbitration be-
tween the insurers. This would appear to 
be an undesirable preservation of fault 
based claims among insurers. It may 
happen, however, that the provision will 
fall into disuse in practice. For example, 
two insurers with a large volume of 
claims against each other may agree to 
square accounts periodically on an actuar-
ial basis, or even to forego these reim-
bursement claims against each other alto-
gether, because it would be cheaper for 
both'to do so. 
The state of Oregon has a provision simi-
lar to Section 11, viz., ORS 743.825. It 
should be emphasized that Oregon has an 
add-on statute with no partial tort exemp-
tion.6 Oregon further requires the injured 
person to include in his claim or legal action 
the benefits furnished by the insurer, ORS 
743.828{3)(b). By a separate statute, there 
is a provision in Oregon for subrogation. 
ORS 743.830 provides: 
6. Id. p. 386. 
5. Id. at pp. 392-393. 
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If a motor vehicle liability insurer has 
furnished personal injury protection ben-
efits . . . 
(1) The insurer is entitled to the pro-
ceeds of any settlement or judgment that 
may result from the exercise of any 
rights of recovery of the injured person 
against any person legally responsible for 
the accident, to the extent of such bene-
fits furnished by the insurer less the'Jn-
surer's share of expenses, costs and attor-
ney fees incurred by the injured person in 
connection with such recovery. 
(2) The injured person shall hold. in 
trust for the benefit of the insurer, all 
such rights of recovery which he has, but 
only to the extent of such benefits fur-
nished. 
(3) The injured person shall do whatev-
er is proper to secure, and shall do noth-
ing after loss to prejudice, such rights. 
(4) If requested in writing by the,in-
surer, the injured person shall .take, 
through any representative not in conflict 
in interest with him designated by the 
insurer, such action as may be necessary 
or appropriate to recover such benefits 
furnished as damages from such responsi-
ble person, such action to be taken in the 
name of the injured person, but only to 
the extent of the benefits furnished~by 
the insurer. In the event of a recovery, 
the insurer shall also be'reimbursedTout 
.of such recovery for the injured person's 
share of expenses, costs and attorney fees 
incurred.by the insurer in connection 
with the recovery. 
(5) In calculating respective shares of 
expenses, costs and attorney fees unSer 
this section, the basis of allocation shall 
be the respective proportions borne to the 
total recovery by: 
(a) Such benefits furnished by tfce in-
surer; and 
(b) The total recovery less (a). 
(6) The injured person shall execute 
and deliver to the insurer such instru-
ments and papers as may be appropriate 
to secure the rights and obligations of the 
insurer and him as established by this 
section. 
(7) Any provisions in a motor vehicle 
liability insurance policy or health insur-
ance policy giving rights to the insurer 
relating to subrogation or the subject 
matter of this section shall be construed 
and applied in accordance withtfhe provi-
sions of this section. 
[4] This latter section would be a redun-
dancy if Section 743.825 of the Oregon code 
provided for subrogation by the no-fault 
insurer to its insured, when such insured 
received a settlement or judgment for per-
sonal injuries. Similarly, Section 11 in the 
Utah No-Fault Insurance Act cannot be 
interpreted as conferring on the no-fault 
insurer a right of subrogation to the funds 
received byits insured for personal injuries. 
Section 11 grants the no-fault insurer a 
limited, equitable right to seek reimburse-
ment in arbitration proceeding against the 
liability insurer. Section 11 cannot be 
deemed as conferring subrogation rights on 
the no-fault insurer, vis-a-vis its insured as 
to his recovery in a settlement or legal 
action. 
[5] The nature and purpose of subroga-
tion should be reviewed. Subrogation is a 
creature of equity, its purpose is to work 
out an equitable adjustment between the 
parties by securing the ultimate discharge 
of a debt by the person who, in equity and 
in good conscience, ought to pay i t Subro-
gation has a dual basis—". . . when 
the insurer has made payment for the loss 
caused by a third party, it is only equitable 
and just that the insurer should be reim-
bursed for his payment to the insured, be-
cause otherwise either the insured would be 
unjustly enriched by virtue of a recovery 
from both the insurer "and the third party, 
or in the absence of such double recovery by 
the insured, the third party would go free 
notwithstanding the fact that he has a legal 
obligation in connection with the damage.7" 
[6] Under the Utah No-Fault Insurance 
Act, the tort-feasor who has the required 
security, is not personally liable to the in-
ALLSTATE INS. CO. v. IVIE 
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jured person for payment of Section 6 bene-
fits, Section 9(2); therefore, the tort-feasor 
has no personal legal obligation to reim-
burse the injured party's insurer. On the 
other h&hd, the tort-feasor's liability insur-
er, in fulfilling its duty to respond to the 
claims of the injured party to the limits of 
its policy, stands in the shoes of its insured 
and pays on the basis of its insured's per-
sonal liability to the tort victim; this per-
sonal liability does not include PIP pay-
ments. Thus, the tort victim's recovery 
from the liability insurer cannot be reduced 
by the PIP payments. If the victim's re-
covery be reduced by the amount of the 
PIP payments by granting his no-fault in-
surer a right of subrogation, it is the no-
fault insurer who receives double recovery. 
This is so because the insurer receives a 
premium for the benefits, and then receives 
full reimbursement, while the liability in-
surance available to recompense the victim 
is depleted by payments for which the lia-
bility insurer is not responsible to the vic-
tim. 
In the instant action, Allstate has no 
right of subrogation to the recovery of Ivie, 
and the trial court erred in its ruling. The 
cause is remanded with an order to enter 
judgment in favor of Ivie in the amount of 
$7,394.00, the sum representing the PIP 
payments. However, Allstate is not pre-
cluded from claiming reimbursement from 
Travelers in an arbitration proceeding. 
WILKINS, J., concurs. 
STEWART, Justice (concurring): 
I concur in the opinion of Justice Mau-
ghan and add the following comments in 
explanation of my position. 
The Utah Automobile No-Fault Insur-
ance Act, § 31-41-1, et seg., U.C.A. (1953), 
as amended, is neither clear nor specific 
with respect to the relative rights of a 
no-fault insurer in an insured's recovery 
from a third-party tortfeasor. Accordingly, 
it is our obligation to construe the Act to 
effectuate the purposes set out in § 
31-41-2. That provision, in part, provides: 
The intention of the legislature is hereby 
to possibly stabilize, if not effectuate cer-
tain savings in, the rising costs of auto-
mobile accident insurance and to effectu-
ate a more efficient, equitable method of 
handling the greater bulk of the personal 
injury claims that arise out of automobile 
accidents, these being those not involving 
great amounts of damages. 
Contrary to the view of the dissenting 
opinion in this case, the result reached by a 
majority of the Court will not result in 
double recovery to an injured person. It 
will, on the other hand, result in greater 
efficiency, accuracy and fairness in deter-
mining the relative rights of the interested 
parties. Also, it will have the beneficial 
effect of reducing the possibilities for con-
troversy and litigation between no-fault in-
surers and their insureds. 
Pursuant to the majority opinion, a no-
fault insured in an action against a tort-
feasor may not recover from the tortfeasor 
any sums already paid by the nofault in-
surer. Thus, double recovery by an insured 
is in fact barred. The no-fault insurer, by 
being subrogated to the rights of the in-
sured as provided by § 31-41—11, has a 
right to collect directly from the tort-
feasor's insurer (whether or not the insured 
party has filed a tort claim) by way of 
arbitration pursuant to § 31-41—11. If the 
injured party files an action against the 
third-party tortfeasor which results in a 
judgment for the insured, the judgment 
would be given dispositive effect on the 
issue of fault and the relative liabilities of 
the insurance companies in the arbitration 
proceedings, for it is in the arbitration pro-
ceedings that the no-fault insurer is subro-
gated to the rights of the insured. Because 
the insurance company stands in privity 
with its insured, principles of res judicata 
and collateral estoppel dictate as much. In 
cases which do not go to judgment because 
of a settlement, the no-fault insurer and the 
tortfeasor's insurer may be able to use the 
settlement agreement and amount as a 
guide in settling liability for the no-fault 
payments. If no voluntary settlement is 
recorded, the arbitration apparatus may be 
used to settle the dispute. No doubt the 
insurance companies will be able in most 
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cases to settle the accounts between them-
selves without resort to formal proceedings. 
This procedure comports with the language 
and intent of § 31-41-11. 
On the other hand, a construction of the 
Act which subrogates the insurer to .the 
rights of the insured in a judicial proceed-
ing would render meaningless the arbitra-
tion provisions of the Act, lead to insupera-
ble practical difficulties in making an equi-
table allocation between the insurance com-
pany and its insured, and "increased litiga-
tion and its attendant costs.. 
In Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Barnes, 
29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972), this 
Court held that an insurer's claim under a 
right of subrogation to a portion of the 
proceeds from a settlement made by the 
insured with a third-party tortfeasor was a 
matter which had to be proyed on a record 
with evidence showing that the. item .of 
damage sought to be recovered was in fact 
included in the settlement sum. The court 
stated that the insurer must: 
present proof which establishes 
that the damages covered by defendant's 
settlement were the same or cover those 
for which defendant has already received 
indemnity from [insurer]; otherwise, the 
receipt of payment from the tort-feasor 
does not entitle the [insurer] to the,,re-
turn of the payments made by it:,[29 
Utah 2d at 10&-O7, 505 P.2d at.,787J 
It the no-fault insurer were accorded a 
right of subrogation in amounts recovered 
in its insured's tort action against a third-
party tortfeasor, insuperable problems 
would arise. The most conspicuous problem 
would arise with respect to the settlements 
of an action T>y an insured against the tort-
feasor and the allocation of the settlement 
among the insured and his no-fault insurer. 
Settlements are almost always compromis-
es, and they are often negotiated on a 
lump-sum basis without particular damage 
items being dealt with individually. Refer-
ence to particular damage items may not be 
made in the course of settlement discus-
sions, and if each particular damage item is 
discussed, the value, if any, accorded a par-
ticular damage item in the ultimate sum 
reached is often unascertainable. The prob-
lem is even more difficult when dealing 
with a general verdict because it is impossi-
ble to determine what damage factors are 
included in a general verdict Because of 
the failure to segregate and identify dam-
age items, subrogation may not be an effec-
tive remedy to prevent double recovery on 
the one hand, and to insure the victim the 
full value of his lawsuit on the other. 
These difficulties are avoided if the per-
sonal injury protection payments made to 
the insured are not a recoverable damage 
item in an action by the insured against the 
tortfeasor—whether the action results in a 
settlement or a judgment 
The interpretation of the Act adopted by 
a majority of the Court has the further 
merit of avoiding serious problems with re-
spect to legal representation of the insured 
and the insurance company. If the same 
counsel represents both parties in settle-
ment negotiations, conflicts of interest may 
well arise in determining, for example, 
whether or not to settle a lawsuit or to 
press for a larger recovery by way of a jury 
verdict and, of course, run the risk of no 
recovery at all. On the other hand, if both 
the insurance company and the insured are 
to be represented by independent counsel in 
pressing the claim against the third-party 
tortfeasor, conflict in many cases is.likely. 
In sum, the most effective and least cost-
ly way of dealing with the relative rights of 
the insured and the no-fault insurer in a 
recovery from a third party is to require 
each party to pursue its own remedy. The 
insured may sue for all damages less the 
amount paid by the no-fault insurer. The 
no-fault insurer has a right to protect its 
interests in an arbitration proceeding if 
that be necessary. To prevent double re-
covery, the no-fault amounts are not recov-
erable by the victim either in a settlement 
or in a litigated judgment This approach 
will have the effect of reducing litigation^ 
attorney's fees, and the cost of automobile 
accident insurance. 
HALL, Justice (dissenting): 
There is nothing about this case that war-
rants a denarture from T/in<T.^ cfokKoVi^  
ALLSTATE ENS. CO. v. THE 
Qte as, Utah, 606 P.2d 1197 
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principles of subrogation. In adopting a 
contrary view, the majority not only ig-
nores the language of the Utah Automobile 
No-Fault Act l which specifically preserves 
subrogation rights, but also ignores the 
recent unanimous ruling of this Court in 
Jones v. Transamerica Insurance Co.* 
wherein we specifically recognized that the 
Act3 preserved subrogation rights between 
insurers whenever no-fault benefits are 
paid. 
The pure and simple facts of this case are 
wholly supportive of the summary judg-
ment appealed from. Ivie chose to compro-
mise her claim against the tortfeasor by 
accepting the sum of $44,000 in full settle-
ment thereof. Prior to the settlement, 
Travelers duly advised Ivie of its intention 
to include Allstate on its settlement draft 
and thereby satisfy its statutory obligation 
to reimburse Allstate for its advance of 
$7,394 in PIP payments. Indeed, at the 
time of settlement, it issued a separate 
draft for the exact sum of said PIP pay-
ments ($7,394), payable jointly to Ivie and 
Allstate. 
Travelers is not a party to this appeal and 
Ivie makes no further claim against it, con-
ceding that the only matter in dispute is her 
entitlement to the said $7,394. Hence, for 
this Court to award said sum to her and 
then to cavalierly suggest that Travelers is 
obligated to pay over an additional sum of 
$7,394 to Allstate by way of reimbursement, 
constitutes a grave injustice., Such a result 
was not sought, nor even contemplated, by 
the parties, least of all by Travelers, which 
is not present to defend its interests. 
Notwithstanding the assertion of the ma-
jority to the contrary, the net effect of its 
holding is to afford Ivie a double recovery 
of PIP payments at the unbargained for 
.expense of Travelers. " In addition, it de-
prives Travelers of the benefit of its bar-
gain struck with Ivie and increases its obli-
gation from $44,000 to $51,394, by judicial 
fiat. 
1. U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-1, et seq. 
2. Utah, 592 P.2d 609 (1979). 
I have no particular apprehension as to 
the application of the new rule of law to 
future cases since its practical, dollars and 
cents effect would appear to be no different 
than if the doctrine of subrogation were 
adhered to. In a judicial proceeding, the 
court will simply no longer make an award 
for damages already compensated by PIP 
payments, and, similarly, in negotiating a 
settlement of a lawsuit, an insurer will no 
doubt "short" his settlement offer by a sum 
adequate to cover its reimbursement obliga-
tion for PIP payments advanced by the 
insurer of the injured party. 
On the other hand, applying the new rule 
of law in the present case causes me con-
siderable concern for it effects a highly 
unjust and harsh result The majority 
would be better advised to abide by the 
so-called "Sunburst Doctrine" 4 and thereby 
make the change in the law prospective 
only. 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice (supplemental 
dissent): 
I join in Justice Hall's dissent and would 
affirm the decision of the trial court 
The main objective of insurance is to 
provide a fair and honest recoupment of 
losses suffered, and not to "provide a basis 
for parlaying the loss into a double recovery 
for all or part of the damages thus suffered. 
The purpose of the No-Fault Insurance 
Act is to effectuate a more efficient method 
of handling minor claims arising from auto-
mobile accidents which do not involve great 
amounts of damages; and to provide a 
means for the prompt payment of certain 
minimal losses without regard to fault and 
thus without litigation, in order to effectu-
ate certain savings in the rising costs of 
automobile accident insurance.1 It should 
be realized that if the double recovery per-
4. Laid down in the case of Great Northern Ry. 
Co. v. Sunburst Oil Co.t 287 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct 
145, 77 L.£d. 360, cited in Rubalcava v. Gisse-
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mitted by the main opinion is allowed, it 
could not do other than increase, rather 
than decrease, the total costs of insurance-
It requires little reflection to see that the 
majority decision results in an injustice to 
defendant Travelers. In treating a similar 
situation in the case of Transamerica Ins. 
Co. v. Barnes* this Court stated that "If 
the settlement were intended to include 
plaintiffs prior medical expenses, two 
drafts should have been issued, one to plain* 
tiff and defendant jointly and one to de-
fendant alone." * That is the exact proce-
dure followed by Travelers in this instance. 
It cannot fairly be questioned that the ne-
gotiations between Mrs. Ivie and Travelers 
were made in awareness that Travelers was 
obligated to reimburse Allstate for the 
$7,394 PIP payments which Mrs. Ivie had 
already received; nor that she agreed to 
accept $44,000 from Travelers to discharge 
its total liability. This is confirmed by two 
facts: first, Travelers' policy limit was $50,-
000; and it would make no sense to agree 
to pay $44,000, plus the obligation to reim-
burse Allstate for the $7,394 PIP payments, 
which would thus exceed Travelers' policy 
limits. Second, by the fact that Travelers 
issued the two separate drafts, one for the 
$7,394 payable to Allstate and Mrs. Ivie and 
the other for $36,606 to Mrs. Ivie, just as 
this Court directed in the Barnes case, su-
pra. 
Under the facts as they appear in this 
case, it is discordant to my ideas of law and 
justice to require Travelers to pay the $44,-
000 to satisfy the claims of Mrs. Ivie and of 
Allstate, then also be required to pay the 
$7,394 to Allstate to reimburse it for that 
portion Allstate had already paid of Mrs. 
Ivie's damages. That plainly and simply 
results in injustice: it increases Travelers' 
obligation by $7,394 more than it agreed to 
pay; and it allows Mrs. Ivie double recovery 
by awarding her that much more than" she 
had agreed to accept. 
There would seem to be no problem with 
the proposition espoused in the main opin-
ion if the facts had been different I* Al— 
parties had negotiated their settlement 
with an understanding that Travelers was 
to reimburse Allstate for the PIP benefits it 
had paid, and that any settlement arrived 
at was in addition thereto, no unfairness or 
injustice would result But that does not 
appear to be the facts here. If such an 
understanding is to be the condition of ne-
gotiations, it should be so understood by the 
parties, and effective on only a prospective 
basis by applying the "Sunburst Doctrine," 
referred to by Justice HalL 
HALL, J., also concurs in the supplemen-
tal dissent of CROCKETT, C. J. 
( o I KEYNUMBERSYSIUI^ 
ST, PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSUR-
ANCE, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE, 
Defendant and Respondent 
No. 16080. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 8, 198a 
Commercial automobile liability policy 
insurer brought declaratory judgment ac-
tion to determine extent of liability in-
curred by it and by comprehensive general 
liability policy insurer arising out of the 
death "of employee of construction company 
and each party also sought declaration that 
coverage afforded by policy of other was 
primary coverage. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J., 
granted comprehensive policy insurer's mo-
tion for summary judgment and adjudged 
that policy issued by plaintiff provided pri-
JONES v. TRANSAMERICA INS. CO. 
Cite as 592 PJ2d 609 
It is now well established that the trial Utah County, George E, 
Utah 609 
court has power to summarily enforce on 
motion a settlement agreement entered 
into by the litigants while the litigation is 
pending before it. Quite obviously, so 
simple and speedy a remedy serves well 
the policy favoring compromise, which in 
turn has made a major contribution to its 
popularity. 
Yet it is apparent that the summary 
procedure for enforcement of unper-
formed settlement contracts is not a pan-
acea for the myriad types of problems 
that may arise. The summary procedure 
is admirably suited to situations where, 
for example, a binding settlement bar-
gain is conceded or shown, and the excuse 
for nonperformance is comparatively un-
substantial. On the other hand, it is ill-
suited to situations presenting complex 
factual issues related either to the forma-
tion or the consummation of the contract, 
which only testimonial exploration in a 
more plenary proceeding is apt to satis-
factorily resolve. [Citations omitted.] 
The case at hand is not one in which 
complex factual issues are presented; here, 
a "binding settlement bargain is conceded 
or shown, and the excuse for nonperform-
ance is comparatively unsubstantial." 
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS, HALL 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
Elmer G. JONES, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE COM-
PANY, a corporation, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 15809. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Ballif, J., which 
denied him right to recover certain benefits 
under contract of no-fault insurance issued 
in conformance with Automobile No-Fault 
Insurance Act. The Supreme Court, Hall, 
J., held that: (1) insured, who earned more 
than $150 per week during period for which 
he sought compensation but whose income 
allegedly was 25% less than what it would 
have been had the accident never occurred, 
was not "disabled" for purposes of loss of 
earnings benefits nor for purposes of house-
hold services benefits under the Act, and (2) 
by entering into settlement agreement with 
his tort-feasors, whereunder insured re-
leased him from all personal injury claims 
as well as property damage, insured cut off 
insurer's subrogation rights under the Act, 
notwithstanding attempted "specific exclu-
sion" relating to no-fault benefits; thus, 
insured was foreclosed from seeking addi-
tional benefits from insurer. 
Affirmed. 
1. Insurance <§=»531.4 
Under Automobile No-Fault Insurance 
Act, an injured person will not be permitted 
to recover from an insurance carrier over 
and above what carrier has previously paid 
in benefits once he has successfully recov-
ered from his tort-feasor for personal inju-
ries. U.C.A. 1953, 31-41-1 et seq. 
2. Insurance <s=»531.4 
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act 
has no application to property damage 
claims. U.C.A. 1953, 31-41-1 et seq. 
3. Insurance <s=» 531.4 
Term "disability" within meaning of 
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act means 
an inability to work as contrasted with 
term "physical impairment," which general-
ly refers to loss of bodily function. U.C.A. 
1953,31-41-1 etseq. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
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compensation but whose income allegedly 
was 25% less than what it would have been 
had the accident never occurred, was not 
"disabled" for purposes of loss of earnings 
benefits nor for purposes of household serv-
ices benefits under Automobile No-Fault 
Insurance Act U.OA. 1953, 31 41~6(l)(b). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Insurance <s=>60L25 
By° entering into settlement agreement 
with his tort-feasors, whereunder insured 
released them from all personal injury 
claims as well as property damage, insured 
cut off insurer's subrogation rights under 
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act, not-
withstanding attempted "specific exclusion" 
relating to no-fault benefits; thus, insured 
was foreclosed from seeking additional ben-
efits from insurer. U.C.A. 1953, 31 41 1 
et seq. 
6. Insurance <s=»60L2 
Fact that insured entered into settle-
ment with his tort-feasors whereby he re-
leased them from all claims for personal 
injuries and property damage did not pre-
clude insurer from seeking reimbursement 
from" tort-feasor's insurer. U.C.A. 1953, 
31-41-11. 
D. John Mussleman, of Stott, Young & 
Wilson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
appellant. 
Raymond M. Berry, of Snow, Christensen 
& Martineau, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
and respondent. 
HALL, Justice: 
Plaintiff appeals from a summary judg-
ment denying him the right to recoverben-
efits under a contract of "no-fault" insur-
ance issued in conformance with the Utah 
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act,1 (here-
inafter "Act"). 
On February 13, 1974, plaintiff was in-
volved in an automobile accident in Kane 
1. U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-1 et seq. 
County, Utah, while on a sales trip to Cali-
fornia. He experienced little pain at the 
time of the accident and continued on his 
sales trip. It was not until he returned 
home to Orem, Utah, on February 21,1974, 
that he consulted one Dr. Jacobs, an ortho-
pedic surgeon. He then absented himself 
from his employment until March 10,1974, 
when he returned to work and has worked 
continuously since that time. Shortly after 
the accident, plaintiff applied for various 
no-fault benefits under his insurance policy. 
Defendant insurer paid the charges of Dr. 
Jacobs, and other medical expenses totall-
ing $365.63. Defendant also paid plaintiff 
$567.89 in disability benefits for the period 
of February 21 through March 9,1974. 6n 
September 5, 1975 (approximately 18 
months later), plaintiff presented an addi-
tional claim to defendant for $2,485.36 rep-
resenting lost earnings from a reduction in 
earning capacity based on a claim that he 
was partially disabled (25 percent) for a 
period of 47 weeks following the injury. 
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff claimed an ad-
ditional $4,380.00 for inability to perform 
household services, the maximum allowable 
under the Act At the same time as these 
further claims for disability were made 
upon defendant, plaintiff also entered inio 
settlement negotiations with his tortfeasors. 
Defendant refused to pay these subsequent 
claims; however, plaintiff entered into a 
settlement agreement with his tortfeasors 
on January 3, 1976. For the consideration 
of $6,000.00, plaintiff released his tort-
feasors of any and all claims he may have 
had against them for personal injury as 
well as property damage. 
On August 3, 1977, plaintiff filed a com-
plaint against defendant for having refused 
to pay the later disability claims, asserting 
that he had a legal right to compensation 
for loss of gross income and reimbursement 
for his inability to perform household serv-
ices.2 He sought punitive damages for de-
fendant's failtfre to pay. 
After both parties moved for summary 
judgment, the trial court ruled as follows: 
2. U.C.A.. 1953. 31-^l-6(IXb). 
JONES v. TRANS 
Cite as 5 
It is the opinion of this Court that the 
intent of the No-Fault Act was to provide 
benefits to those sustaining less serious 
injuries in automobile accidents, but to 
allow those sustaining more serious inju-
ries the right to proceed against the party 
at fault without limitation as to amounts 
recoverable, but that the person would 
not be entitled to both recovery under the 
No-Fault Act and a suit against and re-
covery from the tort feasor. 
[1] On appeal, the parties choose not to 
squarely address the basis of the trial 
court's decision but focus instead on periph-
erally related matters. Basically the court's 
ruling is correct. The whole tenor of the 
Act is that an injured person will not be 
permitted to recover from an insurance car-
rier (over and above what the carrier has 
previously paid in benefits) once he has 
successfully recovered from his tortfeasor 
for personal injuries. Any other interpretat-
ion .would be to permit double damage 
recovery. 
[2] The Act mandates3 that every resi-
dent ^ owner of a registered motor vehicle 
maintain either insurance or other approved 
security thereon.4 It is designed to totally 
eliminate claims for injuries5 of lesser con-
sequence which fail to meet a basic "thresh-
old'! test set forth in the statute 6 and pro-
yides for the payment of benefits by one's 
own insurer without regard to fault.7 
No-fault benefits are also available to 
those who sustain greater injuries. This is 
Sfceven though they remain free to pursue 
aLtort claim as well.8 However, this does 
noi entitle one to a double recovery for a 
single loss since the statute specifically af-
fords subrogation rights and arbitration be-
** U.C.A.. 1953, 31-41-4(1). 
^ U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-2. 
«• The act has absolutely no application to prop-
erty damage claims. See U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-
2. 
* U.C.A., 1953,31-41-9. 
7
* Supra, footnote 4. 
$• Ibid. 
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tween insurers whenever no-fault benefits 
are paid.9 
A fortiori, the legislative intent specifi-
cally expressed in the Act itself to '^ possibly 
stabilize, if not effectuate certain savings 
in, the rising costs of automobile accident 
insurance and to effectuate a more effi-
cient, equitable method of handling the 
greater bulk of the personal injury claims 
that arise out of automobile accidents"10 
negatives the contention that double recov-
ery is permitted. Double recovery for a 
single item of loss was never contemplated 
by the legislature u and we will not permit 
any type of automatic reward or "windfall" 
to an injured plaintiff.12 
Specific points raised on appeal concern 
the validity of the disability claims plaintiff 
made upon defendant in 1975. Plaintiff 
argues that by wrongfully refusing to pay 
the benefits sought, defendant had tortious-
ly breached the insurance contract, thereby 
giving rise to a claim for punitive damages. 
Defendant counters with two main argu-
ments: 1) that the refusal to pay the dis-
ability benefits was justified in that plain-
tiff was not "disabled"; and 2) that by 
settling with his tortfeasors, plaintiff had 
chosen his remedy and had cut off defend-
ant's subrogation rights as provided by stat-
ute. With these contentions we agree. 
[3,4] The benefits contemplated by the 
Act are phrased in terms of "disability" not 
in terms of "physical impairment." The 
former is generally understood to mean the 
inability to work, whereas the latter refers 
to the loss of bodily function.13 Plaintiff 
concedes that he was able to work during 
the period for which compensation is sought 
10. Supra, footnote 4. 
11. See Compensation Systems and Utah's No-
Fault Statute, Keeton, 1973 Utah Law Review 
383. 
12. Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., Utah, 
559 P.2d 958 (1977). 
13. See 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation 
§ 296. 
s
- U.C.A.. 1953.31-41-11. 
D ^ « « Q-7 
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but argues that his income was 25 percent 
less than what it would have been had" the 
accident never occurred. The Act limits 
disability benefits for loss of earnings to a 
maximum of $150 per week and plaintiff 
admittedly earned more than $150 per week 
during the entire time for which benefits 
were claimed. He does not, therefore, fall 
within the "disability" coverage. Likewise, 
if not disabled for purposes of loss of earn-
ings benefits, neither is he disabled for pur-
poses of household services benefits. In-
deed, the Act was never intended to give an 
injured plaintiff a windfall or extra income 
as a benefit for having had an accident.14 
[5,6] Notwithstanding the foregoing 
analysis, defendant's second argument is 
dispositive of this appeal. As indicated sn-
pra, in 1974 plaintiff received no-fault bene-
fits totalling $933.52.15 In 1976, plaintiff 
accepted $6,000.00 from his tortfeasors as 
additional recovery and released them of 
any further claims for personal injury and 
property damage. Plaintiff asserts that the 
specific exclusion in the release agreement 
preserved any no-fault claims which may be 
made against the tortfeasors. He also 
makes various intimations that the recovery 
from the tortfeasors is not the same as the 
disability sought from the insurance carrier. 
For example, in his brief on appeal, plain-
tiff suggests that the portion of the 
$6,000.00 to be allocated for personal injury 
should be determined by "a court" which 
would then "offset" any insurance claim. 
No such motion or other request for appor-
tionment was ever made. Before the trial 
court, plaintiff urged that he may well be 
prohibited from suing his tortfeasors for his 
injuries, (due to the "threshold" require-
ments discussed supra), and therefore the 
14. Supra, footnote 12. 
15. The trial judge correctly ruled that any 
rights defendant may have for reimbursement 
for this amount from the tortfeasor's insurer 
under U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-11 is unaffected by 
the settlement and by this action. 
16. U.C.A., 1953. 31-41-11 provides as follows: 
Subrogation rights and arbitration between 
insurers.—(1) Every insurer authori: 
$6,000.00 must have been tendered as a 
release from only property damage liability. 
We cannot adopt plaintiffs arguments. 
Plaintiff accepted the $6,000.00 from his 
tortfeasors as additional recovery in lieu of 
any further insurance benefits to which he 
might have been entitled- This agreement 
expressly releases plaintiffs claim against 
the tortfeasors for known and unknown 
personal injuries as well as for property 
damage arising from the accident As indi-
cated supra, defendant insurer is subrogat-
ed, to the rights of plaintiff in asserting a 
claim against the tortfeasors' insurers in 
recovering benefits based upon liability.16 
The rights to which the subrogee succeeds 
can be no greater than those of the person 
for whom he is substituted.17 By executing 
the release, plaintiff discharged the tort-
feasors of any and all liability, notwith-
standing the attempted "specific exclusion" 
relating to no-fault benefits. By so doing, 
plaintiff has chosen his recovery and cannot 
now successfully assert a claim against his 
insurer. 
The above discussion being dispositive of 
the issue of the availability of further no-
fault benefits, defendant has not breached 
its contractual obligations with plaintiff to 
give rise to a claim for punitive damages. 
The summary judgment is therefore af-
firmed. Costs to defendant. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, 
WILKINS and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
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agree as a condition to being allowed to con-
tinue to write insurance in the state of Utah: 
(a) That where its insured is or would be 
held legally liable for the personal injuries 
sustained by any person to whom benefits 
required under this act have been paid by 
another insurer, including the state insurance 
fund, it will reimburse such other insurer for 
the payment of such benefits, but not in ex-
cess of the amount of damages so recovera-
ble. 
DUPUIS •. NIELSON 
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the contract would be unconscionable.1 2. New Trial 
Nevertheless, the issue was not raised be-
low, nor on this appeal. Consequently, I 
concur in affirming the judgment. 
Utah 685 
Clarice DUPUIS (Heater), Plaintiff and 
Appellant and Cross-Respondent, 
v. 
Edwin Cyrill NIELSON, Defendant and 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
No. 16865. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 21, 1981. 
Driver of car, upon recovery against 
driver of pickup in personal injury action 
based on automobile accident, filed motion 
for additur or new trial based on inade-
quate damages. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., 
J., denied motion, and driver of car appeal-
ed. Pickup driver cross-appealed claiming 
right of setoff, The Supreme Court, Stew-
art, J., held that: (1) evidence did not com-
pel finding that reasonable persons would 
have reached different measure of damages 
which would have enabled court to grant 
motion for additur, and (2) pickup driver 
was not entitled to reduction of car driver's 
award of general damages to offset no-
fault insurance payment for household ser-
vice benefits. 
Affirmed. 
1. New Trial <s=> 161(1) 
When damages are not so inadequate 
as to indicate disregard of evidence by jury, 
court is not empowered to entertain motion 
for additur. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
59. 
161(1) 
Evidence, in personal injury action aris-
ing from automobile accident, including evi-
dence that injured party was under stress 
for reasons unrelated to accident, did not 
compel finding that reasonable persons 
would have reached different measure of 
damages such as would empower court to 
entertain motion for additur. Rules of Civ-
il Procedure, Rule 59. 
3. Automobiles <s=*251.12 
Basic principle of No-Fault Act is to 
prevent double recovery by no-fault in-
sured. U.C.A.1953, 31-41-1 et seq. 
4. Automobiles <s=>251.17 
Where jury award to car driver in per-
sonal injury action based on automobile ac-
cident did not include award for household 
service benefits, pickup driver involved in 
accident was not entitled to reduction of car 
driver's award of general damages to offset 
no-fault insurance payments made for 
household service benefits. U.C.A.1953, 31-
41-11. 
Samuel King and James E. Hawkes, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant and 
cross-respondent. 
Frank N. Karras, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent and cross-appel-
lant. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Plaintiff, upon recovering against de-
fendant in a personal injury action, filed a 
motion for an additur or new trial based on 
inadequate damages. It is from the lower 
court's denial of that motion that plaintiff 
herein appeals. 
The accident in which the alleged dam-
ages were sustained occurred when defend-
ant was driving his pick-up truck and 
struck the rear of plaintiffs car which had 
stopped at an intersection for a red light. 
A directed verdict on the issue of liability 
was entered in favor of plaintiff at the 
conclusion of all evidence. 
See Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 
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The jury awarded appellant $1,000 in 
general damages; $686.73 in special medical 
damages; and $100 for loss of earnings. In 
support of her contention that the damages 
were grossly inadequate, plaintiff refers to 
the following evidence: She received medi-
cal treatment from two physicians, one 
physical therapist, and one chiropractor. 
She maintains that she was forced to leave 
her employment a couple of months after 
the accident in order to convalesce. At the 
time of trial she was working with her 
husband painting signs and was not able to 
pursue her former employment as a bus 
driver because of her injuries. She further 
testified that she suffered continual head-
aches, pain when bending her neck, and 
pain in performing simple tasks such as 
opening jars and dressing herself. 
Defendant, of course, argues that the 
jury's award of damages was not inade-
quate. In support of the jury verdict, de-
fendant points to the following evidence: 
(1) Of all the doctors who allegedly had 
treated plaintiff, only Dr. Thomas Soder-
berg was produced at trial, a doctor whom 
she had visited on only a few occasions. No 
physician testified that plaintiff could not 
work because of injuries sustained in the 
accident; the only evidence on this issue 
was appellant's testimony. (2) Plaintiffs 
testimony further disclosed that during the 
period in question she was undergoing emo-
tional problems arising from a divorce, she 
had remarried, and her husband had experi-
enced a heart attack. Defendant contends 
that the above circumstances required 
plaintiff to leave the area and that was the 
reason for her quitting her job. (3) Medical 
records demonstrated that plaintiff was un-
der stress for reasons unrelated to the acci-
dent. 
[1,2] It has been held that this Court 
may order an additur or in the alternative a 
new trial in appropriate circumstances. Bo-
don v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d 
826 (1958). However, when the damages 
1. Defendant's claim is misnamed. The concept 
of a set-off does not apply to the instant cir-
cumstances, see Robison v. Robison, c 
are not so inadequate as to indicate a disre-
gard of the evidence by the jury, a court is 
not empowered to entertain a motion for an 
additur. Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Plaintiffs contention that the 
award of damages is inadequate in light of 
the evidence is without merit The evi-
dence does not compel a finding that rea-
sonable persons would have reached a dif-
ferent measure of damages. Jensen v. Ea-
kins, Utah, 575 P.2d 179 (1978). 
On a cross-appeal defendant claims a 
right of set-off.1 Prior to trial, plaintiffs 
own no-fault insurer paid plaintiff no-fault 
benefits pursuant to §§ 31-41-1 et seq. of 
the No-Fault Act. Defendant's insurer, in 
accordance with § 31-41-11, reimbursed the 
no-fault insurer in the sum of $494.09 for 
medical expenses; $1,200 for loss of earn-
ings; and $708 for loss of household serv-
ices. As a result the trial court reduced the 
judgment against defendant to reflect sums 
received by plaintiff from her no-fault in-
surer for medical expenses and loss of earn-
ings, leaving a balance due plaintiff of 
$192.64 for special damages. The court re-
fused to award any offset against the gen-
eral damage part of the verdict for the $708 
which defendant's insurer had paid the no-
fault insurer as reimbursement for house-
hold service benefits. Defendant contends 
that the court erred in this refusal. We 
disagree. 
[3] Several cases recently decided by 
this Court have dealt with the respective 
rights of an injured party, the tortfeasor, a 
no-fault insurer, and the tortfeasor's insur-
er. Street v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, Utah, 
609 P.2d 1343 (1980); Allstate v. Jv/e, Utah, 
606 P.2d 1197 (1980); Jones v. Transamerica 
Ins. Co^ Utah, 592 ?J2d 609 (1979). These 
cases are predicated upon the proposition 
that a basic principle of the No-Fault Act is 
to prevent double recovery by the no-fault 
insured. 
[4] To the extent that plaintiff would 
receive double recovery of a particular type 
Transit Co., 46 Utah 426, 151 P. 49 (1915). The 
rights claimed belong to defendant's insurer, 
* ~~ defendant 
WALKER 
Citeas,Utatf» 
of damage, an adjustment of the judgment 
vev \Ja\s> a^a& ^ ^s» fe^TO^rafe. \LW*%N%T, t\>fe 
judgment may only be reduced to the ex-
tent it specifically and identifiably included 
special damages of the same types as those 
for which no-fault benefits had previously 
been received. This is consonant with the 
basic procedure outlined in Allstate v. Ivie, 
supra. Under Allstate a judgment for 
damages may only reflect damages suffered 
over and above those particular types of 
damages reimbursed by the no-fault insur-
er. Defendant is not entitled to a reduction 
of plaintiffs award of general damages to 
offset no-fault insurance payments for dif-
ferent types or categories of damages. See 
Transamerica Insurance Company v. 
Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972); 
see also Street v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 
supra, wherein a similar factual situation 
arose and the same result was reached. 
Also see Brophy v. Ogden Rapid Transit 
Company, 46 Utah 426, 151 P. 49 (1915). 
The judgment of the lower court is af-
firmed. No costs. 
HALL and CROCKETT,* JJ., and MAU-
RICE HARDING, Retired District Judge, 
concur. 
MAUGHAN, C. J., does not participate 
herein; HARDING, Retired District Judge, 
sat. 
WILKINS, J., heard the arguments but 
resigned before the opinion was filed. 
v. STATE 
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Willie Mae WALKER, aka Dell Walker 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Utah, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 16705. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 23, 1981. 
Defendant was convicted of unlawful 
possession of controlled substance with in-
tent to distribute for value, and following 
her later discovery that prosecution was 
made aware of and failed to disclose during 
trial certain evidence favorable to her de-
fense, she petitioned for writ of coram nobis 
or in the alternative writ of habeas corpus. 
Tne Tmr& district Zonti, %£ti Y ^ e Zomiiy, 
Peter F. Leary, J., denied her petition, and 
she appealed. The Supreme Court, Mau-
ghan, C. J., held that: (1) prosecutor's ac-
tion in failing to disclose contradicting tes-
timony to plaintiff or court and his reliance 
on false impression created by original tes-
timony in both closing argument and sum-
mation to jury constituted prosecutorial 
misconduct analogous to knowing use of 
false testimony; (2) there existed reasona-
ble likelihood that false impression fostered 
by prosecutor could have affected judgment 
of jury; and (3) prosecutor's actions de-
prived defendant of fair trial and constitut-
ed denial of due process. 
Reversed and remanded for new trial. 
Hall, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
L Criminal Law <s=>706(2) 
Any conviction obtained by knowing 
use of false testimony is fundamentally un-
fair and totally incompatible with rudimen-
tary demands of justice. 
2. Constitutional Law <s=>268(9) 
Conviction obtained through use of 
false evidence known to be such by repre-
sentatives of state must fall under due 
process clause of Federal and State Consti-
tutions if there is any reasonable likelihood 
that such false testimony could have affect-
!
 CROCKETT, Justice, concurred in this case be-
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number of cores. The court was justified in 
its action but did not go far enough. We 
feel the court also should have considered 
the parties' course of performance and al-
lowed defendant a reasonable time after 
termination to recover cores from its late 
1974 purchases. Our position is supported 
by the Code, which provides, "[°]^ 'termina-
tion' all obligations which are still execute 
ry on both sides are discharged but any 
right based on prior breach or performance 
survives:' 70A-2-106(3). Thus, under the 
Code defendant's right to a reasonable time 
to gather cores for turn-in is not destroyed 
by termination of the parties' relationship. 
We conclude, after termination, defend-
ant was entitled to a reasonable time in 
which to recover cores from its late 1974 
purchases. We do not disturb the trial 
court's amended holding allowing defend-
ant to turn in 2,450 cores from purchases in 
1975. We place an important qualification 
on our holding, however. Although defend-
ant is entitled to turn in enough usable 
cores to cover his $4,807.40 debt, defendant 
is not entitled to turn in cores for cash. 
Throughout the course of their dealings the 
parties operated on the basis that credit 
^rather than cash would be allowed for core 
rturn-ins.. It would be unjust for the court 
to restructure their understanding at this 
point. In summary, defendant should be 
allowed a reasonable time to turn hT to 
plaintiff, up to 6,410 usable cores/ This 
figure includes the 2,450 cores the trial 
court allowed defendant to turn in. Any 
number short of 6,410 not turned in, at the 
close of the reasonable time period, shall be 
paid for in cash. 
Remanded to the trial court for judgment 
in accordance with this opinion. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS and 
STEWART, JJ., concur 
HALL J
 F concurs in the result. 
( O iKEYNUMSaSYSTEM; 
Mildred A. STREET, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
The FARMERS INSURANCE EX-
CHANGE, a corporation, and Preferred 
Risk Mutual Insurance Company, a cor-
poration, Defendants and Respondents. 
No, 16109. 
Supreme Court ot Utah. 
March 28, 1980. 
Insured brought action seeking order 
compelling no-fault automobile insurer to 
endorse and deliver draft issued by automo-
bile liability insurer of tort-feasor, with 
whom insured had entered into settlement 
agreement, to insured, and insured, also 
sought award of attorney fees of one third 
of amount received on behalf of no-fault 
insurer. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Maurice Harding, J., entered 
judgment after granting insurer's motion to 
dismiss, and appeal was taken. The Su-„ 
preme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) 
no-fault automobile insurer did not have-
interest in proceeds of settlement, which 
concerned payments for inability to per-* 
form household services, between its in-
sured and third-party tort-feasor by virtue 
of claimed right of subrogation pursuant to 
Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act, 
and (2) remand was required to determine 
factual issues concerning insured's entitle-
ment to attornev fees. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Hall, J., concurred in part and dissent-
vi in part and filed opinion. 
1. Insurance <8=>60O5 
No-fault automobile Insurer did not 
have interest in proceeds of settlement, 
i.:-u —earned payments for inability to 
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sured and.third-party tort-feasor by virtue 
of claimed right of subrogation pursuant to 
Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. 
U.OA.1953, 31-41-1 et seq., 31-41-
6(l)(bXii). 
2. Insurance <s=*601 
General rule that subrogated insurance 
carrier must pay its fair share of attorney 
fees and costs if it has given notice and does 
nothing to assist in prosecution of claim 
applies in situation^ in which benefit is con-
ferred upon insurer as result of mistake, 
such as when there is in fact no subrogation 
right in the insurer to any of sums obtained 
in settlement. 
3. Appeal and Error <s=> 1177(8) 
In action in which insured sought rea-
sonable attorney fees for benefit conferred 
on no-fault automobile insurer as result of 
settlement of action .against. third-party 
tort-feasor, remand was required.to deter-
mine insured's entitlement to attorney-fees 
where no factual findings were made as to 
whether insurer in fact benefited, from in-, 
sured's recovery to extent, that drafts was 
allegedly endorsed and delivered to the in-
surer in amount representing reimburse-
ment for medical-expenses,.lost wages and 
property damage, and as to whether insured 
did so in mistaken belief as to nature of 
subrogation rights provided under norfault 
insurance statutes. U.CA.1953, 31-41—ket 
seq. 
F. Alan Fletcher & Patrick J. Garver, of 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff and appellant..;. 
-A. -Alma Nelson of Hanson & Garrett, 
Frank N. Karras, Salt. Lake City,-for de-
fendants and respondents. 
STEWART, Justice: 
The issue in this case" is whether a no-
fault insurance carrier has an interest in • 
the proceeds of a settlement betwe*™-'**« 
tue of a right of subrogation claimed pursu-
ant to the Utah Automobile No-Fault In-
surance Act See §§ 31-41-1 et seg., Utah 
Code Ann. (1953), as amended. Plaintiff 
also seeks an award of attorney's fees to be 
paid out of any recovery Farmers Insurance 
Exchange may obtain based on a right of 
subrogation. 
The district court dismissed plaintiffs 
complaint to compel her no-fault insurer, 
the defendant Farmers, to endorse a draft 
made out jointly to plaintiff and Farmers 
by Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Com-
pany. Preferred Risk, the insurer of the 
tortfeasor, tendered the draft in settlement 
of plaintiffs claim. Plaintiff seeks reversal 
of the lower court's dismissal and claims 
that Farmers had no right by way of subro-
gation to share in the settlement amount. 
The plaintiff, Mildred A. Street, was in-
jured in a collision between her automobile 
and one operated by Janet M. Clayton in 
August 1975. Pursuant to the terms of 
Street's no-fault insurance policy with 
Farmers Exchange, Farmers paid Street 
$10,132.47, of which $3,233.10 was for medi-
cal - expenses, $1,816.40 for lost wages, 
$702.97 for property damage, and $4,380 for 
inability to perform household services 
(hereafter "loss of services"). 
.The payment for loss of services was 
made in accordance with the insurance poli-
cy and as required by § 31-41^1)(bXiiX 
which provides for payment to be made for 
loss of services at the rate of $12 per day. 
"in lieu, of reimbursement for expenses 
which would have been reasonably incurred 
for services that, but for. the injury, the 
injured person would have performed for 
hiss.household and* regardless of whether 
•any of these expenses are actually^in-
curred." Street did not actually" incur' "ex-
penses for "loss of services," since substi-
tute household services were provided vol-
untarily and without compensation by 
Street's neighbors, friends, and family 
members. 
£H^+»3 damages exceeded the threshold 
03
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tortfeasor, see § 31-41-9, and she filed suit 
against Ms, Clayton seeking general and 
special damages for her injuries. This ac-
tion was concluded by a settlement. Prior 
to settlement of the tort action, Farmers 
placed Street and the tortfeasor's insurer, 
Preferred Risk, on notice of its claim to 
subrogation for the amount Farmers paid 
to Street 
Farmers agreed to discount its subroga-
tion claim by 20% in the event the parties to 
the action entered into a settlement This 
was based on the comparative negligence 
ratio between plaintiff and tortfeasor which 
plaintiff and Preferred Risk had agreed to. 
It was agreed that plaintiff was 20% negli-
gent and the tortfeasor, 80%. 
The stipulation for dismissal and release 
provided for a total payment of $14,000, 
broken down as follows: 
(1) Special damages of $7,256.14, repre-
senting $3,165.31 for medical expenses, 
$2,480.45 for lost wages, and $610.38 for 
property damages; and (2) General dam-
ages in the amount of $6,743.86. The stipu-
lation between the parties contains the fol-
lowing language: 
Plaintiffs hereby acknowledge such claim 
and agree to pay Farmers Insurance 
Group such amounts, not exceeding the 
tabove itemization, which may be deter-
mined to be due and owing to Farmers 
Insurance Group pursuant to its subroga-
tion rights. In entering into this stipula-
tion, however, plaintiffs do not concede 
that Farmers Insurance Group's claim of 
subrogation rights for payments made for 
"services" is valid or that plaintiffs have 
an obligation to repay to Farmers Insur-
ance Group any amount paid by it pursu-
ant to the provisions of Section 31-41-
6(lXbXii), [U.C.A.], as set forth in the 
Personal Injury Protection Endorsement 
to plaintiffs' insurance policy. 
Preferred Risk issued three drafts pay-
able as follows: 
1. A draft payable to Jack L. and Mil-
dred A Street and Farmers Insurance 
Group in the amount of $4,601.98 for medi-
cal expenses, lost wages, and property dam-
ape. 
2. A draft payable to Jack L. and Mil-
dred A. Street and Farmers Insurance 
Group in the amount of $3,504 for "loss of 
services.** 
.1 A draft payable to Jack L. and Mil-
dred A. Street and their attorneys in the 
amount of $5,894.02, representing the bal-
ance of the settlement amount. 
The Streets endorsed and delivered the 
first draft to Farmers. The Streets refused 
to endorse the second draft and claimed 
that Farmers is not entitled to reimburse-
ment for loss of services payments because 
loss of services was not a recoverable dam-
age item. Specifically, they claimed that 
since this item could not have been recov-
ered from the tortfeasor by way of dam-
ages, Farmers had no right of subrogation 
as to i t 
Plaintiff filed suit in district court seek-
ing an order compelling Farmers to endorse 
and deliver the second draft to the plaintiff 
and to restrain Fanners and Preferred Risk 
from arbitrating the reimbursement issue. 
Plaintiff also sought an award of attorney's 
fees of % of the amount received on behalf 
of Farmers. 
The trial court granted a motion to dis-
miss the complaint on the ground that a. 
no-fault insurance carrier is entitled to re-
imbursement to the extent that the insured 
recovered damages from the tortfeasor or, 
Its insurance carrier, even though the 
amount recovered did not include the type 
of damages for which the no-faalt insurer 
had made direct payments to the no-fault' 
insured. Thus, according to the trial court's' 
ruling, a no-fault insurer could collect out 
of damages attributable to pain and suffer-
ing sums paid for an entirely different type 
of damage, L e., loss of services payments to' 
the insured. 
[1J Farmers* claim for reimbursement 
in this case cannot be sustained. Allstate 
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Insurance Co. v. Ivie, Utah, 606 P.2d 1197 
(1980), is dispositive. It holds that the Utah 
No-Fault Insurance Act does not contem-
plate the granting of a right of subrogation 
to a no-fault insurer in an action by the 
no-fault insured against a third-party tort-
feasor. The right of subrogation, as ex-
plained in Ivie. is a rigtitr fr% **» w w , i g ^ T>_ 
&n arbitration proceeding between insur-
ance companies of the respective parties y 
that double recovery can be avoided, unnec-
essary litigation made less likely, and the 
inherent conflicts between the insured and 
the insurer avoided. 
The plaintiff also contends that she" is 
entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee for 
the benefit conferred on Farmers as a re-
sult of a settlement of her action against 
the third-party tortfeasor. The general 
rule is that a subrogated insurance carrier 
must pay its fair share of attorney's fees 
and costs if it has given notice and does 
nothing to assist in the prosecution of the 
claim. Cedarholm v. State Farm Mutual 
Insurance Companies, 81 Idaho 136, 338 
P.2d 93 (1959); ^ State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co. v. Clinton, 267 Or. 653, 
518 P.2d 645 (1974); Iowa National Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Huntley, 78 Wyo. 380, 328 
P.2d 569 (1958); 44 AmJur^d Insurance. 
§ 1846 (1969); and Annot.2 A.L.R.3d 1441 
(1965). 
[2] The problem in this- case is that 
there 'was in fact no subrogation right in 
Farmers to any of the sums" obtained in 
settlement, as we held in Ivie,-supra. How-
ever, if a benefit was conferred on Farmers 
as a result of a mistake, the general rule 
which governs attorney's fees in a proper 
subrogation claim should be extended to the 
instant situation. Had Farmers been com-
pelled to collect from Preferred Risk under 
the rule enunciated in Ivie, supra, it would 
necessarily have incurred expenses. Equity 
and good conscience require that Farmers 
should not have a free ride from plaintiffs 
efforts if such be the case. 
1. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie, Utah, 606 ?2d 
1197 (1980). 
[3] The resolution of plaintiffs claim 
for attorney's fees must depend upon find-
ings of fact to be made by the trial court. 
Since the court dismissed plaintiffs com-
plaint without taking evidence, no factual 
findings were made as to whether Farmers 
in fact benefited from Street's recovery to 
the extent that the Streets allegedly en-
dorsed and delivered a draft to Farmers in 
the amount of $4,601.98, which represented 
reimbursement for medical expenses, lost 
wages, and property damage, and whether 
plaintiff did so in a mistaken belief as to 
the nature of the subrogation rights provid-
ed by the No-Fault Insurance Statute. If 
such a benefit were conferred upon Farm-
ers by the actions of the plaintiff, plaintiff 
is entitled- to a reasonable attorney's fee 
from Farmers to the extent that Farmers 
benefited in the settlement secured by 
plaintiff. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of 
the lower court and remand the case to the 
trial court for further proceedings in accord 
with this opinion. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN and 
WILKINS, JJ., concur. 
HALL, Justice (concurring and dissent-
ing): 
I agree that Farmers has no right^ of 
subrogation.1 However, for that very rea-
son (i. e., as a matter of law), it is * my 
opinion that plaintiff is not entitled to at-
torneys' fees.' * Simply' stated, I deem it 
wholly inappropriate to compensate plain-
tiff for "protecting" a right of subrogation 
when in fact no such right existed to be 
protected. Farmers' only right to reim-
bursement of PIP payments is through 
mandatory, binding arbitration,2 to which 
plaintiff is barred as a party. 
Furthermore, the judgment having been 
reversed, plaintiffs demand that Farmers 
and Preferred Risk be restrained from arbi-
trating the reimbursement issue would ap-
2. Id., interpreting U.C.A., 1953. 31-41-11. 
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pear to be revitalized. As indicated supra, arbitration. On remand, findings should be 
it is my opinion that the arbitration is only made on this issue as well 
between insurers and that plaintiff should 
be precluded from participating in the pro- ^ivY_ 
ceeding in any way. At the very least, a (o §^*|gjBER_^^-
factual question exists as to whether plain- viz ~r-r^-^ 
tiff is entitled to. equitable relief as would 
deprive, Farmers of its statutory right to 
